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Problems Within Epistemology A New Approach Essay

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Fred Dretske (2005) rejects the claim that closure holds over known entailment. Dretske argues that propositions, P, have heavyweight implications, Q, which cannot be known by the same reasons that P is known by; and that if Closure holds this leads to scepticism. However, Dretske argues that we can rule out closure by acknowledging that relevant alternatives for P are distinct and separate from those for Q. Thus closure fails and scepticism is avoided. Intuitively I find myself agreeing with Dretske, but think that this intuition itself is part of the larger problem within epistemology. Using ideas from Nagel et al, I contend that the analytic approach to the problems of closure and knowledge itself is potentially limited; that gaps between thought modes can explain cases of apparent loss of knowledge as exposed by Dretske. Moreover, that if we want to further success regarding problems within epistemology a new approach may be needed. I suggest we look toward the rational sciences, and towards a form of experimental epistemology.

It’s commonly thought and reasonable to expect that if we know that a given proposition is true, that we can thereby deduce and know what is subsequent to it, its implications, are true also. If this is the case, knowledge would appear to be closed under known entailment, otherwise known as the Closure principle.

Closure Principle: if, while knowing P, S believes Q because S knows that P entails Q, then S knows Q (Luper 2016).

However,

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