Philippa Foot on the Fatal Sequence to Abortion

Bertha, M. (2014). Pro-Life, Pro-Choice : Shared Values in the Abortion Debate. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. https://fortlewis.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search- ebscohost-com.fortlewis.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edspmu&AN=edspmu.9780826519924&site=eds-live&scope=site Throughout this book, Bertha claims that she is for pro choice, but at the end of the reading, she states that she has changed her beliefs to pro life. This specific author performed studies, exams, courses, and clinicals and discovered the facts about the harm that takes place to your body after having an abortion. Bertha discusses the hard, mental griefs and traumas that follow the procedure, as well as the uneasy argument about the virtuous worth of the human fetus. The author brings experience to the discussion through the psychological department, being an Associate Professor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities, Arts and Cultural Studies at Arizona State University, as well as having written many informative and knowledgeable articles.

In Judith Jarvis Thomson’s philosophy paper, A Defense of Abortion, she argues that abortion is permissible because an individual’s right over their own body outweighs a fetus’s right to life. In this paper I will focus on whether or not abortion is always permissible. First, I will present Thomson’s argument which says that abortion is sometimes permissible. I will do so by describing her “famous violinist” thought experiment. Next, I will object to Thomson’s claim and expand the scope of her argument by arguing that abortion is in fact, always permissible. I will do so by presenting a new thought experiment. Finally, I will conclude in saying that Thomson is correct and abortion is in fact only sometimes permissible.

The next issue is, in Thomson’s opinion, the most important question in the abortion debate; that is, what exactly does a right to life bring about? The premise that “everyone has a right to life, so the unborn person has a right to life” suggests that the right to life is “unproblematic,” or straight-forward. We know that isn’t true. Thomson gives an analogy involving Henry Fonda. You are sick and dying and the touch of Henry Fonda’s hand will heal you. Even if his touch with save your life, you have no right to be “given the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand.” A stricter view sees the right to life as more of a right to not be killed by anybody. Here too troubles arise. In the case of the violinist, if we are to “refrain from killing the violinist,” then we must basically allow him to kill you. This contradicts the stricter view. The conclusion Thomson draws from this analogy is “that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body—even if one needs it for life itself.” This argument again proves the basic argument wrong. The right to life isn’t as clear of an argument as I’m sure opponents of abortion would like it to be or believe it is.

In 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect ', Phillipa Foot takes into account what is called the Doctrine of Double Effect (henceforth DDE), which appeals to two effects that an action causes - one intended at and desired, the other foreseen as a consequence of the action but undesired. She uses this doctrine to critically examine its application and thereby assert that "My conclusion is that the distinction between direct and oblique intention (the DDE) plays only a quite subsidiary role in deciding what we say [in these cases], while the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid (the DAO) is very important indeed." In this paper, I will begin by first reviewing and commenting on the soundness of arguments in support of DDE in some cases provided by Foot. Then, I 'll show how and why Foot proposes an appeal to DAO or the Doctrine of Acts and Omissions which is explained by her on the basis of negative and positive duty distinction. I will then criticise this approach. Finally, I will analyse three different abortion cases mentioned by Foot from the points of view of DDE and Foot 's proposal of DAO.

Judith Jarvis Thomson and Don Marquis both have different views on abortion. Thomson believes that in some cases, abortion is morally permissible, due to the life of the mother. Marquis believes that abortion is almost always morally impermissible, except in extreme circumstances, because the fetus has a future life. I will simply evaluate each of the authors reasoning’s that defend their belief, and give my argument for why I believe Judith Thomson’s essay is more convincing.

In Judith A. Thomson’s article, ‘A defense of abortion’ Thomson defends her view that in some cases abortion is morally permissible. She takes this stance even with the premise that fetuses upon the moment of conception are in fact regarded as persons. However one criticism of her argument would be that there is a biological relationship between mother and fetus however there is no biological relationship between you and the violinist. Having this biological relationship therefore entails special responsibility upon the mother however there is no responsibility in the case of the violinist. Thomson argues against those who are opposed to abortion with her violinist thought experiment.

To put it simply, an abortion is defined as, the intentional termination of a pregnancy most often preformed before the third trimester (within weeks 1-28). The controversy over abortions usually stems from the difficulty between individuals to agree on a set of conditions that would constitute ones’ decision, to abort as just. This issue is examined by many philosophers, particularly, Judith Thomson and Don Marquis. Both philosopher’s views loosely encompass the complex underlying beliefs of those who stand behind the “pro-life” and “pro-choice” arguments. Tomson and Marquis demonstrate the very distinctively different perspectives one could take on the issue. Don Marquis suggests that fetuses, being persons, possess the right to a “future like ours” and that it would be wrong to intentionally impede on “the life that I would have lived if I had lived out my natural lifespan” except for in “rare circumstances”. While, Tomson asserts that not all abortions are morally wrong, nor do they “violate the victim’s right to life”, and by having one that is in no way indicative that a fetus’s rights have been violated. Despite the fact that both philosophers present valid positions, and outline their key differences, Tomson goes far beyond Marquis’ efforts by illustrating that the way in which we view abortions ought to be redefined in order for one to maintain a clear perspective.

