Protecting the Welfare of Nonhuman Animals

Peter Singer has written many works in support of animal rights. In one of his greatest works Animal Liberation, Singer goes into great depths on how similar in biology animals are to human beings. Another strong point was not only the biological resemblance, but also the behavioral tendencies and traits humans and nonhuman species share. There are two major areas of focus that Singer puts emphasis on that need to be recognized for the purposes of my argument. One focus is this utilitarian approach that only the human species carry: the belief of ethical and morally good behavior should be extended to the consideration of nonhuman species. The second focus that is the basis for my argument is Singer’s argument against a huge human social construct labeled speciesism.

In Peter Singer’s article, All Animals are Equal, Singer claims that animals deserve the same equal rights and respect that the human lives get. His strongest argument is defined by all animals, human or non-human shall be defined as equal. Singer makes some very strong arguments within his article, but I feel some of his statements are humanist. As an animal lover and mother to two pets, I disagree that not all animals or living things endure the same amount. However, I do agree that animals do deserve the rights to live lives as animals should. This paper will analyze Singer’s argument in relation to the specific issue of animal equal rights. It will also include the counterarguments I have against his claims of his article.

A highly popularized and debated topic in our modern society is the promotion of animal equality or animal rights. Many people, philosophers included, have a wide range of opinions on this topic. Two of the philosophers studied in class who discussed animal rights were Peter Singer and Carl Cohen. Singer, who has the more extreme view on animal rights, believes that all animals are equal and that the limit of sentience is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interest of others (Singer, 171). While Cohen, who’s view is more moderate than that of Singer’s, believes that animals do not have rights, stating that to have rights one must contain the ability for free moral judgment. Though, he does believe that we as

Nevertheless, I do not mean that our moral obligations to them are identical to our moral obligations to other human beings – the view that Regan, many vegans, as well as those who are against speciesism. In his essay “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,” Regan argues that non-human animals deserve equal consideration and treatment, because they are, in many ways, similar to humans. Most of us nowadays would agree that non-human animals are not what Descartes called “automata,” that “have no mind and are unable to think;” they surely can feel pain and pleasure just like we do, and this has become a common knowledge (Regan, 4). However, as far as I am concerned, that non-human animals have sensations is in no way suggesting that our moral obligations to other humans need to be applied to non-human animals as well, regardless of the fact that we do have moral obligations to them. In other words, we are not entitled to treat them precisely the same way we treat other humans, because no matter how many similarities we share with them, they are still not humans; they do not and cannot reason rationally and make free choices like we do – at least we think they cannot. As a result, we are not obliged to treat them the way we treat other humans, when the concept of rights does not apply in their worlds, and they cannot act or think the way other humans

In her essay Speaking of Animal Rights, Warren (1987) argues for the weak animal rights position, which holds that non-human animals have weaker rights than human beings because non-human animals do not have the same moral status as us human beings (383-4). This is due to their lack of the ability to “reason well enough to function as autonomous moral agents” (385), which she believes is a requirement for being moral of human beings (384-5). In this essay, I will argue that Warren’s weak animal rights position misses the entire point about speaking of animals rights and we should instead recognize non-human animals as our moral equals and grant them full moral rights in virtue of their entitlement to dignified existence , rather than basing moral equality and rights upon rationality, as Warren indicates.

Regan introduces his stance in The Case for Animal Rights on how we view non-humans as less than the intrinsic value. Regan’s mentality is about how we have this sense of value for each other, and how we should translate that respect and value to others, like animals. We treat “immoral humans” (criminals) with basic human respect (food, shelter, and hygiene). While, there are some people that do not take care of animals with the same respect as we treat humans. Animals are a part of the world that we live in, but we have grown used to seeing animals as lower than us. Regan’s viewpoint shows how we should see all beings as equals with inherent value. Regan sees this as part of the Respect Principle, a principle where we treat individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value (322). His main argument is that everything has a subject-of-life criterion. Subject-of-life criterion is the philosophy that everything is alive with inherent value.

Peter Singer is deeply rooted against speciesism, in which humans favor themselves as having greater moral rights than animals. Racism and sexism are equally as wrong of acts as speciesism. Singer acknowledges the difference between animals and humans mentally and physically, although he argues that animals’ wellbeing’s to be considered. He states that “allowing animals to suffer from neglect or for the sake of large profits may also be unnecessary and cruel” (288). Animals are being treated inhumanely with their living conditions and are abused.

Nowadays, People are more and more exploiting and handling animals as if they are some kind of resources. Some people view themselves are the most important beings on the planet, so everything can be done in order to ensure their survivals such as carnivorous eating and testing on animals. However, some considered this as humans violated morality, as animals have their own lives, have feelings and families as human posses. Therefore, in this essay, philosophers such as Tom Regan, Carl Cohen and Mary Anne Warren express their own individualistic approach on the subject of moral ethics and whether or not animals have rights related to John Stuart Mill.

