Perhaps the best indication of the Court’s attitude towards the Commerce Clause analysis of environmental cases are its decisions concerning state garbage regulations. Each garbage law that has come under the Court’s review has been invalidated without any consideration for its putative local benefits. This approach is highlighted by the Court acknowledging the states’ legitimate environmental interests yet still negating any measures to protect those, essentially rendering any conservation motives irrelevant. City of Philadelphia is one example of that trend; Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality (1994) shows another one. Here, Oregon’s intent to reduce the volume of waste before disposing it in the few landfill …show more content…
As a result, the states face a heavy burden of proof to show that absolutely no economic rationale was factored in their legislation, following the Court’s repeated assertions that “[n]o state may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade.”
A close comparison of the Court’s holdings also reveals the expansion of its definition of commerce. In City of Philadelphia, the interstate movement of solid waste was considered a part of commerce even though waste itself presented no commercial value. In Sporhase, despite the judgement of Nebraska’s own highest court, the Court found water to be an article of commerce that represents a national interest and is thus subject to federal regulation. The constant shifting between natural resources as natural resources and natural resources as market commodities depending on whether the government relies on affirmative of negative Commerce Clause only reinforces the Court’s hostility towards environmental cases and frustrates both federal and state efforts to protect the environment.
The case factually closest to Maine v. Taylor is probably Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979), which also revolved around fishery preservation. Here, Oklahoma had enacted a statutory scheme governing the acquisition, transportation, and sale
The case that I have chosen to discuss is Case 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (1999) 978 P.2d 2 20 Cal.4th 785 Peter Ramirez, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. YOSEMITE WATER COMPANY, INC., Defendant am Respondent, No. S070114, Supreme Court of California, June 17, 1999.
The Environmental Protection Agency has dismissed at least five members of a major scientific review board, the latest signal of what critics call a campaign by the Trump administration to shrink the agency’s regulatory reach by reducing the role of academic research.
This assignment is meant to explore the landmark Supreme Court decision Mapp v. Ohio. It is the purpose of the essay to examine the facts of the controversy, the arguments offered by the petitioner, and discuss as well the Supreme Court's ruling and its possible impact on precedent. The analysis will conclude with my commentary and opinion in regard to the Mapp decision.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” Despite its silence as to the effect of that affirmative power, federal courts have recognized the Framers’ wish to create a unified national market and have found a dormant congressional authority in it. Since the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), that dormant authority has limited state regulations that burden interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional regulation. Congress has the power only to restrict the scope of permissible state regulation but it does not absolutely preclude states from affecting commerce. "[T]he states retain authority under their police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern', even though interstate commerce may be affected." A challenged statute is upheld if its effect on interstate commerce is merely incidental. On the other hand, a state regulation that is facially or practically discriminatory will be defeated unless it shows a legitimate local purpose that cannot be accomplished by any less discriminatory alternatives.
This problem was further worsened by the inability of the government to enforce taxes. Rhode Island’s letter to Congress clearly depicts the absence of federal control over state legislatures, as Rhode Island “[rejected] the recommendation of Congress, respecting an impost on imported goods” (doc A). Because each state retained its sovereignty, they could easily accept or reject the demands of Congress. This lack of federal power substantially restrained the government in carrying out its
A controversy arose between Ogden, who had obtained the license from Fulton and Livingston, and Gibbons, who had obtained his license through the United States government. Ogden petitioned the New York Court to “enjoin” Gibbons, his formal partner, from continuing with this business in that state. The Court favored Ogden and granted the injunction and Gibbons appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the right for Congress to have vast powers. According to the Supreme Court, Congress can regulate who can enter into a monopoly and this case made a distinction between interstate and intrastate within a state. Although the federal government has not been specifically delegated the power to regulate commerce within a certain state that does not mean that the federal government cannot regulate a states commerce. When the Commerce Clause has a broad interpretation, intrastate regulations are often included. Commerce is more than just buying or selling; it is intercoursing, which according to this case does include such stipulations as navigation. Interpreting commerce in a broad sense has thus established what is known as a Federal police power. Police powers refer to or identify the inherent authority of the state government to regulate individually liberty, freedom for health and welfare and safety. The Federal government does not have police power, but it can be seen as evidence in this case how the Federal
