Pros And Cons Of Operation Desert Storm

In 2003, President George Walker Bush and his administration sent the United States military to war in Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s ruler and dictator, who murdered over 600,000 innocent people, and “...used chemical weapons to remove Kurds from their villages in northern Iraq…” (Rosenberg 2). According to the Department of Defense’s website, the war removed Saddam Hussein from power, ending an era when “Iraqis had fewer rights than when its representatives signed the Human Rights Declaration in 1948” (1). American blood, money, and honor was spent in what was allegedly a personal war and perhaps a fight to gain oil and natural resources, but only history may reveal the truth. Although the Iraq War removed tyrant Saddam Hussein from power, the failures of the war dwarf the successes.

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

The fourth mission was to collect more information on Iraqis weapons of mass destruction activity, as with the objective of collecting information on other terrorist groups. The U.S military recovered documents on its illegal weapon programs. The fifth objective was too lock Iraq’s oil production and fields. Many people thought was the first objective because U.S military forces secured the filed within early hours of the war. The U.S had made announcement on April 14th, that all of Iraqis major oil sources were under control. There was very little damage on the resources. One of the last goals that were important to the United States was too give Iraq humanitarian relief and end sanctions. Even while the war was still in the process the U.S forces started to help the

The American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 led to the collapse of Saddam Hussein, yet unleashed a huge partisan war. The instability has led to many terrorist organizations feeding on the chaos, most notably, Al-Qaeda and, now, ISIS (Daesh). The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was not successful in stopping the spread of terrorism and has led to strained relations with many countries.

From August 2, 1990- February 28, 1991, the Gulf War was fought between the US-coalition forces and Iraq. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, decided to travel into the neighboring state of Kuwait because of a dispute over debt. The Iraqi Army’s occupation of Kuwait began on August 2, 1990. They were immediately condemned by the UN Security Council. George H. W. Bush then deployed troops into Saudi Arabia and urged allies to do the same. It became the largest military alliance since World War II.

Operation Anaconda was a major U.S. and Afghan combined offensive that took place in March of 2002. Named after the snake that would coil around its victim and squeeze the life out of them before devouring them, this was the intent of the offensive. This offensive would lead us into further development as a fighting force that would need to adjust, so that our decisions bring our Soldiers home. The Army Profession adamantly displayed itself throughout the battle and this paper will explain a few of these instances.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

The Iraq war has surely not long past in accordance to plot. The Bush administration’s aim to ‘swoop down from the sky, finish off a regime, pull again and reload the shotgun geared up for the subsequent target stalled as Iraq took far longer and became a long way greater complicated than turned into anticipated. There had been no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links between Saddam and Al Qaeda are unsubstantiated, human rights has had its setbacks, living conditions are negative and there is nevertheless ongoing internal battle and hostility. The oil producing undemocratic regimes of the region are still undemocratic, and anti-Americanism has fuelled extremism inside the region which can also further endanger

I’m no military genius but to win a war, you need to know: first, that you are at war, second, who your enemy is, and finally, what strategies you are going to engage to win.

The American way of war is not ‘one size fits all’ sort-to-speak. The United States has been involved in several different types of wars and military conflicts. Each condition was different and called for a unique strategy. Planners must learn from America’s past wars and use those lessons to devise plans that will decisively defeat the enemy. Because of an ever changing threat, planners must know and understand all of the various types of war, the many war strategies, and recognize the situations where it is appropriate to employ each. There are many nuances in a war that makes each conflict unique, so the military planner must be just as dynamic, creative and flexible in devising a strategic war plan. The nature and essence of war do not change, but the enemy, his tactics, his weapons and his methods do change. And so does the American way of war evolve to defeat every changing enemy

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Imagine you are a citizen in a small country on the persian gulf. All of the sudden you see smoke clouds instantly form on your invaders as you hear a loud BOOM! You rush into your home full of fear. A month later, soldiers come and destroy nearby patrol camps of the country nearby who invaded and annexed your country. That is what happened in Operation: Desert Storm in the eyes of the people of Kuwait. This event shows Justice is a valuable value. If America and the U.N.(United Nations) hadn’t helped Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi invasion would be unjustified because the reasons for war were small disputes between Kuwait and Iraq. Also Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries might have been invaded and then annexed into part of Iraq, which

Brian Linn argues, “A military institution’s concept of war is a composite of its interpretation of the past, its perception of present threats and it prediction of future hostilities.” With that in mind, ADRP 1-01 offers the following from Michael Howard, “I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter. What matters is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.”

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