Personal Identity Argument

What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind.

According to Salmon, 1985 (Salmon 1985, p171), development and change are not limited to childhood but continue throughout our lives. It is however argued that personal identities are similar to social identities, and include group or collective identities.

If on Tuesday, I suffer an accident and lose all of my memory, it is probable that my family and friends will still love and care for me, creating an impression that I am indeed the same person I once was. These conditions imply the theses of animalism and bodily continuity when it comes to personal identity. However, is this human habit enough to discard the idea that it is psychological continuity that sustains identity? Whilst many may argue that it would be against our intuition to say that I am no longer the same person, I do not believe that this is caused by our intuition, but instead a societal construct that’s sole purpose is to make the trauma of the accident and loss easier to deal with. By using this premise and upholding the psychological

There are various kinds of identity (individualized or shared) that people are expected to possess. (Hollinger, 2004) namely; personal identity which is known as a

In the movie “looking for alibrandi the director presents the viewer with the idea that people can attain an enduring sense of both identity and belonging. The director believes that many life experiences compel us to alter our sense of self. Both text, movie and the story of my friend suggest that our identity changes depending on

In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Gretchen Weirob argues that an individual has different character traits that split that person into diverse identities, no one is simple and he or she may have a complex identity. A person who experiences false memory may not be the same person Gretchen makes a careful distinction between two types of identities; these are the numerical and qualitative identities. The writer declares the former to be the identity and the later as the exact similarity. Same body same soul does not necessarily mean it resides in one person. I am numerically identical to myself. The same body could be equated to being numerically identical to oneself, for instance as they could be two and both of them boys, but in essence, they are still two people.

In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism.

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

The question on personal identity has been a philosophical debate for a long time. Philosophers over time have tried to argue what being a person that one is, from one day to the necessarily contains. In their endless search for philosophical bases on the same, multiple questions on the issues of life and death arise such that the correct answers to personal identity determine the changes that one person undergoes, or may undergo without being extinct but rather continuing to exist. Personal identity philosophical theory confronts the most ultimate questions on our existence as well as who we are and if by any chance there is a possibility of life after death. In attempts to distinguish change in a person in survival and after death, a criterion of personal identity over time is given. Such criterion specifies all the necessary and sufficient conditions that must prevail for a person to continue to exist (Perry et al,103)

The purpose of this essay is to define what Personal Identity is by analyzing John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity. John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity will be examined, in order to establish a better understanding of whether or not the argument for personal identity could be embraced. In order to do so, the essay will i) State and explain Locke’s argument that we are not substances or mere souls and ii) State and explain Locke’s concept of personal identity and its relations to what he calls self, consciousness and punishment. This essay will also focus on Thomas Reid’s perspective on personal identity and iii) State and explain Reid’s criticisms of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and lastly iv) I will evaluate whether or not Reid’s objections are good. Locke’s argument may seem to be plausible at first, however, the essay will conclude by rejecting John Locke’s argument for personal identity due to Locke’s inadequate reasonings and Thomas Reid’s criticisms.

In general we differentiate between two “kinds” of identity. On the one hand there is the so called social identity, which stresses self-interpretation as a member of a certain social group and on the other hand there is the personal identity, which puts it´s emphasis on individuality and distinctiveness. This distinction is widely known as “patchwork-identity”. Both identities are only a subgroup of many different subjectively interpreted identities that everyone of us has innate.

Personal identity is a concept within philosophy that has persisted throughout its history. In the eighteenth century this problem came to a head. David Hume dedicated a portion of his philosophy in the attempts to finally put what he saw as a fallacious claim concerning the soul to rest. In the skeptical wake of Hume, German idealist, beginning with Immanuel Kant, were left with a variety of epistemic and metaphysical problems, the least of which was personal identity.

In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the

What makes up a person is their past experiences and what they have been through, memory is not a necessary element in ones’ identity because if a person’s memory fails, they will most likely still have the same beliefs which they developed from their past experiences and thoughts, even if they do not remember them accurately. For example, if you are told to think of your “self” what picture comes to your mind? Do you picture a self/soul? There is no way you can know what your soul looks like, because simply there is no soul; you just picture your experiences and perceptions which make up your identity. David Hume, a philosopher, said that our minds