Pragmatic Pacifism And Peacemaking Must Be Seen As Parts Of A Broad Framework For Building Cultures

The documentary “Ghost in Rwanda” illustrates the devastation of the 1994 Genocide where approximately eight hundred thousand Rwandans were exterminated by their own government. The genocide was a result of ongoing conflicts between the Hutu, the ethnic majority in Rwanda, and the Tutsi the ethnic minority. The United Nation assisted in the establishment of a peace agreement between the two warring parties and sent General Romeo Dallaire, UN Force Commander, to Rwanda to ensure the terms of the agreement were honored. Dallaire had never seen action and welcomed opportunity to make a difference supporting peace in Africa. The peace mission was especially important to Dalliaire in light of recent U.N. failures to maintain peace in Somalia and Bosnia.

[2] When determining US policy, diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft should be more readily deployed than military intervention for the purpose of genocide prevention and mitigation. As interventionist Samantha Power notes in her book, A Problem From Hell, “[t]he United States should not frame its policy options in terms of doing nothing or unilaterally sending in the marines.” The period of time pre-genocide, which may be characterized by internal unrest or civil war, is a key period of time for U.S. policymakers interested in preserving human life and a nation’s stability. If policymakers fear the development of genocide, they can take steps such as threatening legal consequences, enacting economic sanctions, or “calling on countries aligned with perpetrators to ask them to use their influence.” All of these and similar options are far less risky to the U.S. than a military intervention and can be readily applied in order to prevent violence escalating into genocide or in the case of a suspected, but unconfirmed, genocide.

This New York Times article covers the reasoning behind the U.N.’s failure to put an end to the Bosnian genocide. Up until 1995, the U.S. refused to intervene in the genocide taking place in Bosnia. The American government refused sending in their own troops and also vetoed Security Council draft resolutions to increase the number of UN peacekeepers. The American foreign policy toward Bosnia changed in 1995 due to new evidence of the atrocities being committed in Bosnia. This evidence was becoming common knowledge to the public and the United States’ lack of action was becoming an embarrassment. Because their inaction would make America look bad, this gave them no choice but to interfere in

American involvement in humanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial issues in contemporary US foreign policy. The definition of humanitarian intervention is a military intervention; entering into a country for the purposes of saving lives and protecting citizens from the violation of their human rights. As in all debates, there are always two sides. One side disputes that military force should only be applied when, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, ‘a vital national interest is at stake.’ ¹ The opposing side disputes that the US should apply military force to mediate when in the words of former president Clinton, “someone comes after innocent civilians…and it is in our power to stop it, we will stop

In 1994, one of the most brutal genocides of all time took place in the small country of Rwanda. Over the span of approximately 100 days, 800,000 Rwandans were killed—an average of 8,000 people per day— with Tutsis being the primary target. The staggering numbers called for international intervention, yet the action taken across the world was slim. Samantha Power’s “Bystanders to Genocide” reveals that the U.S.’s handling of the Rwandan genocide under the Clinton Administration was both minimalistic and ineffective. She discusses how the U.S. made full effort to pull out all Americans and then pulled back completely on aid, put their own interests above the needs of the Rwandans, and used the history of a similar situation in Somalia to validate their reluctance to take action. Power’s article presents a strong case for why the action, or lack of action, taken by the U.S. was a poor handling of the situation, but leaves the reader with little understanding of why these decisions were made. By examining the U.S.’s decisions in relation to the ideas that Dalai Lama discusses in “Beyond Religion”, the question of why can be answered. Through this lens one can see that the true reason behind their decisions is a lack of “genuine compassion”. This lacking becomes the basis of their decisions, and becomes a rational for standing by during the murder of 800,000 people.

Internally, the U.N. leadership charged with handling peacekeeping operations did not have enough time to setup and receive proper instruction as to the events transpiring in Somalia. Second, the manner with which the U.N. planned to continue U.S. operations did not align with the actions taken by their predecessors. “Such changes of leadership, tradition, doctrine, personal chemistry, operating procedures, policy instincts, and bureaucratic systems were bound to disrupt the effectiveness and credibility of the military presence” (Crocker, 1995). Aside from operational failures by the UN and US in Somalia as a part of UNOSOM II, Richard K. Betts explains well another key reason why failure was imminent. In his article “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention”, he says that foreign nations can’t just provide military assistance in terms of a peacekeeping effort, because when the fight is “over” what is to say further uprising will not continue (Betts, 1994). Avoiding a lack-luster strategy of neutrality in times of conflict, he advocates for decisive action on behalf of a favored organization. In the case of UNOSOM II, coalition forces should have worked harder to politically intervene. By not rebuilding a political structure in Somalia, a vacuum of power continued to exist, resulting in a continuous oligarchy dominated by the

