Operation Iraqi Freedom Case Study

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

In the weeks immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the nation watched anxiously as the Bush Administration declared war on terror. Following the invasion of Afghanistan to hunt down those responsible for this horrific incident, the U.S. swiftly changed its priority to invading Iraq and overthrowing its government by capturing its president, Saddam Hussein. In this mission, the U.S. scrambled to find a connection between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist organization al-Qa’ida. Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, many scholars have focused on the effects of the Iraq War, speculating on the Bush Administration’s motives for the decision. While some within scholarly circles have attributed the invasion

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

…The U.S. began the Iraq war with the goal of ridding the region of a tyrannical government that didn’t protect its people. However, a decade later, at the conclusion of the U.S. military mission in Iraq, the people are perhaps worse off than they were before the

Following the events of September 11th, President Bush was looked to as a leader to lead the country out of chaos. “In the weeks after the attack, Bush’s approval rating rose to 90 percent—the highest recorded job-approval rating in U.S. presidential history” ( millercenter). Nowadays however, Bush is often criticized for the actions he took during the invasions. “The Bush administration’s strategy had been to reduce the U.S. military presence as Iraq’s stability improved. Yet the goal proved unattainable, owing in part to the power vacuum left by the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the rise of sectarian violence within the two dominant strains of Islam in Iraq” (millercenter). Of course hindsight is always 20/20, but many blame the Bush Administration for the power vacuum created in the Middle East. Bush’s foreign policy typically surrounded a strong use of force and led to increase in terrorism surveillance creating a discussion that is hotly debated today Following the end of Bush’s second term, Barack Obama had won the presidency and the work in the Middle East was far from over. Obama proved to have a different ideology from Bush, wanting to remove troops from the Middle East, something he

The relationship between the United States and Iraq has been a rather complicated relationship. This relationship can be classified as a roller coaster ride that last through out history. The United States and Iraq relationship became rocky in 1958 when King Faisal was overthrown and Iraq signed with the Soviet Union. Because of the relationship that the United States had with the Soviet Union this made Iraq and the United States relationship a little questionable. In 1967 Iraq broke all ties with the United States when they decided to join ranks in the protest of the United States and Israeli strategic alliance. This decision that the Iraqi made once a country we were allies to a country we do not trust but we will deal with, a country

The mission command activities of lead, direct, and assess are tools that a commander will use to help make decisions, interpret results, and stay up to date on current and future operations. Using this framework during the occupation and rebuilding of the province of Nineveh and its capital city of Mosul, Iraq, General Petraeus kept within his higher commander’s guidance and successfully reestablished basic services and security to the city. After toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division undertook the task of rebuilding and restoring order to the populous city of Mosul. By utilizing the mission command activities of lead, direct, and assess, Petraeus and his staff were able to accomplish this mission

In 2003, George W. Bush invaded Iraq, believing that the country’s president Saddam Hussein was using weapons of mass destruction against the people of Iraq. This war started a larger war, named “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. The consequence of this inessential war were the lives of over 4000 Americans, over 1 trillion dollars in spending, and superfluous tension in the Middle East. Though there are many theories on why Bush invaded Iraq, the one that makes the most sense is overconfidence. Simply put, George W. Bush and his administration had faulty and ambiguous evidence, but their overconfidence and pride lead them to put the war into action anyway. This self-assuredness lead to the expiration of Bush’s tenure and the broken hearts of many

Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and, therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key components necessary when planning such as “task organization, mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions and control measures” (ADRP 5-0, para 2-69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became apparent. In the case study there are missing elements “Initially Task Force Mountain was not designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems” (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003).

On September 11, 2001, a great tragedy struck the heart of New York City in the United States of America. A terrorist led group pulled off a surprise attack on the twin towers with hijacked planes that were used as weapons to destroy to them. Thousands of Americans lost their lives in the attack and many citizens tried their best to save any struggling survivors from the rubble. This single moment marked the start of a series of events that would lead to the Iraq war. During the war, there were objectives that the United States along with its allies wanted to achieve in order to bring peace to Iraq. These objectives included the end military activity in Iraq, overthrowing the Iraqi government, and the capture of Saddam, the war would last over a decade from 2003-2011. After the war was officially ended by President George W. Bush, many politicians were satisfied with the outcome of the war calling it a “Mission Accomplished”. However, current events have proven that the outcome of the war has failed to end the conflict within the country prompting more acts of violence, terrorist influence, and foreign intervention.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Despite shortcomings with the decision to go to war, how the war was actually carried out posed more problems. The administration had a very favorable view of how the war would go and how post-war issues would work themselves out. They were under the impression that this war would be like any other situation where a new government was put up, like in Japan, Germany, or in many former Soviet states. The US has never dealt with this situation in the Arab world, though. In many cases, administration’s expectations for the war were simply unrealistic – some estimates had all forces out of Iraq within a year and one comment led people to believe that Iraq’s reconstruction would only cost the US $1.7 billion.