Petraeus Drug Wars Case Study

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

In “The Army Disease: Drug Addiction and the Civil War” written by Johnathan Lewy, he has concluded that the Civil War and the use of hypodermic syringes were the foundation of what led to the events of 21st century drug addiction, as well as one of the first events for the current mass drug addiction in America.

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

Earlier this week we were privileged to watch the PBS Frontline film titled, “Losing Iraq”. In the beginning of this film, General Keane believed that the United States shouldn’t invade Iraq. Keane noticed that the war plans didn’t include adequate plans for securing the country. At the same time, General Franks announced that by September 2003, 110,000 troops would be prepared to leave and that a division of 30,000 would stay and handle Iraq. At this point of time, this was huge news for the United States, they truly believed that the major combat phase of the war in Iraq was over. United States next step was to send Jerry Bremer to Iraq to attempt to fix 20 years of dysfunctional government. Jerry Bremer was a very interesting candidate

Another example of Bush’s obstinacy is the surge in troops he approved in Iraq. “The conventional wisdom about the U.S. troop surge was that by 2006, Iraq was in complete chaos, and because of this, many Americans called for the U.S. to bring the troops home. Instead of withdrawing U.S. troops, President Bush sent in 30,000 additional ones against the advice of a number of his advisors” (Bowman). Bush assembled a panel of scholars, historians, and retired four star generals to help him create a new plan for the war in Iraq. The majority of these panel members agreed on one thing, the current track that the U.S. was on was not working, and advised Bush to change tactics. After a number of meetings with the committee, Bush decided to stay on course with his original plan and completely ignored the counsel of his own hand-picked advising panel. “The justification was for such a move was that by the end of 2007, Iraq started to stabilize. For example, in 2008, Senator Lindsey Graham spoke out on the subject at Republican National Convention and said that, "by every measure, the surge of troops into Iraq has worked”’ (Bowman). In a 2007 speech to Congress on the surge in the Middle East, General David Petraeus agreed and proclaimed, "The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met" (Bowman). “On the other hand, some disagree that Bush’s aggressive strategy and blatant disregard of his advisors’ wishes were the reasons for success. Doug Ollivant, an Army

While almost the entire Iraq war was mired in controversy, no one moment was more inundated with it than the Second Battle of Fallujah, a two month knock down drag out fight between coalition forces and radical Jihadists, it was the war’s magnum opus with urban combat rivaling what Marines faced in 1968 on the streets of Hue city Vietnam during the Tet offensive (Head, 105). While many debate the war overall the focus of this essay is on the battle itself and how the US government created the circumstances in which the insurgency in Fallujah could flourish as well as the ideology and motives of the Jihadi fighters and US forces and why the battle was necessary for US forces to wage so they could begin the process of bringing western

For example, when David Petraeus took command of the Afghanistan mission in July of 2010, he attempted to impose the same strategy that had worked in Iraq. As Gentile explains, the “American military establishment could only provide one course of action in Afghanistan – COIN.” In The Insurgents Kaplan tells the story of how one of Petraeus’s advisers told him rather directly to not talk about Iraq so much because he was not doing enough to factor in and adapt to the differing conditions in Afghanistan, such as its primitive economy and scattered population. COIN became arborescent in its approach, and was always looking back to the root concepts that had made the Iraqi operation successful. The strategy did not evolve as Kilcullen suggested it would. In many ways it seems that the COIN approach simply became the “New Western Way of War;” just as dogmatic as the ways of conventional warfare had been

In a speech given by President Bush, he called the surge “A new way forward”, which indirectly confirmed to many that the White House was aware of the military shortcomings in Iraq. Although the Bush administration most likely had the best of intentions, there are a few key reasons the Iraqi surge did not have sustained positive results. The surge strategy was to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 20,000; these troops would be used in urban civilian areas where military forces have had a difficult time clearing out neighborhoods. The surge was initially a success, however, after several months it became clear the success was short-lived, and the overall strategy was short sighted. Members of Al Qaeda simply left the region while it was heavily occupied, only to return when the U.S. threat had vacated the area. There was a survey conducted by Iraq, and the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens felt that daily living conditions had not changed they were in favor of American troops leaving their country. Although the primary goal of improving the lives of citizens was not fully realized, there is a bigger flaw with the surge, it had aimed to reduce American and Iraqi casualties, as well as lower the number of Al Quad attacks. As already stated, these surges did have some fleeting success, which were able to produce statistics that briefly pacified many critics of the war,

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

After years, the US must withdrawal troops from Iraq, but leaving behind is a shattered and exhausted country with no longer a war land but peace has not seen. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was not only destroyed the regime, but also destroyed the internal security and order. It has been promoted the rise of the forces of al-Qaeda terrorists and the sparking an outbreak of conflict ethnic conflicts, sectarian. The Bush Administration rested its public case for war against Iraq on two putative threats – Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda. In hindsight, the Bush Administration should have planned much better such as strategy of exiting, released convincing evidences about Iraq’s possession of WMDs, whether Iraq was connected to the 9/11 terrorist attacks or maybe, ultimately stayed out of the

I showed up relatively late to the war, or so I thought at the time. My first deployment was in the midst of the chaotic surge of 2006. When I arrived in Iraq, I found faith in my training and hoped that my fellow comrades’ experiences would fine-tune my skills. Since that time, I have learned numerous things about our Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). To my surprise, the poor decisions I learned about while reading the book Roberts Ridge, have influenced the

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

I will briefly describe what the surge is in literal terms and the context under which it was planned and then implemented. In 2006 it was clear to most American citizens and top military commanders that the war in Iraq was not going well. Efforts to rebuild Iraq and increase the economic well being of it’s citizens amounted to very little. The Iraqis recruited to join the new Iraqi army and police force that was loyal to the democratic government put in place by the United States were for the most part proving to be wholly incapable of providing security which made the country completely dependent upon the security provided by the coalition forces. Democratic elections were held successfully in 2005 to elect representatives to the Iraqi

Insurgencies strive to escalate friction between different groups in a society and attempts to recruit support from any group that shares common elements with their organization. These groups may be aligned along religious, racial, social, or ethnic lines. Traditions and language similarities can also be a reason for alignment amongst these terroristic groups. To be successful against insurgents in a particular area and to avoid alienating the public, counterinsurgents must understand the local environment. This includes local social and national issues that effect the local environment. They must also understand if these groups have extreme devotion or significant hatred towards a particular group, the enemy is typically willing to die