Polaroid vs. Kodak

The problem in this case is concerned with Eastman Kodak losing its market share in film products to lower-priced economy brands. Over the last five years, in addition to being brand-aware, customers have also become price-conscious. This has resulted in the fast paced growth of lower priced segments in which Kodak has no presence.

Polaroid’s overall growth strategy was to be the number one and only instant photography company through the invention of it’s own technology in its own laboratories. “Growth objectives are a key part of an organization’s overall strategic plan. Almost all strategic plans deal with the size the company wishes to be in the future” (Human Resource Management pg. 110). One of the ways in which Polaroid planned to be the only instant photography company—in turn would also make it the greatest—was through 533 patents. “Polaroid is still characterized by many as a company that hold too tight a grip on its patents” (Human Resource Management pg. 130). Polaroid’s strategic plan was always to stick with their one invention, improve on it’s technology, and target the sole market. This affected HR planning and strategy because Edwin H. Land did not want to enter other markets; Land wanted Polaroid to be about instant photography. The decision to stay in only one market affected HR from doing what they are suppose to do. It prevented them from being creative or innovative.

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

a. How does Polaroid’s distribution needs vary by subsidiary in Europe? What are the implications of these differences? You must consider the cultural diversity of the countries in Europe where Polaroid operates.

The names of Kodak and Fujifilm are well known around the world. They are two companies that have made a name from photos, film, cameras and printers. They are competitors that started in the same business and took different paths. Though they shared similar products their management direction and company direction differed. The differences led one company to be successful and the other to struggle.

Polaroid Corporation, headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, was a company marketed a wide variety of instant photographic products for consumers and industries. After the deregulation of US motor industry consolidation of the warehouses in US took place, which resulted in an improved service level and reduced costs. Overwhelmed by the consolidation results, the management wanted to consolidate the subsidiaries’ warehouses in the Europe to a direct distribution.

It is considered that photography only became widely available to the public when the Kodak Eastman Company introduced the box shaped Brownie Camera in 1900. (Baker, n.p.) Its features became more refined since its original placing on the market; one of the reasons why it has become considered the birth of public photography is because of the processing. Using a similar image capture system, the brownie exposed the light to a 120mm roll of film, which could be wound round, meaning six photographs could be taken before the slides needed removing. The first Brownie used a six-exposure cartridge that Kodak processed for the photographer. (Kodak.com, n.d.) Realistically, the armature photographers did not need to understand darkroom processes,

* Introduces the construction and use of statistical process control (SPC) charts and an understanding of the relationship between SPC and conformance quality.

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

What I feel about Kodak’s move was that they are trying to make a space for themselves in an already crowded market. Kodak is trying to carve out a niche for them by offering inks for low prices. But, they have forgotten the abilities of the competitors. They have probably underestimated them. HP and Canon are big names in the printing industry and because of their continued rollout of good quality products; customers trust them more than they trust Kodak. It is also observed that Kodak had forgotten that if HP lowers their price to almost the same level like Kodak, Kodak won’t stand a chance. The only way that Kodak can hope to make some profit is by hoping that their competitors won’t reduce the price of the inks as it is the only source of revenue in the printing industry. But I am pretty sure that marketing research people of Kodak has made a blunder by opting for this. The major fact is that they have forgotten cartridge refilling industry which is cheap too and people have started to use that as they are comparatively cheaper to the original printing inks. I sincerely feel that Kodak has taken the wrong path to get out of their troubles.

In late March 1996, Ralph Norwood was faced with the task of restructuring Polaroid’s capital structure. In the past, Polaroid had a monopoly in the instant-photography segment. However, with upcoming threats in the emerging digital photography industry and Polaroid experiencing recent losses in their market share due to Kodak’s competition, Gary T. DiCamillo, recently appointed CEO of Polaroid, headed a restructuring plan to stimulate the firm’s performance. The firm’s new plan has goals such as to aggressively exploit the existing Polaroid brand, introduce product extensions, and enter new emerging markets such as Russia in order to secure Polaroid’s future.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay