Opposing Argument: Abortion

In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob argues that an individual has different character traits that split that person into diverse identities, no one is simple and he or she may have a complex identity. A person who experiences false memory may not be the same person Gretchen makes a careful distinction between two types of identities; these are the numerical and qualitative identities. The writer declares the former to be the identity and the later as the exact similarity. Same body same soul does not necessarily mean it resides in one person. I am numerically identical to myself. The same body could be equated to being numerically identical to oneself, for instance as they could be two and both of them boys, but in essence, they are still two people.

In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism.

In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the

In On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, Mary Anne Warren discusses a few arguments against abortion, namely bringing into play whether the fetus is actually a person, or “not a member of the moral community”. She

In “Why Abortion is Immoral”, Don Marquis offers his anti-abortion argument known as a “future like ours" (Marquis, 558). Marquis takes a step back from focusing on the complicated moral status of the fetus, and instead asks seemingly less controversial questions: what makes killing an innocent adult wrong, and what right we adult humans possess not to be killed? His answer serves as the first premise for his argument: killing is prima facie morally wrong because it deprives an individual of their future of value. His second premise is that killing a fetus, i.e. abortion, also deprives it a future of value, which he refers to as a “future like ours” (559). Marquis concludes that because fetuses possess the innate property that is sufficient to make killing adult human beings wrong, that killing fetuses is also wrong. Simply stated, abortions are prima facie immoral, for the same reason that killing an innocent adult is prima facie immoral (559)

The purpose of this essay is to define what Personal Identity is by analyzing John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity. John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity will be examined, in order to establish a better understanding of whether or not the argument for personal identity could be embraced. In order to do so, the essay will i) State and explain Locke’s argument that we are not substances or mere souls and ii) State and explain Locke’s concept of personal identity and its relations to what he calls self, consciousness and punishment. This essay will also focus on Thomas Reid’s perspective on personal identity and iii) State and explain Reid’s criticisms of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and lastly iv) I will evaluate whether or not Reid’s objections are good. Locke’s argument may seem to be plausible at first, however, the essay will conclude by rejecting John Locke’s argument for personal identity due to Locke’s inadequate reasonings and Thomas Reid’s criticisms.

This essay will look at Marquis’s “future like ours” argument and challenge the premises and implications of his conclusion. I will not be considering exceptional circumstances, such as rape or major health implications, as Marquis’ focus was on general deliberate abortions. I will argue that the ideas of personhood, future-directed preferences and bodily autonomy establish a great moral difference between killing an adult and killing a foetus. In disproving Marquis’s conclusion and his counter-examples to criticisms, I will draw upon utilitarian and rights-based theories.

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

In his essay "Why Abortion is Immoral," Don Marquis argues against the morality of abortion on the premise that the value of a fetus' future is so great that it is immoral to take that potential future away from it. Essentially, he contends, abortion is tantamount to murder: killing an individual is prima facie wrong because the loss of the goods of one's future is the worst loss a human can suffer. He calls this potential future a "future-like-ours," which is the basis for his contentions. In the next few pages I will delineate the general progression of his argument, and later, will evaluate the plausibility of said argument. Though Marquis makes both logical and compelling claims, there are

The debate about abortion focuses on two issues; 1.) Whether the human fetus has the right to life, and, if so, 2.) Whether the rights of the mother override the rights of the fetus. The two ethicists who present strong arguments for their position, and who I am further going to discuss are that of Don Marquis and Judith Thomson. Marquis' "Future Like Ours" (FLO) theory represents his main argument, whereas, Thomson uses analogies to influence the reader of her point of view. Each argument contains strengths and weaknesses, and the point of this paper is to show you that Marquis presents a more sound argument against abortion than Thomson presents for it. An in depth overview of both arguments will be

In “Why Abortion is Immoral,” Don Marquis argues that abortion is immoral because it denies the victim, which is the fetus or embryo, of their right to a future-like-ours. He argues that killing is prima facie wrong, and that this logic can be applied to a fetus. In this paper, I will address the ambiguity within the future-like-ours theory, which I will refer to as the FLO theory, and argue that the fetus’ right to a future of value does not override and should not be prioritized over the right to a future of value for the fetus’ host, which is the mother.

In, “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,” the author, John Perry, proposes three totally different ways of thinking about personal identity. The first theory is presented by a character named Gretchen Weirob, she believes that a person is their body. By this she means that a person’s identity is intertwined with the DNA and molecules of their body. Their personality as well as their personal identity can’t be separated from their body, and they cannot exist without it. The second theory was presented by a character named Sam Miller, he believes that a person is their immaterial soul. So in general, Sam thinks that the soul is this invisible, immaterial substance that is able to exist from the body. The third and final theory was presented by a character named Dave Cohen. Cohen believes that a person has continuity of memory, and/or psychology. So in general Cohen’s theory is that personal identity is a set of correlating experiences and/or memories enclosed in the brain. All three of the personal identity theories state some very valid points, but they also have some inconsistencies, some more than others. But there is one theory that seems to be the most credible, and creates a very compelling argument while also having a little science to back up some of its points.

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

Personal identity is a concept within philosophy that has persisted throughout its history. In the eighteenth century this problem came to a head. David Hume dedicated a portion of his philosophy in the attempts to finally put what he saw as a fallacious claim concerning the soul to rest. In the skeptical wake of Hume, German idealist, beginning with Immanuel Kant, were left with a variety of epistemic and metaphysical problems, the least of which was personal identity.

While numerous philosophers have debated how to quantify personal identity, It is my contention that Rene Descartes presents the best argument .This essay will examine the strengths and weaknesses within his theory. This essay will also also compare Descartes argument to Rick Parfit and David Humes individual interpretations of what personal identity is. Lastly, this essay will examine the weaknesses within Descartes argument and the points some have contention with.