Psychological Operations During Operation Desert Storm

We have all seen or read about the political and social upheavals caused by war. Some may have even experienced it first-hand. Throughout history war has had negative psychological implications on those effected. However, there is no greater negative impact of war than the psychological and emotional turmoil that it causes individual soldiers.

Operations Desert Shield/Storm took place during the Gulf War, which was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of more than 30 nations mandated by the United Nations, led by the United States commanded by General Norman Schwarzkopf, who conducted one of the greatest military campaigns of all times that resulted with the coalition victory. The name Operation Desert Shield was for the operation leading to the built up of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm for the combat phase to liberate Kuwait. This war included more than 500.000 United States troops, dominated by technological superiority that definitely favored the coalition forces. The use of missiles, guided bombs and invisible plane made easy to destroy Iraqi ground targets, being so the first war in history to use the air power to defeat ground forces. The commander of this operation General Schwarzkopf was a consolidated leader with great experience in war and diplomacy, who had extend knowledge of the Middle East since the childhood. General Schwarzkopf ability to use the principles of mission command led the coalition into the desired end state, which was the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait. General Norman Schwarzkopf successfully utilized mission command principles within Operation Desert Storm/Shield by creating a shared understanding, building cohesive teams through mutual trust, provide a clear commander’s intent, and accept a prudent risk, which played a

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The battle of Ap Bac was a small battle engaged between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the insurgents, or the People Liberation Armed Forces (Viet Cong AKA VC) with the assistance of American’s weapons and advice during the Vietnam War. It took place on 2 January, 1963, near a small village named Ap Bac which is located approximately 65 km southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. (Starry, 2002). As a senior leader, it is important that we have to be technically and tactically proficient. In order to be proficient, we not only need to be trained, but also we have to know how to gain experience from past battles in history using battle assessment, and critical thinking process to study the battle. That way, we know what needs to be improved, how to sustain it, and how would we execute it better next time. Therefore, studying the history of the battle of Ap Bac will enhance the knowledge of how the commanders used the most effective and efficient method for applying decisive action on the battle field. It would be a successful outcome for the South Vietnamese ARVN, and Kennedy’s administration would have gained more trust from American people for the presence of American troops in Vietnam, if the American advisers and the ARVN’s commanders would have integrated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (ITP) throughout the operations process to identify the gaps of intelligence between human intelligence (HUMINT),

Most authors who write about war stories write vividly; this is the same with Tim O’Brien as he describes the lives of the soldiers by using his own experiences as knowledge. In his short story “The Things They Carried” he skillfully reveals realistic scenes that portray psychological, physical and mental burdens carried by every soldier. He illustrates these burdens by discussing the weights that the soldiers carry, their psychological stress and the mental stress they have to undergo as each of them endure the harshness and ambiguity of the Vietnam War. One question we have to ask ourselves is if the three kinds of burdens carried by the soldier’s are equal in size? “As if in slow motion, frame by frame, the world would take on the old

The Battle of Big Hole in 1877 demonstrated well the dynamics of communication, strategy, and risk assessment in every stage of the battle, from the gathering of information to the aftermath of the slaughter. The materials of gathering intelligence, for example, can literally make or break the matter of mission completion. In this case, communication between commanders aided in U.S. Army in cutting off the path to Canada for the fleeing Nez Perce Native Americans.

The Gulf War is often remembered as an easy victory by most Americans. Perceived as an intense military campaign intended to bring about a swift victory, and often referred to as a battle between good and evil. In reality, the U.S. military had a host of troubles in the conflicts of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Sheild which became known as the Gulf War of 1990-91, many of troubles were caused by the unnecessary deaths of allied troops, and the Iraqi civilians alike. Other catastrophes were avoided purely by luck or incompetence of the Iraqi Military. What new military strategies, procedures and technologies are now in place as a result of lessons learned. Hopefully to ensure that some of the worst mistakes that were made evident by the Gulf War will not be repeated in a subsequent war in Iraq or elsewhere. The intense reality of the actual battle fought by the United States and its allies against Iraq, left many a U.S. military spokesmen were scoffing at the Iraqi forces as “the fourth-largest army in the world.” And “the second-largest army in Iraq” by the world at the end of the Gulf War,

