Persian Gulf War I: Surveillance, Intelligence Group (SRIG)

Partnerships were not just joint but a better relationship between the Operational units under INSCOM and the proponent for intelligence under Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). These formed a strong bond that allowed current education, training, and mission success to shape the Army’s next steps. The relationship between TRADOC and the Operational frontend is absolutely vital to the success of training and education. Too often TRADOC would lag behind or operations would not communicate the changing demands, thus hindering the advance of military intelligence occupational

The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or outside the country. The Department of Defense is responsible for overseeing the establishment of command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed from the highest-ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The principles that establish the command structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the various missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in mission deficiencies are organizational structure, decision-making, and collaboration.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

After World War II American intelligence had the need to be transformed. The inexperience along with bureaucracy and poor coordination among American intelligence officers obligated the United States intelligence community to change dramatically in order to confront the new challenges that emerged after the end of WWII. From Early America through WWI the intelligence system of the United States of America was involved in operations in which they had to construct intelligence systems virtually from scratch (Andrew 1995). Human intelligence was already developed, but with certain limitations and other intelligence disciplines were underdeveloped and very seldom sophisticated. After WWI America recessed and settled in a period of peace. The

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

As we have seen throughout the entire history of warfare, ancient world terrorism, political intrigue and elitist terrorism of the middle ages, and into modern terrorism, intelligence is of vital importance on both sides. Armed forces have always used intelligence of some form be it sneaking up a hill and scouting what is on the other side to the use of modern platforms such as

A 1998 abstract review for military training by Paul J. Jaeger reflects to the importance of “the application of operational intelligence as a function of operational art” and how the “Planning and execution for the Midway operation required fusion of strategic operational and tactical intelligence by the commanders involved; most notably Admiral Chester Nimitz” (Jaeger, pg 22). The strategy employed was to act immediately and tactically to the intelligence the commanders received from the code breakers. David J. Jerabek also “analyzes Admiral Nimitz strategic leader competencies and evaluates his contributions in achieving a total victory in the Pacific for the Allied powers” (Jerabek)

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

Enemy combatants, in familiar terrain, chose to stand and fight from fortified positions; forcing commanders to improvise and adapt quickly to unforeseen circumstances. Support elements received the operational order within just one week of the expected execution date. Staff elements created analysis and plans on poor intelligence estimates and recent experience. Strategic planners also failed to establish command and control of the assault force. Lack of forethought for an integrated joint operation, although ultimately successful, led to the death of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support elements, and failed to establish effective command and control.

To fully identify how counterintelligence supports the maneuver commander an understanding of the operational framework that the maneuver units operate in must be understood. The Army’s overall conceptual framework has changed over time due to the Army’s participation in conflicts. To appreciate the current mission of maneuver forces a quick glance of recent history must be accomplished. In 1982 the Army’s capstone doctrine focus was AirLand Battle. This primarily

According to this now-infamous study, Saddam had "so overextended his capital in the war with Iran that he was not in a position to undertake any significant hostile action for, at the very least, three years"�. The CIA grossly underestimated Saddam's penchant for military expansionism. Critics of the quality of US intelligence abound. Freedman and Efraim have concluded that "Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that was unresponsive to the needs of the United States Army"� while Seliktar writes of an "unprepared organization" and of "considerable in-theatre limitations and restrictions."� Arguably, the military success camouflaged these intelligence failings. Surprisingly, these intelligence failures during the Gulf War were carried over into the Iraq War.

Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

The historical process of creating and implementation of the Military Decision Making Process has changed significantly since World War I. The US Army did not have a published staff doctrine or guidance to assist commanders in the decision making process. The Regulations for Field Maneuvers (1910), did not provide staff guidance. In 1914, the field service regulation (FSR) identified the need for decision making processes. The Staff Officer Field Manual (1932), complied principles, data, and information that was intended to guide the operations of staff of all units and territorial commands. The Staff Officer Field Manual (1932), was a detailed manual that explained staff functions and more complete commander estimates of implementation time.

Still, depending on the availability of military intelligence analysts and MI assets or lack of appropriate METT-TC/PMESII-PT assessments, it is completely realistic that the “Analyze phase” of the targeting cycle could prove most difficult because this phase of the targeting cyclic relies heavily on the analytical support of both U.S and HN forces. Clearly, a deficit in military intelligence assets would cripple this portion of the targeting cycle and overcoming the “wrong set of circumstances” under these conditions would likely prove to be most difficult.