President Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'Domino Theory Principle'

I think the final reason I found this essay so compelling was its relevance in today’s world. The topic of nuclear war is as prominent as ever in our society, yet to any of us who weren’t alive during the second world war to see the only instances of this weapon ever used, it seems so foreign. And to see such a passionate, rational, and objective view

President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his impressive diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” He wielded that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy during the early twentieth century. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him was the superior muscle power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nations ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms within the state. Powerful states employ all the elements of power to include diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and of course military to meet their national objectives. Although one might expect that militarily powerful states regularly triumph over weaker states in matters of war, superior military power does not guarantee a victory. This paper will show that states possessing weaker military power are capable of defeating militarily superior states that struggle to formulate sound military strategies for their armies, fail to generate the required military effectiveness on the battlefield, or cannot overcome the unpredictability of war.

Specifically, George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ served as the outline for a strategy designed to contain Soviet expansionism and imperialism (“Iron Curtain”, CNN). The policy of containment would ultimately drive the decision to employ force in countering the aggression of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Kennan’s assessment of the Soviets proved accurate, and on 29 August 1945, Stalin’s regime tested their first atomic bomb successfully (Judge & Langdon, 66). This test represented a restoration in the Cold War’s balance of power, but for the United States, it signified a tremendous loss in advantage (Judge & Langdon, 67). This strategic balance limited America’s strategic options, which hinged largely upon the idea of nuclear deterrence. With the advent of the Soviet nuclear era, America now found itself in a tit-for-tat scenario and subject to the perceived unpredictability of Stalin (“Korea”, CNN). Moreover, 1949 also saw the victory of Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the

This paper will opposed a lot of previous thoughts about how close the world came to nuclear war, but instead attempt to show how close it felt, and how it was in fact both Khrushchev and Kennedy’s commitment to avoid nuclear war that kept that idea distant. Throughout this paper I involve a brief overview of how the crisis unfolded and will outline the difficulties which made the crisis what it was, as well as drawing up why the crisis was seen as the closest the world has come to nuclear war. I will then advance to why Khrushchev and Kennedy had no

I disagree with Kenneth Waltz’s position that nuclear proliferation makes the world a safer place, and how best to measure the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in regimes that are developing, unstable, or “third-world.”1 While some scholars see nuclear weapons as a threat to stability and peace due to their mass destruction capability and the potential for horrific fallout triggered by ethnic and geopolitical instability, others see those weapons as holding the power to maintain an appropriate balance of power between opposing regimes at times of tension and during periods of low level conflict. This debate is reflected in international relations.

The domino theory was the common thought that if one country came under the influence of communism, then the rest of the countries surrounding it would too, one by one in a domino manner. According to “Dig Deeper”, “In communist nations, people were not allowed to own land, follow their religious beliefs, or speak and act freely. Americans were afraid that the Soviets would take over the U.S. and take away their freedoms.” When America has always been known as the land of the free and home of the brave, it was no surprise Truman feared all of his country's freedoms being taken away due to communism. “Dig Deeper”’s text renders the extent of America’s repulsion towards communism and why America’s leader strongly felt that way. Referring to the U.S, “Determined not to "lose" another country to communism, and interested in shoring up its anticommunist credentials, the Truman administration found itself defending a nation a world away from U.S. soil.” This source of information in the article, “The United States Enters the Korean Conflict“ depicts on how far Truman was willing to go and how he would take any means necessary for the expansion of communism to be stopped thus supporting Truman's fear of

The recent bombing in Afghanistan begs the question whether the president has too much power over war instigation matters. The opinion column by Michael Krepon on the New York Times titled “How to Make the Nuclear Button Safer” addresses the unsettling problem, that at the event of war, the president has unrestrained power of launching a nuclear attack.

Secretary of State John Kerry apparently “ ‘let [members of the Gulf Cooperation Council] know that there is going to be live oversight over Iran not to gain or to get any nuclear weapons’ ” (Gordon). I argue that the fear of nuclear weapons is due to the happenings of the Cold War. The fact that the United States almost went to nuclear war with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Bay of Pigs conflict is in the front of the minds of world leaders and those in charge of countries worldwide. Due to this, any discussion of nuclear capabilities is understandably handled with an abundance of

You might wonder what the Domino theory had to do with the cold war? The cold war nation was born of the domino theory which held , if one of our neighboring countries fell under communist influence or control we would soon follow ( U.S History ).The U.S. got involved with the domino theory

Society might argue that there is evil, yet what some call evil others call good. Nuclear weapons are the greatest legacy from the Cold War. Since then, generations have grown up afraid of a sudden nuclear war. The two words aforementioned can make many people shiver, and it can also get them to debate. From debating these two words, came two common beliefs: it is either the most dangerous challenge we face as a community and should be “un-invented”, or although they pose a significant threat they are essential to our defense.

Carl Sagan very memorably likened the nuclear arms race to “two sworn enemies standing waist deep in gasoline – one with three matches, the other with five.” This scenario underscores the false sense of security, the fallacy of nuclear superiority, and the danger posed by the proliferation and mere existence of weapons capable of achieving nuclear holocaust and widespread destruction. This essay will analyze and acknowledge the grounds for supporting/tolerating nuclear proliferation using the cases of Israel and Iran as examples, while arguing that theoretical grounds for proliferation do not outweigh the actual and potential risks of escalation to nuclear war, nuclear miscalculation or accident, or nuclear technology falling into the hands of increasingly sophisticated terrorist groups.

An advertising executive named John Caples once said, “Times change, people don’t.” History students learn it is an axiom, and I have always been a devout student of history. What that statement means, is that as a species our motivations have always remained the same. The cause of almost every conflict throughout history has remained the same. The reasons can be economic, logistical, ideological, vengeful, or religious among others. However, parallels to any current or future issue can be discovered by studying history. The concerns related to nuclear conflicts are not new to me; it is merely history repeating itself. I grew up during the Cold War, the era of Détente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union. I lived within fifteen miles of Warner Robins Air Force Base, one of a handful of logistical support centers for the U.S.

The existence of nuclear weapons for better or worse have indubitably impacted our lives in one way or the other. There are the some who find these weapons to be singularly beneficial. For example Defence Analyst Edward Luttwak said “we have lived since 1945 without another world war precisely because rational minds…extracted a durable peace from the very terror of nuclear weapons.” (Luttwak, 1983). Moreover, Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz both extrapolate that “the probability of war between American and Russia or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is practically nil precisely because the military planning and deployments of each,

By telling of how mankind has never created a device of such raw-controllable power, Eisenhower strategically challenges the fact of questionability of logic of producing said armaments, calling for means of the resolution of the global programs by way of formation of a sub-committee to regulate the control until discontinuance. Eisenhower strengthening his words by calling that ‘all’ countries of the world should be engaged in the disembarkation of activities involving such destructive armaments. Yet again accessing alliteration pointing emphasis to the audience that not one country, but ‘all’ are affected in these terms. The strategic literary tactic of indication of personal beliefs and attitudes by visualization of a the capability of a single warhead promotes to the audience the desolate future we as humanity are

Two types of influence models can be distinguished within the scholarly literature on political influence of arms. In the first model the deployment of weapons is used as a threat to make an adversary comply with the desires of weapons possessor (Schelling 1967). Under this setting the engagement of states in diplomatic relations prior to political crisis which requires such actions from the weapons’ possessor is not a necessary condition. In this context arms capability to hurt is turned into the bargaining power, and advantage is gained by playing on an adversary’s instinct to survive and avoid pain (Schelling 1967, 2–6).