Power Transition Theory And The Balance Of Power Theory

Realism is one of the most dominant international relations theories in the academic world. But within Realism, Realists are split on a number of issues. A perfect example of which being the rise of China. Over the past 30 years China has increased not only in population and power, but has also achieved one of the strongest economies in the world. The rise of China is seen as problematic by many realists. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has enjoyed a position of hegemony in the unipolar power structure of the world. Many fear that the rise of China could upset the current balance of power. One such individual is a prominent realist scholar, John Mearsheimer. He believes that war with China is inevitable and “calls for the US to do whatever it can to slow China’s rise.” Another political theorist Jonathan Kirshner wrote this paper to counter many of Mearsheimer’s claims, stating that Mearsheimer’s offensive realism “is wrong, and dangerous”. Kirshner suggests that instead of using offensive realism we should look instead to the theories roots in classical realism to analyse the rise of China.

The program includes initiatives to bolster the national economy and gain global influence through exploiting natural resources, increased missile program, and development of a eugenics program to foster a greater generation (Lieberthal 3). The program is an attempt by China to become a world power by the end of the decade. While China has started developing these programs it is still necessary for them to build a large amount of infrastructure to become a global leader. People that worry about China’s comprehensive national power program fear a slow increase of China’s influence in global conflicts and economic presence. While a slow increase in China’s influence would change the global dynamic, America would remain as a global power. However if war with China and a large selloff of American debt, China would quickly rise to as a global power by reducing America’s economic stability. War with China and a selloff of United States debt would create drastic changes in American stability, and should be of greater concern than China’s comprehensive national power

The recent interactions of emerging and established states suggest that the existing standards of the current global economy are shifting. According to Stewart Patrick in his article “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” the United States must accommodate for emerging states within the global economy and refrain from enforcing their values of an open and liberal international economy in order to achieve effective cooperation. Similarly, Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue in their article “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijingʻs Fears” that as China gains more influence within the global economy, the United States will have to respond appropriately to maintain its economic values. Both articles ultimately assert that

The rise of China has been one of the most fiercely debated topics in modern history among political scientists about whether the rise is good or bad for western civilization, and more specifically the hegemony of the United States. With many people and political scientists split on the issue. The reason for this split on opinion can be blamed on the how Political Scientists view the world and whether they are inherent: a Liberal (in International Relations Terms), a Realist, or a Constructivist.

The United States and China have had a well-documented rocky relationship. It has become common knowledge that America is in debt to China for around a trillion dollars. With countries like the United States indebted to them, there seems to little doubt that China is well on it's way to becoming a super power. Author John Tkacik agrees with this notion, and suggests that all evidence points to China becoming a military superpower. He goes on to state that in less than a decade, China will become America's only competition for both military or strategic influences. On the other hand, however, author Samuel Bleicher disagrees due to the disadvantages of having a Communist government, as well as, weak economic, social, and legal structure. He

The United States held 24.6% of world income in 1980 and 19.1% in 2011. (Sachs 2012) Many also believe that China is set to become the world’s largest economy in the near future. However, the ‘danger’ for US power is not that China will become the strongest economy on the global scale. As Drenzer argues, China ‘won’t prosper economically, as it won’t embrace capitalism’. In the long run, the danger to the US is that US power will decline ‘on all fronts’, not just economically. (Drenzer, Rachman & Kangan)

It is no longer appropriate to say, “China is quickly emerging as a global superpower.” The fact is China is just that. Realizing this the United States of America has attempted to once again turn its focus eastward. Continuing problems at home and in the Middle East however have made doing so difficult. Additionally more and more frequently attempts at influencing the ongoing narrative in the Asia- Pacific region have been rebuffed. Even allies have found strength in the emergence of a system that fails to conform to previously prescribed methods and ideals. This leads to a fundamental question America must answer quickly. Has the growing hypocrisy of idealistic political rhetoric versus actual foreign policy finally undermined American credibility with developing nations, or for the purposes of this paper more specifically China? The answer is yes.