In her article, “The Defense of Abortion”, Judith Jarvis Thomson states an analogy involving a violinist. She first states that you are allowed to unplug yourself in the violinist scenario, second abortion after rape is analogous to the violinist scenario, therefore, you should be allowed to unplug yourself and be allowed to abort after rape (Chwang, Abortion slide 12). In this paper, I will argue that abortion is morally acceptable even if the fetus is considered a person. This paper will criticize premise two from the traditional argument against abortion string that killing innocent persons is wrong (Chwang, Abortion slide 9). Following the violinist analogy will be an objection to this analogy and my respons to them. One of the

In the paper titled “A Defense of Abortion” Judith Thomson uses several premises to bring the readers to the conclusion that Abortion is not morally wrong. After reading her paper I have concluded, that abortion is in fact morally wrong, excluding extenuating circumstances. In this paper I will show that abortion is morally wrong by way of the following argument:

Thomson’s argument, “A Defense on Abortion,” is a piece written to point out the issues in many arguments made against abortion. She points out specific issues in arguments made, for example, about life beginning at conception and if that truly matters as an argument against abortion. Thomson uses multiple analogies when making her points against the arguments made against abortion. These analogies are used to show that the arguments made do not really make sense in saying it is immoral to have an abortion. These analogies do not work in all cases, and sometimes they only work in very atypical cases, but still make a strong argument. There are also objections made to Thomson’s argument, which she then replies to, which makes her argument even stronger. Her replies to these arguments are very strong, saying biology does not always equate responsibility, and that reasonable precaution is an important factor in the morality of abortion. There are some major issues in her responses to these objections.

In Mary Anne Warren’s “The Abortion Issue,” children are not persons in the empirical sense. Warren believes that prior to a certain point in a pregnancy, the child does not have “the capacity to understand” the ramifications of what an abortion would be, therefore the abortion does not infringe upon the rights of the unborn fetus. She states that: “…in the ways that matter from a moral point of view, human fetuses are very unlike human persons, particularly in their early months of development”(152). In essence, personhood as defined by Warren can only come after the first trimester. Before that time, the fetus does not have the sentience that would make it a person. Warren’s main criteria for

In disagreement many people say that one person?s right to life always outweighs another person?s right to autonomy. However Thomson?s argument makes a very interesting unwanted pregnancies resulting in permissible abortions. To counteract her claims I?m going to use a hypothetical situation as she did. Let?s say a mother gives birth to a set of conjoined twins. The twins grow up having a somewhat troublesome life considering the fact that neither one has the opportunity to achieve autonomy. Once they get older, lets say age 18, twin A obtains the information that twin B?s survival depends on the use of twin A?s vital organ?s. However twin A would survive if twin B was too be separated from him thus granting twin A his right to autonomy. It seems that it is obvious that it not permissible for twin A to kill twin B. The following argument shows a more concrete view of the situation. It is morally impermissible for twin A to kill twin B if he has the right to life and the right to twin A?s body. Twin B does have a right to life. Twin B prima facie has the right to twin A?s body. Therefore it is morally impermissible for twin A to kill twin B. In turn this would create the argument that abortion is not permissible even when the pregnancy is not voluntary.

Judith Jarvis Thomson proposes her argument in her article, A Defense of Abortion. There, she explains to her readers during what circumstances is abortion justifiable. Thomson uses the argument by analogy strategy to explain to her readers her argument. She tries to reach her conclusion by comparing it to similar cases. The point she is trying to make is to tell her readers that abortion is morally permissible only in some cases, like when the mother has been a victim of rape, when contraception has failed or when the pregnancy is of danger to the mother. She explains to her readers that abortion is justifiable only in some cases, not all. Thomson uses the case of a violinist to show her readers that abortion is morally permissible when a woman has been victim of rape. She also uses the people seeds story as an analogy to explain that abortion is morally acceptable when contraception has failed. Thomson also mentions the right to life in her article. She uses the right to life to explain to us that it is morally justifiable for the mother to abort the fetus when the fetus is endangering the mother’s life. In order to help her readers understand the notion of right to life she is trying to propose to us, she does so by using the Henry Fonda example. In my point of view, I find most of Thomson’s analogies irrelevant to the argument she is trying to make. I will explain to my readers why I find Thomson’s analogies irrelevant.

The following essay will examine the morality of abortion with specific reference to the writings of Don Marquis, Judith Jarvis Thompson, Peter Singer and Mary Anne Warren. I will begin by assessing the strength of the argument provided by Marquis which claims that abortion is impermissible because it deprives a being of a potential “future like ours,” and then go on to consider the writings of Singer, Thomson and Warren to both refute Marquis claims and support my assertion that abortion is morally permissible primarily because of the threat to the freedom and bodily autonomy of women extending the right to life to a foetus in utero would pose.

'The Abortion' by Anne Sexton is a first person narrative poem in the style of a stream of consciousness and conveys a woman's emotional and physical journey whilst undergoing an abortion. I intend to discuss how through the effective use of imagery, tone, symbolism and word choice the poet successfully builds up an atmosphere which adds to your appreciation of the poem.