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Polarization In Congress

Decent Essays

All 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives were up for reelection in 2010. In the 2010 U.S. House election, the average amount spent by Super PACs in 87 districts was $242,580; see Table 1 and Figure 1 for average spending by outside entities and challengers. The maximum about Super PACs spent was $912,503 in Colorado’s Fourth Congressional District, where Cory Gardner (R) defeated incumbent Betsy Markey (D). The average independent expenditures by political parties in 94 districts was $1,238,897. The maximum outside party spending was $4,289,706 in Michigan’s Seventh Congressional District, where Tim Walberg (R) beat incumbent Mark Schauer (D). The average challenger spending was $704,692 in 366 districts. Figures 2, shows the …show more content…

Outside party spending has a significant effect in 2010 on member’s ideological position in the 112th Congress (p = 0.03). When there is outside spending present in a district, there is a slight impact on a member polarization score, which decreases by 0.003 units. While the substantive effect of outside party spending is minimal, at best, the null hypothesis can be rejected. Outside party spending promotes moderation of ideological positions by members of Congress. The cross-level interaction of Super PAC spending and the percent of Obama’s state vote share is significant (p = 0.01). The null hypothesis can be rejected, for the interaction of Super PAC spending in relation to Obama’s state vote share diminishes extreme ideological scores in Congress. Figure 3, shows predicted logarithmic effects of the interaction between the log of Super PAC spending and Obama’s votes share. As the log of Super PAC spending increases and the percentage of Obama vote share in the state is low at 35%, there is a greater movement to an extreme position compared to when Obama’s vote share is at 65%. Very minuscule moderating effect on a member’s polarization

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