Every country since the beginning of time has competed with one another to be the most dominant country with the most power. International power differs a little bit from domestic power. Power in regards to global affairs are tangible and intangible resources that have underlying power relationships. Tangible things would be a powerful army. Some of the intangible things would be allies. There are three types of different relational power aspects. They are commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences. Commanding change is when you can convince others to change their preferences to better accommodate yours. Controlling agendas is when you make another person's agenda irrelevant and replacing it with your own. Establishing

Ho-fung Hung’s work attempts to reconcile the widespread expectation that China’s rise would lead to a fundamental change in the global status quo with the observed fact that China has become increasingly connected to and one with the global status quo. To do this, he must first examine China’s rise and prove that it upholds the global status quo, and further must look into the origins of China’s rise, going back to the 13th century, to understand why this rise seemingly changed so little about the global world order.

The events that have taken place over the past couple of centuries, and more so the past decade, have monumentally impacted the relationship between the United States and China for better and for worse. Today, China and the U.S. have evolved into two of the most elite superpowers in the world, and they classify as some of the most prominent leaders in economics, military, technology, and universal innovation. Currently, the United States is just weeks away from electing their next president, cyber-attacks are being investigated exponentially, and the South China Sea Debate continues to be disputed. The outcomes of all these events will undoubtedly affect the relationship between China and the United States for the next 10 years.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become more integrated and willing to cooperate within the global political and economic systems than ever in its history. However, there is growing apprehension in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. in regards to the consequences of rising in economic and military power in China. Descriptions about Chinese diplomacy in the policy and scholarly are less positive lately concerning China’s obedience to regional and international rules. There was little debate in the U.S. and elsewhere in regards to whether China was or was not part “the international community.” Scholars and experts in the early 1990s have contended

Realism assumes that under a balance of power, the overriding aim of all states is to maximize power and become the only hegemony in the system. States only help themselves in the anarchic international system. Therefore, China’s rise is regarded as a disconcerting threat to the U.S.’s primacy of power in the present international stage. The power shift in East Asia is creating security dilemmas; the U.S. thus demands more security to its Asian allies including Philippines, Japan and South Korea. The rapidly-rising Chinese power would inevitably challenge the current international balance of power and appear aggressively in the eyes of weaker power such as the Philippines. Therefore it seeks help to its ally, the U.S., to counterbalance the power of China. China intends to gain more resources and to transform current international order to its favor according to its national interests. The 2010 Chinese White Paper on National Defence states that: “Contradictions continue to surface between developed and developing countries and between traditional

Theories are used in many fields of science, but in no field are they more prevalent than Political Science. These theories are often used and researched upon to try and attempt to discern how states interact with one another. Offensive Realism, a new branch of realist political theory, is brought forth in John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. This theory focuses on the key aspects of realism, while adding a twist as to why war is an option. In his book, Mearsheimer explains the history of great powers, and predicts that China, the world’s current rising great power, will not gain hegemony in Asia peacefully. With the rise of China, he asserts the US will form coalitions with multiple states throughout Asia, to contain their growing power. This rise in power, and subsequent reactions by the US, are based on his theory Offensive Realism, which is used to predict China’s future actions. The rise of powers, and the reactions of other powers, is historically analyzed, beginning in the late 18th century, all the way to modern times. These analyzes each attempt to support his overall claim that China will rise through non-peaceful means, and shows significant support with historical examples. While the theory often meets an exception when the usual non-European power, Japan, is mentioned, Mearsheimer’s theory introduces a solid new aspect to the realm of Political Science, and presents enough evidence and information to be considered integral to

Snyder claims that realism failed to predict the Cold War. Given this, Mearsheimer states “China cannot rise peacefully.” Since realists describe the world as a self-help system, according to Posen, every country “must look to its own interests relative to those of others” and because “security is the preeminent issue in an anarchic world, the distribution of capabilities to attack and defend should matter.” Thus, because China’s strive for regional hegemony inevitably threatens the power dynamic of the global system, the U.S. will, according to Mearsheimer, take an offensive realist approach that will eventually lead to war. In addition, as seen in post-Cold War, economic stability greatly determines the distribution of power. Friedberg notes, that the projected “speed and magnitude of China’s growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented” and as early as 2015, “China’s economy could overtake that of the United States.” Although the U.S. faces an unprecedented challenge to economic power, according to Ikenberry, China has signaled cooperation by “redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones.” Nevertheless, following the actions of the U.S. post WWII, China strategically makes “itself more predictable and approachable” to reduce “the incentives for other

seen in history that it is possible to restrain the players. It is said to be