Personal Identity Essay

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

In philosophy, the matter of personal identity

Presently, there is no conclusive definition of personal identity, but in this paper, I will focus on two notions that are frequently discussed – numerical and narrative identity. Numerical identity is the continuity of self over time, while narrative refers to the memories, experiences, etc. that answer “Who Am I?” (Lipsman and Glannon 2013). Another way of thinking about identity is in terms of core values that if changed, will also change that person’s identity (Witt, Kuhn and Timmermann 2013), I will include this view as part of narrative identity.

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

ABSTRACT: In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues for a Reductionist View of personal identity. According to a Reductionist, persons are nothing over and above the existence of certain mental and/or physical states and their various relations. Given this, Parfit believes that facts about personal identity just consist in more particular facts concerning psychological continuity and/or connectedness, and thus that personal identity can be reduced to this continuity and/or connectedness. Parfit is aware that his view of personal identity is contrary to what many people ordinarily think about persons, and thus if his view is correct, many of us have false beliefs about personal

If on Tuesday, I suffer an accident and lose all of my memory, it is probable that my family and friends will still love and care for me, creating an impression that I am indeed the same person I once was. These conditions imply the theses of animalism and bodily continuity when it comes to personal identity. However, is this human habit enough to discard the idea that it is psychological continuity that sustains identity? Whilst many may argue that it would be against our intuition to say that I am no longer the same person, I do not believe that this is caused by our intuition, but instead a societal construct that’s sole purpose is to make the trauma of the accident and loss easier to deal with. By using this premise and upholding the psychological

The most plausible and least problematic view of personal identity is the psychological view. It takes the position in which each person stage remembers the previous stage barring a break. In the example given by Miller about the Julia North case he states, “Memory is sufficient for

Memory View: Personal identity persists over time because you retain memories of yourself at different points, and each of those memories is connected to the one before.

The concern about identity is a major existential question. People recognize different objects by their sense, and thus consider their appearance, sound, or smell as their identities. In many cases, even though the physical traits of an object have changed, people still know the object. Therefore, these physical definitions of objects are not their identities. The connections of these characteristics, and furthermore of them and their inner self, define the uniqueness of an individual. Since the massive universe constantly moves toward entropy, the only consistency is “change”: caterpillars transform to butterflies, the ugly duckling turns into a beautiful swan, and I have become unacquainted with my mother language but more comfortable with English. Thus, I am concerned about my rising ignorance of my own culture and of my true being in the world. But in the poem “Identity” by A. R. Ammons, I find relief: identity holds its center within but proceeds to randomness on the exterior to adjust and adapt.

Personal identity is a concept within philosophy that has persisted throughout its history. In the eighteenth century this problem came to a head. David Hume dedicated a portion of his philosophy in the attempts to finally put what he saw as a fallacious claim concerning the soul to rest. In the skeptical wake of Hume, German idealist, beginning with Immanuel Kant, were left with a variety of epistemic and metaphysical problems, the least of which was personal identity.

The first prominent argument I will discuss is one that ascribes human continuity from personal identity a bodily nature. Essentially this means a person can discern one’s self as identical to one’s past self through continuity of the physical body one possesses. In other words, a person (P) at a specific time (t) is identical to a person (P2) existing at another time (t2) if and only if P’s body at t is physically continuous with the body of P2 at t2. From this we can gather that I may identify myself as the same self 15 years ago simply because the body I have now has been physically continued from the body I had 15 years ago (t2). This notion seems intuitive enough as I can readily distinguish that wherever I go my body will be there with

The question on personal identity has been a philosophical debate for a long time. Philosophers over time have tried to argue what being a person that one is, from one day to the necessarily contains. In their endless search for philosophical bases on the same, multiple questions on the issues of life and death arise such that the correct answers to personal identity determine the changes that one person undergoes, or may undergo without being extinct but rather continuing to exist. Personal identity philosophical theory confronts the most ultimate questions on our existence as well as who we are and if by any chance there is a possibility of life after death. In attempts to distinguish change in a person in survival and after death, a criterion of personal identity over time is given. Such criterion specifies all the necessary and sufficient conditions that must prevail for a person to continue to exist (Perry et al,103)

In the United States, many people have multiple identities-- some of them were born somewhere, then came to America; some of them were born here, but went to some other countries, then cam back again. However, these people were influenced by different backgrounds, cultures, and experience. Think about identities, everyone wants to exactly know herself/himself, having a correct explanation and importantly, choosing a right way to go. From Dhingra and Rodriguez, a thorough analysis about identities is given.

One is defined by various categories. Whether one’s identity is delineated by race, gender, or social status, one may ask themselves “Who are you?” In the play Othello by William Shakespeare, the protagonist Othello struggles with his status as an outsider. Even the closest of his friends and loved ones are questioned. His right hand man Iago manipulates, confuses, and mentally tortures Othello to the extent that he questions the fidelity of his partner, Desdemona. Self-identity for Othello becomes murky as the waters are tainted with lies and deception. In Frankenstein by Mary Shelley, a state of perplection is palpable with regards to the question “Who are you?”. The main character, Victor Frankenstein, creates a “monster” using parts of unearthed corpses. Once conscious, the monster struggles with who he is as he is forced unnaturally into society. In this case one is not questioning loyalty, but the mere fact of humanity: What makes someone a human being? The interpretations of “Who are you?” is multifaceted, as the characters in both novels reflect inwardly on what defines them and what others think they are. Individual's’ self-identity fluctuates throughout their lives due to varying circumstances.

Turning to more theoretical work, one finds the same movement of ideas. Reflections on personal identity -- and hence the renewed interest in the category of person -- constitute one of the rare points of