Prussian Military Reforms Essay

16. Prussian militarism was very similar to Germany’s militarism during the world wars. German military traditions are stated to be based off of Prussia’s and both German and Prussian armies were very strong, uncompromising, and brutal.

Napoleon modernized warfare and dominated the battlefield by combining tactics of past war heroes and the use of new artillery. Napoleon Bonaparte once said, “Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, and Frederick the Great. This is the only way to become a great general…” (St. Rosemaire Education Institution). Napoleon led a successful Italian Campaign in 1796 by using the ideals of Julius Caesar: Always have more men than the opponent and always have more knowledge of the opponent than the opponent has of you.

Rosemary), superior morale, and large numbers in the army. These tactical choices made Napoleon a force to be reckoned with. In the beginning of his career, he was very successful in terms of military tactics and taking control of different countries. Take, for example, the First Italian Campaign of 1796, where Napoleon’s troops were outnumbered by about 25,000 soldiers. By observing the troop’s movements and tactics, he discovered their strategies and using reasoning, he scattered the opposing forces and took each portion on separately. His strategy is described best in the following: “When faced with superior numbers, he would divide the enemy army and defeat each section individually by skillfully deploying his reserves at the right time and place. When faced with inferior numbers, he would smash into an opponent’s flank, distracting them and damaging morale.” (St. Rosemary) It is said that “Bonaparte had accomplished virtual miracles, […] defeating three different Austrian commanders, despite his inferior troop numbers and artillery and nonexistent logistical support.” (Schom, pg. 58) It was a close battle, and the French army may have nearly lost, but Napoleon did manage to keep his troops stable enough to succeed against the odds.

Impacted by nationalism and counsel from military officers, European governments sloped up military spending, buying new weaponry and expanding the extent of armed forces and naval forces. Because of their late Industrial Revolution, German innovation was significantly more progressed than those of the British, French and Russians. In view of their area and absence of a warm-water port, Russians had the most noticeably bad innovation, and hence, the most exceedingly awful military.In Europe, colonialism happened at the stature of industrialization. As European nations were finding more about the sciences and large scale manufacturing advantages through industrialization, an interest and rivalry for more land and deliver was creating, and this

The Art of War in the 17th and 18th Centuries is a history course book whose author's are United States Military Academy history instructors Lieutenant Colonel Dave Richard Palmer and Major Albert Sidney Britt III. The textbook gives an insight into the military tactics and the political reasons when they were brought about in the 17th and 18th centuries. The text was published in West Point, New York in 1969. The book contains 9 chapters and 185 pages. There is no additional information on the authors.

Although the character of warfare has changed dramatically, the nature of warfare remains the same – political in nature, with its relations effecting both means and desired

The second factor that stifled the innovation of the British military is the operational attitude of the military leadership. The British military failed to study the lessons learned from World War I until 1932. This failure to study the battles of the war in a timely manner resulted in the development of inferior doctrine and training concepts. If the lessons would have been learned earlier than 1932, substantial changes could have been made to the British doctrine and professional military education system prior to 1932.

Although German clearly had the advantage and benefit of possessing the greatest tactical, technological, and operationally advanced military in the world for the majority of the war, yet they overestimated their abilities and allowed their resentment to skew military objectives and hinder efforts to connect Germany’s end, ways and

Military Affairs* (87-95) -Attitude towards war and why they go to war (87-9), how they wage war (89-95) and their use of Zapoletans (90-2), why wives and children fight (92-3), amazing armor and weapons (94), “truces…observed religiously” (94, vs. 86), victors live abroad “in great style” (95).

The Art of War, is an ancient military treatise written by Sun Tzu, “Master Sun” in fifth century BC China. Although it is one of the first texts written on the subject matter of war, it is still renowned as one of the most comprehensive texts of this type. Similar to The Prince by Machiavelli, another early text, The Art of War can be difficult to understand. Interestingly however, many leaders still read this text today, drawing comparisons to unruly situations and war. This same dynamic can be seen in interpretations of The Prince, a text I found very interesting, therefore a similar disposition can be expected from The Art of War. The organization of the text is unorthodox, compromised of many one-liners making up thirteen total chapters: Estimates, Waging War, Offensive, Dispositions, Energy, Weakness and Strengths, Manoeuvre, The Nine Variables, Marches, Terrain, The Nine Varieties of Ground, Attack by Fire, and Employment of Secret Agents. For the purposes of analysis, the text can be grouped into three sections: planning, attacking, and situation responses. Some areas are easier to draw parallels to today’s landscape; therefore, these are the aspects to provide focus. As a tool of comparison, after a brief summary the book will be rated on a scale from 1 to 5 in four different categories: readability, relevancy, practicality, and value to an emerging leader.

Chief of Staff, Von Moltke was a good organiser and planner of the army. He was able to increase their size, improve tactical mobility and also the provision of supplies. Without this strength of backing the unification of Germany would not have been possible. The Prussian army also had good quality weaponry, shown in the introduction of the

Although it may seem that the French Revolution and industrialism influenced the adaptation of the Prussian army automatically, as Moltke 's influence is quite evident. Moltke 's concept of war involved combining ‘rapid mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement, and combat into one continuous sequence, making every effort to bring superior numbers to bear in the final decisive battle’ therefore, the key task of Moltke’s reform was to create, from the Prussian army, an efficient, modern way warring fighting force. Primarily his effort was focused on the restructuring of the General Staff and the officers’ training. Moltke oversaw further improvements in Prussia 's military recruitment and education systems once he became Chief of Staff. ‘These resulted in a doubling of the size of the field and the army and further strengthening of its reserve consequently capability’. ‘The old divisions of the Great General Staff were replaced by three departments, which recalled the "Theatres of War". This restructuring of the General Staff formed the basic framework of the whole Institution. Moltke developed the method of general directives into guiding principles’.

Possibly one of the most asked questions in military history is how was the German Army able to decisively defeat a numerically equivalent Allied Army in France during May and June 1940? One of the primary reasons for Germany’s success was their innovation in armored warfare, particularly at the tactical and operational levels during the interwar period. The study of the German Army during a period of prolonged peace and constrained resources reveals that one of the most important qualities that a military should possess to innovate effectively is the ability to learn as an organization. A learning organization creates knowledge internally, externally acquires knowledge, and diffuses knowledge throughout the organization .

The discipline of military history is dynamic, changing with development as much of the subject area as the societies and organisations that make use of it. The dynamic nature of the discipline of military history is largely related to the rapidity of change the military forces, and the art and science of managing them, as well as the frenetic pace of technological development that had taken place during the period known as the Industrial Revolution, and more recently in the nuclear and information ages.

From the scope of many factors, in my opinion, there were three most important enabling factors which affected process during the all developing period. First factor was independent mind-set and military culture of Prussian officers. Scharnhorst opened the intellectual ground for new way of military thinking. Officer Corps was unlocked for middle class citizens. They were continuously educated and then selected by merit. This concept was continuously cultivated by Scharnhorst’s successors. They maintained and improved the educational process which built ‘… the system of values and beliefs … that enable Prussian officers to exercise independence of mind’ (Stewart, 2010). All this finally produced excellent leaders, with ability for rapid decision in any level of command. Therefore independence of mind and intelligence became the key enablers for the development of the indirect command philosophy. Second factor was the strong desire of to alter the state of the military affairs in order to improve military capabilities. But what is important that it was not only based on critical study history and lessons learned from wars, but also based on the analysis of different social and technological innovations. ‘Auftragstaktik represented a compromise that was necessary to achieve some degree of control in a