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Psychology as a Science: Jaegwon Kim's Argument and Why it is Faulty

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Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not …show more content…

Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality. In Kim’s 1992 publication he argued that is mental properties are multiply realized then they essentially cannot be casual properties and therefore, they cannot be scientific. From this notion, he cannot allow there to be psychological laws nor can there be any kind of psychological theory either. Kim think that we can anticipate that there are many distinct and local psych theories. There will be several psychologies, one for human, one for aliens, one for elephants and so on. He concludes that it is impossible to have one psychological theory that reins over all species. Kim substantiates that only laws of physics can be universally applied to everything. He also states that economics, biology, chemistry and sociology will fall prey to the same faults as psychology does. It seems that to respond to Kim we must consider a multitude of scientific and philosophical issues. Kim’s essential argument relies on two different metaphysical principles. Firstly, he presents the ‘Casual Individuation of Kinds’ principle that states that kinds in science are individuated on the

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