Petraeus Drug Wars Case Study

The Republican’s 2006 loss of both congressional houses was a clear rebuke of President Bush’s war strategy. Political loses motivated the President to abandon compliance with normal civil-military theory, replace Secretary Rumsfeld and assume direct control over strategic decision-making. These actions produced clear and concise strategic direction that was previously lacking. President Bush announced the change to his war strategy less than month before General Petraeus’ assumption of MNF-I Command. The new direction established security of the Iraqi people and political reconciliation as the prerequisite for victory (ends) and provided surge forces (means) to achieve the objectives. The new strategic direction coupled with General Petraeus’ new counterinsurgency doctrine (ways) finally reconciled the ends, ways and means imbalance of the previous

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created

The American “War on Drugs” war created to keep an exorbitant amount of people behind bars, and in a subservient status. First, America has a storied history when it comes to marijuana use. However, within the last 50 years legislation pertaining to drug use and punishment has increased significantly. In the modern era, especially hard times have hit minority communities thanks to these drug laws. While being unfairly targeted by drug laws and law enforcement, minorities in America are having a difficult time trying to be productive members of society.

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

The function of the military forces for the United States has had no choice but to evolve as wars wax and wane. As the rise of militant terrorist groups became a threat to the United States and its allies, the armed forces of the United States were deployed by the President to countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Instability in these countries threatened bordering allies, and after September 11, 2001, the threat was brought to U.S. soil. Each president from Clinton to Obama has had to shape the policy of how the armed forces fit into civil-military policies abroad and overseas. In a war time environment, such as Iraq, the purpose of how the military should be deployed is easier to clearly state. But in times when there is no imminent threat, it is much more difficult to transition

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

In “The Army Disease: Drug Addiction and the Civil War” written by Johnathan Lewy, he has concluded that the Civil War and the use of hypodermic syringes were the foundation of what led to the events of 21st century drug addiction, as well as one of the first events for the current mass drug addiction in America.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

With numerous opinions regarding whether the United States should continue airstrikes, re-send troops, or go another route, it is difficult to resolve the situation. Former Michigan representative Kerry Bentivolio’s thoughts that the removal of the United States’ troops from Iraq allowed the militant group easier access to overthrow the government is shared by many conservatives. Bentivolio (2009, para. 10) said in his address to congress

In a speech given by President Bush, he called the surge “A new way forward”, which indirectly confirmed to many that the White House was aware of the military shortcomings in Iraq. Although the Bush administration most likely had the best of intentions, there are a few key reasons the Iraqi surge did not have sustained positive results. The surge strategy was to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 20,000; these troops would be used in urban civilian areas where military forces have had a difficult time clearing out neighborhoods. The surge was initially a success, however, after several months it became clear the success was short-lived, and the overall strategy was short sighted. Members of Al Qaeda simply left the region while it was heavily occupied, only to return when the U.S. threat had vacated the area. There was a survey conducted by Iraq, and the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens felt that daily living conditions had not changed they were in favor of American troops leaving their country. Although the primary goal of improving the lives of citizens was not fully realized, there is a bigger flaw with the surge, it had aimed to reduce American and Iraqi casualties, as well as lower the number of Al Quad attacks. As already stated, these surges did have some fleeting success, which were able to produce statistics that briefly pacified many critics of the war,

While almost the entire Iraq war was mired in controversy, no one moment was more inundated with it than the Second Battle of Fallujah, a two month knock down drag out fight between coalition forces and radical Jihadists, it was the war’s magnum opus with urban combat rivaling what Marines faced in 1968 on the streets of Hue city Vietnam during the Tet offensive (Head, 105). While many debate the war overall the focus of this essay is on the battle itself and how the US government created the circumstances in which the insurgency in Fallujah could flourish as well as the ideology and motives of the Jihadi fighters and US forces and why the battle was necessary for US forces to wage so they could begin the process of bringing western

Following the events of September 11th, President Bush was looked to as a leader to lead the country out of chaos. “In the weeks after the attack, Bush’s approval rating rose to 90 percent—the highest recorded job-approval rating in U.S. presidential history” ( millercenter). Nowadays however, Bush is often criticized for the actions he took during the invasions. “The Bush administration’s strategy had been to reduce the U.S. military presence as Iraq’s stability improved. Yet the goal proved unattainable, owing in part to the power vacuum left by the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the rise of sectarian violence within the two dominant strains of Islam in Iraq” (millercenter). Of course hindsight is always 20/20, but many blame the Bush Administration for the power vacuum created in the Middle East. Bush’s foreign policy typically surrounded a strong use of force and led to increase in terrorism surveillance creating a discussion that is hotly debated today Following the end of Bush’s second term, Barack Obama had won the presidency and the work in the Middle East was far from over. Obama proved to have a different ideology from Bush, wanting to remove troops from the Middle East, something he

Another example of Bush’s obstinacy is the surge in troops he approved in Iraq. “The conventional wisdom about the U.S. troop surge was that by 2006, Iraq was in complete chaos, and because of this, many Americans called for the U.S. to bring the troops home. Instead of withdrawing U.S. troops, President Bush sent in 30,000 additional ones against the advice of a number of his advisors” (Bowman). Bush assembled a panel of scholars, historians, and retired four star generals to help him create a new plan for the war in Iraq. The majority of these panel members agreed on one thing, the current track that the U.S. was on was not working, and advised Bush to change tactics. After a number of meetings with the committee, Bush decided to stay on course with his original plan and completely ignored the counsel of his own hand-picked advising panel. “The justification was for such a move was that by the end of 2007, Iraq started to stabilize. For example, in 2008, Senator Lindsey Graham spoke out on the subject at Republican National Convention and said that, "by every measure, the surge of troops into Iraq has worked”’ (Bowman). In a 2007 speech to Congress on the surge in the Middle East, General David Petraeus agreed and proclaimed, "The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met" (Bowman). “On the other hand, some disagree that Bush’s aggressive strategy and blatant disregard of his advisors’ wishes were the reasons for success. Doug Ollivant, an Army

President Obama’s strategic plan in Iraq and Syria is to continue Airstrikes to slow the forward progression of ISIS, while utilizing deployed U.S. service members to work with coalition partners to assist with partner building capacities. These partners include “Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and moderate Syrian fighters, and both Sunni and Shia militia groups.”3 To be successful in this endear as mentioned by Sec Carter, “the only way to have a lasting defeat of ISIL is to have someone who can govern and secure territory once ISIL is defeated, a local force on the ground. That 's why the strategy calls for the United States to help train and equip, and then help enable local ground forces.”4 Without basic security the Government of Iraq (GOI)

The 2003 Invasion of Iraq not only signalled the beginning of the Iraq War, but also demonstrated the power and unchallenged military dominance of the United States. Unlike the first Gulf War, many of the US public, media and officials criticized the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq by questioning the legality and the evidence used to justify the war. These arguments as to whether the Bush Administration was justified in its use of hard power to invade Iraq are diverse and disputed among many historians. The opinions of several historians including Pollack, Mearsheimer and Siilberman, in conjunction with the primary accounts of US president George W. Bush and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein create a conflicting and questionable