They argued that the said tariff was inequitable and unfair to states like Rhode Island, whose economy relies solely on their imports and exports. Versus states like Virginia who had many resources like cash crops, in addition to their trade systems. Under the Article of Confederation in order for the taxation to be imposed there had to be an unanimous agreement between all of the states. Rhode Island's rejection render the Government powerless to enforce the taxation. The Government’s inability to collect taxes paralyzed their ability to pay their employees and creditors as evidenced by Document C, the letter from Joseph Jones to George Washington.This inability to fund the military came at a poor time because the war was just coming to an end in 1783. In document B, the economy is depicted to be going nowhere, while the population is growing. The purpose of this document however, is not to compare commerce to population. It is to show that under The Articles, the lack of a central currency and federal power to regulate trade, was causing the unions commerce to fail. In a letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson in 1786, he details the economic problems caused by congresses limited power to regulate trade. “The states are everyday giving proofs that separate regulations are more likely to set them by the ears then to take them by the ears. When Massachusetts set on foot a retaliation of the policy of Great Britain, Connecticut declared their ports free. A miscarriage of this attempt to unite the states in some effectual plan will have another effect of a serious nature,” (Edmonson 1). Here we see a disorganization between states, and a completely absent sense of central order that was
But above all their major reason of protest was that “ by granting Congress the power to collect moneys from the commerce of these states, indefinitely as to the time and quantity, and for the expenditure of which they are not accountable to the states, they would become independent of their constituents.” (Document A)
Supreme Court found that an economic development plan was indeed “public use” and therefore all of the City’s takings were constitutional. Justice Stevens issued the majority opinion of the Court, he began his writing by stating “the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party… nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose” (Kelo v. New London, 2005, pg. 478). Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and the Chief Justice all dissented. Justice O’Connor wrote the dissent starting with a segment of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) which held that there should be no Act of the Legislature or law made where it would be acceptable to take property from A and give it to B is a breach of the first principles of the social compact and is against all reason. Justice O’Connor then stated “Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded - i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public- in the process” (Kelo v New London, 2005, pg
In Garcia v, San Antonio Metro. Travel Authority, 469 U.S. 528, (1985) where the court discovered "that Congress has a specific force, it doesn't make a difference whether it meddles with the states' laws. As far as possible on the trade control, the constitution itself is the procedure by which it is directed." Congress has the power to manage interstate expressways that are financial in nature.
Justice Johnson concurred: state commercial intercourse should be free from all “invidious and partial restraints.” Since the line between state and federal law is difficult to establish, cooperative federalism is the proper
The court rejects the previous test used to decide Free Exercise cases, the Sherbert test. The state no longer had to prove a “compelling interest” for legislation nor that it was the “least restrictive means” of regulation.
The first one is State v. Salt in 1803. Mr. Salt was a seaman who returned home after being out to sea for three years, to find his wife in bed with another man. Mr. Salt killed both his wife and her lover with his harpoon. He was absolved of murder. Six months later, the state legislature of Oceana codified a portion of the Salt decision. It states that any husband is justified in taking the life of his wife’s paramour if he catches his wife and her lover in the act of committing adultery. The second precedent was decided in 1960, State v. Fenny. The Oceana Supreme Court refused to extend the statute from State v. Salt to Mr. Fenny. Mr. Fenny had killed a man he found having a sexual relationship with his homosexual lover. The court found that the statute only applied to the actions of a husband in a legally recognized, heterosexual marital
The environment, and recreational activities that are essential to the outdoors, have also been negatively impacted by this system for allocating water rights. The issue of whether or not this system is equitable towards environmental protection has been raised because environmental organizations typically do not have the same funds as other entities, such as cities and towns, oil, gas, and energy companies, and manufacturing. Furthermore, as Jones and Cech point out, “environmental concerns continue to be underrepresented in Colorado water law and policy” (p. 712). This has created a situation similar to agriculture, where environmental concerns become second thoughts to those of M&I, giving rise to environmental issues across the state. These environmental issues can have an effect on residents throughout Colorado, from anglers who enjoy healthy streams and rivers for fishing, to kayakers and rafters who need flowing rivers to recreate
At the turn of the twentieth century, a bourgeoisie fixation on capitalistic structures and mass consumerism often juxtaposed the call for meritocracy, thus placing some individuals at an advantage over others. Tension was soon evident between the beneficiaries and the exploited of the gilded economy. This push and pull relationship can best be observed in the 1908 Supreme Court case, Muller v. Oregon, in which the owner of a Portland Laundromat violated state legislation that disallowed women from working more than ten hours a day. Siding with the needs of the laborer, the Supreme Court overruled Muller’s claim for freedom of contract and right to property (Gagnon Lecture, 01/26/15). While many argue that this decision devalues the relationship between employee and employer as well as undermines an individual’s inalienable rights to life, liberty and property at the hands of another, there is an underlying, and perhaps even larger issue at hand. The ruling of the case indicates that judiciary actions taken only reinforce gender formations- once again attacking the plea for equal opportunity. Because of this alarming backlash in societal equity, the Supreme Court’s decision should be deemed unjust. Although the case recognizes the significance of employee rights in the workforce, the decision is restricted to the sole protection of female workers and only