Philosophy Paper #1: Personal Identity

371). This responds to the objections raised by Thomas Reid in the 18th century (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340), however, the Memory Theory did require a modification to include the possibility of temporarily forgetting the experiences of an earlier person-stage, “as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it” (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340). In the conversations held by Gretchen Weirob, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen in Perry’s ‘Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality’ (Perry, 1977), this concept is addressed in depth. Miller relays a chapter written by Locke – “the relation between two person-stages or stretches of consciousness that makes them stages of a single person is just that the later one contains memories of an earlier one...I can remember only my past thoughts and feelings, and you only yours...take this relation as the source of identity” (Perry, 1977, p. 343). These concepts are logical possibilities in my opinion, and are far less unstable than those presented within the Body/Soul Theory, as these concepts do not require the senses of others, but the individual’s first person perception of their personal identity.

John Locke states that personal identity is a matter of physiological continuity that is based on the consciousness of a person rather than the individual’s body. Personal identity is constituted by memory connections; specifically the depiction of autobiographical memory connections that result in constituting personal identity. John Locke states that a person’s personality and psychology can be transferred to another body and that individual can still stay the same person because the consciousness of the person did not change. This idea is known as transplant intuition. This intuition is the basis of the account of personal identity. If a cerebrum was removed from one body and transplanted into a different body, the transplant intuition

In, “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,” the author, John Perry, proposes three totally different ways of thinking about personal identity. The first theory is presented by a character named Gretchen Weirob, she believes that a person is their body. By this she means that a person’s identity is intertwined with the DNA and molecules of their body. Their personality as well as their personal identity can’t be separated from their body, and they cannot exist without it. The second theory was presented by a character named Sam Miller, he believes that a person is their immaterial soul. So in general, Sam thinks that the soul is this invisible, immaterial substance that is able to exist from the body. The third and final theory was presented by a character named Dave Cohen. Cohen believes that a person has continuity of memory, and/or psychology. So in general Cohen’s theory is that personal identity is a set of correlating experiences and/or memories enclosed in the brain. All three of the personal identity theories state some very valid points, but they also have some inconsistencies, some more than others. But there is one theory that seems to be the most credible, and creates a very compelling argument while also having a little science to back up some of its points.

This paper is about organ transplantation; the surgical removal of an organ from one person, which is then transplanted into a recipient with organ failure. (The Organ Transplant Process | organdonor.gov, 2017). The donor can be alive, but in the case of unpaired vital organs the donor must be dead. In this paper I will propose three questions in relation to organ transplantation. The main concepts underlying these questions will be cartesian dualism, which is a philosophy that argues that the humans consists of a palpable body and intangible mind. (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987). Do we merely have bodies or are our bodies part of us?

Despite the advanced science involved, the philosophical issues are not new. English philosopher John Locke “argued that our identity is to be found in the continuity of our consciousness rather than in the continuity of our bodies.” (Solomn 323) Spridonov would agree with Locke: in interviews, he has stressed that he only sees this procedure as a way for him to live on with a new and healthy body. According to both Locke and Spridonov, the person with Spridinov’s head and someone else’s body would be mentally continuous with Spridinov and so would be

The concept of identity is highly paradoxical at best. The notion of having a “true” identity is ultimately impossible. Each of us will take on slightly different identities to acceptably fit given situations. Although he focuses on identifying with another person or object, Burt Olivier is a notable scholar that has written extensively on identity.

There are many questions surrounding personal identity: whether it consists in consciousness, whether we are just a soul or a mind and are we only who we can remember being? Locke claims that our personal identity is found in our identity of consciousness, yet can this be true if a person can change bodies, or one mind can be inhabited by various persons? In this essay, I will first be looking at Locke’s account of personal identity and how he comes to the conclusion that personal identity consists over time. From this, I will then counter-argue Locke’s ideas with Thomas Reid’s discussion on the transitivity of identity, and how Locke’s argument of how consciousness makes the same person over time is inconsistent. In response to Reid’s

The body, as a whole, is always a body composed of many bodies.There is a plurality of bodies in our body just as there are many lives in our life which is why in order for things to make sense they have to make sense as a whole in our lives and why you have to affirm the soul just as you affirm life itself. One must come up with an idea of soul that does not create an intrinsic hierarchy considering we are not on any other level separate from the souls of plants and animals, we

Towards the continuity theory, I felt as if my grandmother did what she could, how she could. She could no longer do the cooking she loved to do when she was younger. So, she stopped cooking, and adapted to reading her bible more, and listening to the radio. This might be true for some people, but I do not feel that it’s true for the majority. Many older people are comfortable leaving their old habits and hobbies in the past. Some choose to accept the fact that they can no longer do these things and adapt to the

To begin with, personal identity refers to the concept that a person develops regarding themselves, and it usually evolves in the course of their lives (Perry, 2008). According to Locke’s, it may include aspects of one’s life that they may not have control over, for instance, the color of your skin of the place that you grew up. Also, he believes that you can demonstrate your personal identity externally through your interaction with others or even what you wear. John Locke tackles the aspect of personal identity and also the survival of consciousness after death. In his explanation, he gives a criterion of personal identity over time. The approach postulates that insofar is the sufficient and necessary condition for a person to survive. According to John Locke, personal identity is dependent on the psychological continuity, and he deliberates personal identity to be established on the consciousness and not the substance of either the body or the soul.

When does a body become a person? The act of being does not constitute a meaningful and fulfilling life. Because life and the biological system can survive through intervention, does that mean the body is a person? To be a person is to contribute to society, community, family, self. Without the ability to contribute, life is not living and at which point the body is not a person.

To begin, my first argument is composed of Cohen and Miller’s use of the brain donor example. The illustration is primarily used against the body theory in order to support my thesis by using psychological factors to self-identify as the same person before and after a brain transplant. Cohen and Miller originally use this argument in rebuttal to Perry, who suggests it is the body donor that survives instead of the brain. However, the new body no longer hosts the previous brain it was born with, which first identified itself as the body. So the body’s individual has been completely removed and changed to the new brain’s identity. Therefore, the argument suggests that the seat of personal identity is within the brain. Since the brain itself remains unchanged, so does the individual.

Many people question themselves, what is it exactly that makes them unique? What is it that defines them as a unique person that no one in the world possesses? In philosophy, these questions do not have just one answer, and all answers are correct depending on which theory appeals most and makes sense to you. In general, there are two ways people approach this question, some say that a person’s identity is the “self” that carries all of their experiences, thoughts, memories, and consciousness (ego theorists), and some say that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences and events that a person has been through in their life, these people deny that the “self” exists (bundle theorists). In this paper, I will be arguing that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences, denying the self and the memory criterion.

We live within the idea that the body and mind are who we are. This is not unusual. But from a yogic perspective it is not the whole truth. When we are young, we are told that our essence is called soul, but we are given