Prior to the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994, the United Nations had established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces consistent of just over 2,000 personnel, and was responsible for the supervision the transition from war to peace. Their responsibilities included ‘monitoring the ceasefire, assisting with demobilisation and mine clearance, and encouraging the facilitation of political and social conditions that would allow a transitional government to take control.1

During the 1990’s, Somalia had a famine crisis, which many Westerners labeled as a ‘humanitarian crisis.’ As always, the hegemon, which was the United States, stepped up to the plate and helped in providing food for the starving Somalis. Seeing starving children drew Westerners to sympathize with these individuals and they blamed the inept Somali government for not doing enough to help its citizens. The intervention was meant to deliver food to the Somalia, but later that turned to ‘mission creep’, “the temptation commanders feel to chase success and perhaps glory around the next corner by expanding their mandate and rolling over anyone in their way” (Hoagland, 1: 1993). What was a humanitarian crisis has now turned into a nation-building

The topic of the United Nations’ (UN) interventions has been a source of heated dispute by scholars since their intervention in the Korea War in 1951. However there are interventions that garner more controversy than others. The tragedies of the Rwandan Genocide and the Bosnian Genocide have been hailed as some of the greatest failures in the United Nations peacekeeping and intervention missions. The Rwandan and Bosnian genocides brought around a deep, introspective critique within the UN on its role in the prevention of genocides and the protection of citizens at risk that has ultimately proved inconsequential in effectively addressing more contemporary cases of genocide. After these genocidal incidents, the United Nations published reports

Humanitarian intervention is argued to be a necessary means as to prevent foreign states abusing the human rights of its citizens; this position is essentially held by the powers which have the capacity to undertake (but also to undermine) these international interventions. This argument that if taken at face value could be seen by the majority as a respectable position to support as it is popularised by the altruistic feelings garnered from the vocal support, or silent nonchalance towards the enacting powerful groups of humanitarian intervention agencies such as the United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA/US). This essay will expand upon the moral codes of which humanitarian interventions are based upon; I do however counter these idyllic foundations with the outcomes from two specific case studies being the US’s Iraq “humanitarian intervention” and the UN’s Libyan humanitarian intervention. These two case studies showcase the alternative neo-colonialist motives behind organizations’ altruistic façade which frames the lives of people as sufferers in conflicts, which is done to support their interventions.

The United Nations efforts in peace-keeping operations in Rwanda had many setbacks and was considered to be a failure for many reasons. One of the reasons being the International community’s failure to make a distinction between a civil war and genocide in Rwanda. (Khan, 196) This meant that the little effort presented by the UN department of peacekeeping operations was often too late. In previous years the world has witnessed countless civil wars which have taken place in Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Georgia and Angola. However, genocide was not present in these wars and was uncommon. (Khan, 196) According to Alain Destexhe, Rwanda was only the third experience of genocide in this century. Thus, with the ongoing tensions and unrest, dating back to 1990, between the Hutu-led government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) it was evident that Rwanda was on course for a civil war but what was failed to realise was that a genocide was also taking place. (Khan, 197)

The age old question of humanitarian intervention in the world of international politics and foreign affairs is a question with no clear answer. In some cases, intervention is seen as a sign of weakness or is taken offensively by the country in which other parties are intervening in. On the other hand, intervention by foreign parties in some cases is greatly appreciated. These two cases, on opposite ends of the spectrum, are more often than not pretty clear answers. The case of the Rwandan Genocide lies in the midpoint of this spectrum is what we will be investigating further to examine whether or not outsiders have the right to intervene, and if so, who has the right to intervene. We will examine several cases throughout recent history in the contents of this paper of intervention in hopes of finding determining factors which in turn lead to humanitarian intervention, support, or no intervention at all.

The main aim of the mission was to help Somalia halt the ravaging civil war that has brought the country to its knees. Somalia is an African country that is located in the eastern part of the continent. Since the fall of the Barre regime in 1986, the country has been seen all forms of war up till the late 2000’s. After the fall of this regime various armed groups began to seek power.

This paper is an analysis of the 1991 humanitarian intervention of the USA into Somalia. The concept of the “humanitarian” mission is embedded into the analyses of the American rhetoric concerning their newfound concern for the area. The military and cultural reasons for the failure are mentioned, as well as the habitual rejection of UN guidelines for it. In fact, this is an excel;lent example of a botched program that seems destined to become the future norm.

“Give War a Chance” is an article written by the American economist, historian and military strategist Edward Nicolae Luttwak in 1999, in the American magazine Foreign Affairs. It make an easily understandable “buzz”, since its main assumption is that most kind of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations are, in an objective point of view, a bad thing for the peace, and that it tends, paradoxically, to slower its establishment. We will analyze here the main hypothesis that Luttwak is developing among the article, the first one being the destruction of the legitimacy usually accorded to peacekeeping operations, led by the UN or by other military organizations, and the second one being the obstacle to a durable peace establishment, created