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

Freeman Teague Jr. effectively expresses the importance and complexity of communication. At one time the U.S. Army defined communication as the exchange and flow of information and ideas from one person to another; it involves a sender transmitting an idea, information, or feeling to a receiver (Clark, 2015). Throughout this paper we will expound on key communication failures that were exposed during Operation Anaconda. The overall verdict is that Anaconda’s outcome was a success, but its original plan was a resounding failure. Many things contributed to the failure, but this paper will focus on the communication aspect.

According to this now-infamous study, Saddam had "so overextended his capital in the war with Iran that he was not in a position to undertake any significant hostile action for, at the very least, three years"�. The CIA grossly underestimated Saddam's penchant for military expansionism. Critics of the quality of US intelligence abound. Freedman and Efraim have concluded that "Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that was unresponsive to the needs of the United States Army"� while Seliktar writes of an "unprepared organization" and of "considerable in-theatre limitations and restrictions."� Arguably, the military success camouflaged these intelligence failings. Surprisingly, these intelligence failures during the Gulf War were carried over into the Iraq War.

As victory in WWII appeared imminent, the USAAF under General Hap Arnold commissioned studies to assess the impact of strategic bombing in the war. In addition to results about strategic bombing, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that “the U.S. should have an intelligence organization capable of knowing the strategic vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions of any potential enemy.” In spite of the aforementioned dearth of intelligence on the USSR, very specific information was needed for military and political leaders to make decisions regarding their strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Additionally, the strategic bomber forces needed a list of verified targets in case conflict with the USSR broke out. In order to fill the major voids in information the US civilian leaders employed a bifurcated approach: human intelligence (HUMINT) obtained through agency operatives, and signals (SIGINT) and imagery (IMINT) intelligence acquired

There were many faults in US intelligence during Persian Gulf War I (Gulf War I) that carried over to the Persian Gulf War II (Gulf War II). A lack of a doctrinal foundation and existing structure by the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) when aiding the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Gulf War I severely hindered the ground operations during this war. Similarly in Gulf War II the army doctrine attempted to provide “a baseline for helping the commander visualise the information environment.” A plan to influence the information is then relayed to subordinates. This failed to prepare commanders to integrate IO (information operations) into their operations by repeating the same mistakes in Gulf War I. These faults

The lessons learned from both the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and Operation Desert Storm where the American lead coalition defeated the Iraqi military are numerous however, lessons learned are for the most part only applicable to the variables that existed at the time. It is a better method to examine the lessons and draw underlying conclusions that are applicable regardless of the variables surrounding them. The conclusions drawn from both the crushing success of the American lead coalition in Iraq and the near tragic defeat of the Israelis Defense Forces (IDF) by the combined Arab militaries are; every military learns different lessons from a conflict, human factors and training are a large determining factor in the outcome of a conflict, and

Cognitive processing therapy is a helpful form of treatment for service members that return from deployment after constant distress in battle. For many of our heroes, it becomes impossible to readjust their lives back into the civilian world. CPT is an intervention that is proven to lower veteran’s PTSD symptoms in an attempt to normalize their lives. It is important to remember that many of our service members continue to fight battles after returning home. They battle against substance abuse, physical injuries, and mental health disorder. Helping professional must serve our military by providing evidence-based practice interventions in an effort to honor our armed forces.

Effective application of intelligence collection assets provides increased situational awareness that enhances the overall lethality of combat power, ultimately saving lives in the process. The U.S. and Japan used multiple forms of intelligence collection during the battle for Okinawa. Each commander used information gleaned from this collection in their decision making process, however, both failed to pre-empt the others actions leading to a fight for inches that lasted 82 days. This paper examines the events leading up to the invasion of Okinawa and the major phases of the battle. This paper will also highlight how alternative use of intelligence assets could have influenced the outcome and why.