Private Security Forces in Iraq

Operation Valhalla was an operation that was conducted in Operation Iraqi Freedom by US Army Special Forces in order to train the Iraqi Army Special Forces unit in order combat the insurgency that was seen in the Iraqi operations that were common occurrence. What had ensued during Operation Valhalla, the two Special Forces Unit (both US Army SF and Iraqi SF) had taken the fight to Jaish Al Mahdi, in order to stop the terror group conducting actions of murder and terror within the area of operations. What had occurred during this engagement was an overwhelming fight that resulted in the defeat of Jaish Al-Mahdi as well as recovering a hostage. This was a success for the two SF units, but what occurred after a media battle or intention to use Information Operations in order to discredit these units. (Dauber 2009, pg. 1-2)

However, this external trust has been fraying from the edges for many years – clear and realistic political strategy has been lacking from civilian leaders, a well-meaning yet disengaged public, and an insular military class that fails to organically adapt to emerging technologies. A clear and realistic political strategy determined by civilian leaders addresses the first leg of the strategic triad – government. It is said success begins at the top, with a cohesive vision and unified guidance. One doesn’t have to look further than the 2003 invasion of Iraq - then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed it would require no more than 150,000 troops to secure Iraq, despite the insistence of then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki that it would take 300,000 troops, a number derived from his experience in Bosnia. (Mills, 2013) However, this detail overshadows the deeper implication – that civilian leaders were not planning for stability operations, or had a plan in place after the conventional phase of the war. The lack of guidance and vision from the nation’s strategic leaders make it extremely difficult, if not impossible for the military to effectively prosecute

This includes finalized mutual assistance agreements that allow effective allocation and activation of neighboring state National Guard forces. As the U.S. embarks or responds to operations abroad, the reduction in the ability to accomplish the homeland security mission advances the importance of mutual assistance agreements. Additionally, the U.S. Northern Command is responsible for finalizing the plan for ensuring balance between the National Guard forces at home or abroad through coordination with integral federal agencies (Laurent, 2004). Thorough coordination will alleviate the various funding issues, as the Guard has limited access to Department of Homeland Security grants. In 2008, the RAND Corporation reported the “ratio between military and non-military national security spending” was 17 to 1 respectively (2008, p. 2). As Gregory Jaksec (2006) makes evident in his report, the solution to balance funding for non-military national security requires an alignment between private and federal sectors through incentives that promote capital investment in homeland

The article talks about the influence of lobbyist on congress, and the big players like Lockheed in taking billions in tax payer money for unessential military contracts. The author also stresses former president Eisenhower’s words about a strong military complex taking away liberty from the people. The influence is on congress from 100 contractors and their lobbyist on our politicians for appropriating contracts in the billions.

The escalation of conflict is not the only problem the increased number of private military contractors bring. These contractors have a different object and priority than the stationed troops in conflicts. The contractor's’ number one priority is protecting their asset, as the private corporations know that if the important figure they are assigned to protect gets captured or killed, it would be devastating for the business and most likely they would lose the funding the government provides. Since the priority of the contractors is to keep the asset safe, they will often be very aggressive, securing perimeters and stopping any vehicles that get too close. There has been many cases where the private contractors shoot at cars to stop them,

General Petraeus spent years developing an understanding of the Iraqi situation and counterinsurgency doctrine and he framed the coalition’s problem in military terms. Coalition forces must defeat the insurgency and secure the operations center of gravity, the Iraqi people, to shape conditions for political reconciliation. The MNF-I Commander recognized that ethnosectarian violence was the root cause of insecurity preventing political reconciliation and the future of Iraq depended upon resolving conflict through political discourse not armed conflict. General Petraeus’ concluded that MNF-I needed more forces to secure the populace, demonstrate American commitment and foster an environment of political reconciliation.

After the Cold War, the military began to use private contractors more. Defense industries have nearly doubled since 1999. Different type of contractors has begun to pop out. Things that were once military jobs have been handed over to civilian contractors. Companies such as Science Applications International Corporation and Computer Sciences Corporation have employed thousands of workers.

action responsible for the fostering of the Iraqi insurgency was the decision to disband the Iraqi military and security forces. The U.S. strategy for the transformation of Iraq appropriately included the removal of Ba’athist domination in all aspects of Iraqi governance. However, the prospect of a complete eradication would prove to be an elusive effort, as almost the entire male population of the country was in one way or another involved in the armed forces, the paramilitary forces, or the militias, as conscripts, recruits, and volunteers. Nonetheless, the head of the CPA, Paul Bremer, issued CPA Order 2, which dissolved all the formal armed and security units of the state, including the regular armed forces, the Republican Guard units, the intelligence and security services, and the ministries associated to their administration and supervision. The scale of this decision was extensive, as it eliminated the jobs of approximately 400,000 personnel, thus creating a significant gap in the host nation’s capacity to provide security. What is not quantifiable was the magnitude and scope of discontent among the former members of the security services resulting from this action, which exacerbated the rising resentment of the Iraqi population, further adding to the narrative of the nascent insurgent organizations. The dissatisfaction of the soldiers, coupled with their possession of skills that would prove to be highly valuable to an

