Operational Environment

Knowledge is the key to being able to come up with an effective plan. Therefore, the more knowledge held the better the plan will be. When it comes to irregular warfare, Marines will need to have knowledge on many different things, the first being the enemy. Acquiring every detail possible about the enemy will give Marines an understanding of what exactly the enemy is capable of with the numbers, assets, and leadership they have. Second is the enemy’s target population. Having a greater knowledge on the population will allow Marines to understand how the enemy might use the resources available to sway the population. The last piece of knowledge is history. General James Mattis said, “We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of their experience.” By studying and obtaining the knowledge of conflicts throughout history, Marines will be able to use that information to devise a course of

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

Dr. Williamson Murray once declared a want to develop his Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) seminar students into hand grenades. His comments were, of course, figurative, but Murray communicated a vision: his company grade students would read more deeply, think more critically, write with greater effect, and ultimately be more willing to challenge conventional wisdom than their peers. Murray, with EWS, engineered the course, from initial selection through the final seminars, to meet his goal of a competent, well-armed officer prepared to make and recommend just decisions grounded in history.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

In some countries people, do not have the freedom to choose their own path. Many people live in places with so much conflict and destruction that they are force to follow the orders of a political lieder and force to make decision that are not in accordance to what they believe, but they do it because they are loyalty to their country, family and friends Pauline M. Kaurin provide a scenario of a soldiers killing civilian people that they confused with a suicide bomber, then she asked, “When is killing murder and when is it a legitimate act of war? Whom can one legitimately kill in war?” (Kaurin in page 41). She argues that during combat distinction from the enemy and civilian should be relevant to preserve the essence of true morality. In the contrast to Achilles the essence of true morality is irrelevant when he claims that no Trojan should keep their life, he swore death to all Trojan. (book XXI). During a time, war, is important to accept the fact of the situation in the eyes a devastation believing that one fate must be accepted in other to continue living or accepting the consequence and the faith of their own

This quote in the first chapter of the book sets the overall tone. The author Tim O’Brien uses his language through out the book in an extremely straightforward manner. He does not sugar coat the way going to war and being in a war is. He does not use stories of heroes,

US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) lack of understanding the operational environment led to a poor definition of the problem. The key to understanding the operational environment is the ability to describe the current and desired operational environment. (JPiii8). CENTCOM’s planning did reflect a good understanding of the current operational environment. CENTCOM understood the influences Iraq’s current political structure

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

Gioe Melaney is the general director of Southern Toro – a subsidiary company included in the distribution system of Toron Coporation in Galveston, Taxas.

3.1 For each hotel, what is the role of technology and the role of operations

A good leader should develop the situation by deploying forward reconnaissance teams to the area and gain real time knowledge. Information can come from many different sources but deciding which source is the more reliable source can be difficult to choose.

The operational environment is the framework the military uses to define a how we will create a concept to defeat an enemy. To help paint the picture of the operational environment the Army uses the acronym PMESSII-PT. PMESSII-PT stands for Politics, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time . I do not believe there are one or two areas that can be focused on and have a successful outcome in combat. GEN David Petraeus stated, “there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan.”1

Poor understanding of the operational environment (OE) led to poor plans. Two main assumptions guided the planning: