The rapid collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein marked a defining moment for advocates of regime change. Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath produced a number of challenging problems for Iraqis, their neighbours, the international community and, not least, the supporters of the invasion. For the last, these problems included the unexpected difficulty of the first phase of the campaign; the failure to find weapons of mass destruction; the lack of effective planning for the aftermath; and the continuing violent opposition to the new regime. This chapter examines key features of neo-conservative thinking in retrospect and prospect after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Neo-conservatives had long argued for, and presumably prepared
Invading Iraq was—and remains—a highly debated and controversial decision within both world politics and the academic disciplines of politics and international relations. With a growing number of deaths, rising tensions in the Middle East, and a failure to find any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the voices condemning the Bush administration have been increasing ever since the decision to go to war was announced. While many scholars have traditionally argued against the war, this paper will argue that the Iraq War can be justified.
The start of the 2003 Iraq War has been debated by many historians. The arguments made by Krebs and Lobasz in their article “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11 - Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq” are very persuasive, as are the arguments made by David Lake in “What Caused the Iraq War?”. These arguments center around the mindset of the Bush Administration, which was fearful of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and eager to use the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as rationale for war regardless of clear evidence. Other historians have presented considerable arguments as well, such as Debs and Monteiro, who argue that Iraq’s possibility of having nuclear weapons posed concern to the Bush administration. However, the best rationale for the start of the 2003 Iraq War combines the coercion model put forth by Krebs and Lobasz with the Lake assertion that the post-war rebuilding was not adequately considered. Krebs and Lobasz have the most salient arguments on manipulations of information, with insightful points regarding the motives of the Bush administration. Their points, however, aren’t complete as David Lake contains stronger information in certain parts of the debate. Lake adds important observations about Saddam’s inability to admit to not having nuclear weapons and the U.S.’s failure to estimate the costs of the post-war were key causes for the start of the war.
The relationship between the United States and Iraq has been a rather complicated relationship. This relationship can be classified as a roller coaster ride that last through out history. The United States and Iraq relationship became rocky in 1958 when King Faisal was overthrown and Iraq signed with the Soviet Union. Because of the relationship that the United States had with the Soviet Union this made Iraq and the United States relationship a little questionable. In 1967 Iraq broke all ties with the United States when they decided to join ranks in the protest of the United States and Israeli strategic alliance. This decision that the Iraqi made once a country we were allies to a country we do not trust but we will deal with, a country
The war in Iraq lasted for eight years and resulted in many casualties; the cost of the war was tremendous. The reason for the war changed as time went by, starting with getting rid of weapons of mass destruction and then, when the weapons of mass destruction were not found, the name changed to Iraqi Freedom. A debate between two writers that emerged of the war in Iraq shows different perspectives. Writer John Mueller, who holds the Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at Ohio State University, makes the case against war on Iraq. Also, writer Brink Lindsey, who is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is in favor of this war. This paper will examine the perspectives as reported by both John Mueller and Brink Lindsey as they argue about the case of the United States invading Iraq. I will conclude from the evidence that the war on Iraq was unnecessary and counterproductive because it increased not decreased the terrorism, refugee crises, cost lives and money without achieving any of its objectives.
U.S. marines once stated, “The only thing you should feel when you shoot your enemy is the recoil from your rifle.” The Iraq War started in March 2003, President George Bush accusing Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein of harboring weapons. President Obama promised that he was going to bring the troops home from Iraq. Our troops should be removed from Iraq because the war has cost us billions of dollars and it was America’s greatest tragedy.
In March 2003, President George W. Bush announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began: a mission to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein, ensure that Hussein has no ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, and pledge to employ direct, pre-emptive strikes against Iraq to protect the United States. The United States government claimed they wanted the Iraqi people to achieve a united, stable and free country which would require our “sustained commitment” (History). After the United States’ Government deposed the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein, the divide between the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’is deepened. As the government disappeared, so did the control between the Iraqi groups. Violent conflict ensued for years as the groups competed for power (Iraq Timeline). Despite Iraq’s recognized borders, exercised sovereignty, and international recognition, the people remained segregated, and even pitted against each other.