Both in and out of philosophical circle, animals have traditionally been seen as significantly different from, and inferior to, humans because they lacked a certain intangible quality – reason, moral agency, or consciousness – that made them moral agents. Recently however, society has patently begun to move beyond this strong anthropocentric notion and has begun to reach for a more adequate set of moral categories for guiding, assessing and constraining our treatment of other animals. As a growing proportion of the populations in western countries adopts the general position of animal liberation, more and more philosophers are beginning to agree that sentient creatures are of a direct moral concern to humans, though the degree of this

One of the most controversial topics in modern philosophy revolves around the idea of non-human animals being considered human people. Controversy over what makes up an actual person has been long debated. However, society deems it as a set of characteristics. The average person normally does not realize how complicated a question this is, and in fact many scientists, philosophers, and individuals will side differently on this specific topic. I personally do not believe that animals are capable of being human people, but throughout this argumentative paper I will address critical views presented from multiple philosophers on why this seems to be the case.

Regan’s philosophy is his subject of a life criterion and that if you are an experiencing subject of a life, then you have rights. Regans says “we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others.” (185) He believes animals are also experiencing subjects of a life and that they have inherent value. Their inherent value is no more or no less than the inherent value of humans. He also believes that anything with inherent value has rights which must be respected by other beings.

In Stanley Benn’s “Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests”, it is explained that animals and human imbeciles are distinguished not because of fundamental inequality, but solely on the basis that the two subjects are of different species. In regard to animals’ moral rights and the infringement of those rights due to the practice of speciesism, Singer employs a utilitarian style of argument to defend animals’ moral rights; in short, the interests of each being which is involved should be taken into consideration and said interests should be given the same weight as that of another being. Speciesism is morally wrong because it attempts to assign undeserved weight to the interests of beings of separate species, solely based off the difference of species. Naturally, or rather unnaturally, human beings have always awarded themselves the utmost importance due to the idea of human dignity, as in humans occupy the central spot within any earthly ranking. Logically, Singer argues that the practice of speciesism is wrong because the conditions in which it exists are synonymous to the conditions which facilitate racism and sexism, before they had been recognized as

In his article “All Animals Are Equal,” Peter Singer discusses the widely-held belief that, generally speaking, there is no more inequality in the world, because all groups of formerly oppressed humans are now liberated. However, it often goes without notice that there are groups of nonhuman animals that continue to face unequal treatment, such as those that are consumed or used as scientific test subjects. Singer’s article criticizes the belief that because humans are generally more intelligent than nonhuman animals, then all humans are superior to all nonhuman animals. Singer argues that intelligence is an arbitrary trait to base the separation of humans and nonhumans, and declares that the only trait that one can logically base moral value is the capacity to have interests, which is determined by a creature’s ability to suffer. Singer explains that in order to stay consistent with the basic principle of equality, anything that has the capacity to suffer ought to have its needs and interests recognized, just as humans’ needs and interests are currently recognized through what he calls “equal consideration.” In this paper, I will explain Singer’s notion of equal consideration as the only relevant sense of equality and why it applies to the rights of both human and nonhuman species that are

In the last section our class we have discussed the question of what has value. We read many articles written from various points of view on what has value and moral rights and why they have value. This tension between what has rights and what does not is often played out between humans and non-human organisms. Many philosophers and people, including myself, believe that animals have value and moral rights. Yet, there are still many who believe it is silly to think that animals have rights like humans do. Philosopher Peter Singer, author of the article “All Animals Are Equal” describes this conflict of views as an opportunity for people to expand their moral horizons. He notes in his paper how the civil rights movement is somewhat

However, Edwin Converse Hettinger (2001) argued that just because the ability to recognize and claim rights rest solely with humans does not mean that only humans should enjoy these rights (288). Hettinger (2001) cites the fact that infants do not have the ability to make a rights claim, nor can they recognize the rights of others to do so, yet, they are given rights (288). Another example revolves around mentally disabled humans who do not have the capacity to make rights claims (Hettinger 2001 287). Some animals can perform “quasi-moral” functions, capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct. For example, dogs have the ability to be obedient, protective, and solicitous; however, there are severely retarded humans who could not achieve these minimal moral duties (Hettinger 2001 288). Moreover, Hettinger (2001) says that adult chimpanzees, pigs, parrots, and members of many other species far surpass humans when compared to infants and the mentally disabled in their abilities to act independently and with self-awareness (288). Thus, Hettinger (2001) believes that people should not so easily dismiss the fact that some animals are better able to perform moral functions than some humans. Cohen’s view suggests that if most humans have the capacity for moral behavior, but some do not, then those who do not, still deserve moral consideration because they are “of a kind” (i.e., human kind). Consequently, Hettinger (2001)