Before we begin we must first understand the different definitions of proprietary and contract security operations. There are many definitions and explanations that are used to distinguish between the two but I will use the definitions provided by Fischer, in his book titled Introduction to Security. “Proprietary security operations are those that are “in-house,” or controlled entirely by the company establishing security for its operations” Fischer, Robert; Halibozek, Edward; Walters, David (2012-11-23). Introduction to Security (Kindle Locations 877-878). Elsevier Science. Kindle Edition. A good example of this would be if a company purchases all the equipment and security personnel to provide security functions

Since the Revolutionary War, America has used contractor support to supplement various roles throughout our military. Throughout the years, these roles have adapted, and the total number of contractors has increased. Today, the current ratio of contractor to service member is nearly 1 to 1 in a deployed theater. Think about that for a moment, for every Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, or Marine, there is a civilian contractor and, in most cases, their primary role is sustainment. Herein lies a fundamental problem, while we operate in relative safety in the COIN environment, how will these contractors function in a near-peer on peer threat scenario?

In response to the September 11th attacks, the United States launched the Global War on Terrorism, invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite these wars and the necessity for post-conflict stability operations, military leadership, including the Secretary of Defense, had neither desired nor trained its personnel to effectively conduct stability operations, which require effective interagency collaboration. Failing to effectively leverage interagency capabilities during the early phases of the 2003 Iraq War at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels prolonged the achievement of the U.S. military’s objective—transferring power to the Iraqis.

The use of mercenaries dates back to medieval ages, where kings and queens frequently hired them to fight battles in their name, and handle revolts and rebellions. However, the industry of hired soldiers was driven underground, and became nothing more than a whisper on the tongues of those who sought to use them for small conflicts and issues. Ironically, the development of drones and high tech weaponry has caused a revolution in the world of soldiers of fortune, and their presence in the battlefield is not unheard of in these violent times. So, knowing that they’re back, why haven’t we employed them globally? Well, the answer is that it’s simply hard to trust these combatants; after all, mercenaries have a notorious history of abandoning their original contractors for a higher bidder. Furthermore, having to keep them in check is a hassle; the US typically prefers for these corporations to abide by a ruleset on what they can and cannot use during armed conflicts. The issue with this is that we would be handicapping our own soldiers, and the risk of letting them use banned military equipment is simply too much. Don’t be mistaken, however; these armed mercenaries are far from weak, and they typically employ the best of the best. They also hold possession over numerous weapons, ranging from M4 carbines to armored vehicles that have been sold by various countries. To restate, the standard PMS is too costly, and too risky to deploy over our own armed forces, despite having a solid foothold in the war economy.

he future of private military companies (PMCs) is depended on several factors, direction of war, and regulation. There are certain factors that will help determine the long term impact with entrusting PMCs and PSCs with critical military and government functions for a long period of time. Those factors are cost efficiency, control, flexibility, control and transparency. These are some elements that will help determine the impact of the PMC and PSC impact with the government functions and also what direction the war is heading. First of all it will cost the government potentially a lot of money to keep having PMC conducting security forces functions. PSCs may be more expensive than military forces-particularly under circumstances when the US wants to provide the same level and quality of service as the military does or when there are high levels of danger. PMCs would be cost effective for the government for a short period, but for a long period of time it will be best to invest in the armed forces. Similarly, for those who believe that a long-term commitment is crucial to successful nation building in Iraq and worried that the US cannot sustain such a long term commitment, the use of PSCs may be a tool to substitute for troops and encourage staying power. Thus there are some significant benefits to be had from involving the private sector in security.

In 2008, the actress and activist Mia Farrow approached the private security company Blackwater and some human rights organizations with a proposition: Might it be possible to hire private military contractors to end the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan? Sean McFate, who had just finished working as a military contractor at DynCorp International, was asked to weigh

Certainly, Iraq’s new fighting force could not be a rebranded version of the army that the American encountered in 2003. Stationing staunch supporters of Saddam Hussein amongst the upper echelons of the military establishment would have undermined support for American intervention in Iraq amongst Shias and Sunnis. Such a development could hardly had ensured security and stability in post-invasion Iraq. To dismiss most Sunnis within the officer class, on the other hand, was equally ludicrous. The elites of the pre-existing army carried the intellectual capacity and the institutional memory necessary to rebuild the state and its institutions. Excluding them from the rebuilding process slowed down the process and created resentment amongst Sunnis.