The decision to invade Iraq was perhaps the largest foreign policy blunder in modern Western history. Its immense cost—in the thousands of lives lost, trillions of dollars spent, and an unquantifiable amount of political capital squandered—represents an immense failure at many levels of government. Today, even though Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and security state have been dismantled, Iraq remains ruined: its economy is in shambles, sectarian strife is rampant, and the Islamic State, a terrorist army, controls much of the northern and western parts of the nation. Iraq is a “state” in name only. In her memoir “The Unraveling” documenting her experiences in Iraq, Professor Emma Sky argues that to identify who is responsible for this failure, blame cannot be placed on just one actor. Both Western policymaking blunders—from the marginalization of experts to de-Baathification to the support of Nouri al-Maliki—and Iraqi politicians’ self-serving agendas acted in concert to exacerbate the sectarianism that ultimately tore the country apart.
The 2003 U.S. led invasion removed Saddam Hussein, an authoritarian from the Sunni minority who governed over a Shia-majority country. After the American invasion, Phase IV, the occupation of Iraq was established to aid Iraq in developing a new democratic regime. Iraqi inhabitants were strongly opposed to having American forces rehabilitate their country, especially after Operation Peninsula Strike. The operation involved the U.S. troops pursuing members of the Fedayeen Saddam militia, an aggressive power devoted to Hussein alongside high-ranking members of the Baath Party and former Iraqi security agencies. Together policy and actions dictated by the U.S. civil and military agents alongside Iraq’s preexisting social conditions, communitarian
Level three difficulty of recovery. The Iran Iraq War is the only case study of a level three disaster within this review. It is considered a one of a kind and instrumental surprise (Mitchell, 1996). A level three disaster is the most difficult to respond to and recover from. Some acts of war mimicked industrial disasters that occur during peacetime. Fires and explosions are examples of these types of surprises that occurred. Other wartime acts included deliberate destruction and contamination by chemical weapons (Mitchell, 1996).
It’s 2007 and MARK HOPKINS (23) is a soldier in the Iraq War. When his unit is attacked, he helps save the life of his soldier friend, RAY JOHNSON (22). Ray loses a leg in the attack.
In the months leading to March 2003 invasion of Iraq there was significant debate between actors, domestically and internationally, over if and how the US should overthrow Saddam Hussein and his oppressive regime. The two main camps on how to negotiate the issue were realist and liberal views on international policy making. For realists the view was held that decision making should be made in the interests of the nation with or without international consent. Contrary, for liberals the ideology was held that policy decisions should be made based on what will benefit the country while also working through and with international partners. The ideology of the two main groups, realists and liberals, focused on to what extent, if any, the US should seek international approval from the UN Security Council in its endeavors to invade Iraq.
Ten years after the war in Iraq, the story is eerily similar, and even more devastating. Iraq is a tale of two countries: one Iraq is for the wealthy and privileged business elites and their government lackeys, while the other Iraq is lacking clean water, a clean environment, basic services and safety. If you're part of the latter Iraq, it's as if the war started this year.
Operational Design (OD) provides a useful framework to analyze the United States (US) military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign plan. Using the OD framework, the US OIF campaign plan from 2002 to 2007 was poor at planning and execution. First, this essay evaluates how OIF planners and commanders understood the Operational Environment (OE) and defined the overall problem. Second, this dissertation assesses strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach using end state, supported objectives, Lines of Operation (LOO), center of gravity, anticipation, and effects. Next, this paper gauges how planners and commanders assessed the initial OIF campaign plan and refined their operational approach over time. Lastly, this essay evaluates the degree to which current joint planning policy and doctrine (APEX and JP 5-0) incorporate lessons from OIF.
With the benefit of hindsight, many people consider the invasion of Iraq a failure. After the initial invasion of Iraq, things go worse instead of better within the country. Ultimately both the United States and Iraq payed a heavy cost due to Western intervention, which this paper will later discuss. The purpose of this research paper is to the Iraq invasion which includes the events leading to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the consequences. The purpose of examining the Iraq invasion as a whole is because a proper understanding of the event cannot be achieved without proper context. Actions have consequences, which this paper will explore. Although the invasion of Iraq took place in 2003, the first paragraph will discuss the country
Various theories will be analyzed in this essay in order to conclude whether or not the conflict between the U.S and Iraq was justified, legal, and why it was initiated. Liberal and realist perspectives will be compared in order to establish whose opinion of the war was the most correct and reasonable. There are many theories regarding this conflict, for instance, Iraq was thought to be in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and as a result, it was believed that Iraq posed a military threat to the United States. Others believe that the principal motivation for the conflict was to gain further access to Iraqi oil and in fact had nothing to do with the possession of weapons. Many also believe that the invasion of Iraq is the main