Putin's Annexation Case Study

Imagine the United States’ acrimony and fear when China and Russia ally with Canada, Mexico and Cuba. Imagine its fury when totalitarianism and socialism dominate its neighbours. How far will the United States go to ensure its national security at that point? In “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” an article wrote seven months after the Annexation of Crimea, John Mearsheimer not only analyzes the causes and effect of the crisis explains Russia’s rationale for its action. Without a doubt, the article successfully fulfilled accomplished its purpose. Mearsheimer is correct; indeed, the west is responsible for the Ukraine Crisis, thus it should adjust its foreign policies toward

Whilst patriotism and romanticism initially called men to war in 1914, by 1918 the idealism soon changed with the reality of trench warfare. Soldiers from across Europe, and indeed the world, first entered World War One with innocent enthusiasm. The expectations of the young men who joined, however, were shaped by the culture of age. It was the romantic mood of the time which essentially reinforced the hope that war would be won in honorable battle and ‘be over by Christmas’. These expectations were far from reality. The experience of war at the Western front was marked with the realities of modern warfare. Indeed, the old methods of fighting yielded to a static war of attrition, characterized by great battles, such as that of the Somme

Secondly, NATO enlargement was not necessarily Russia’s containment by the United States. Some experts indicate that there was no consensus on the issue in American political landscape. At the same time, many countries in East Europe, especially the Baltic ones, expressed their willingness to enter the EU and NATO because they feared imperialistic comeback of Russia. Though this “the chicken or the egg” argument (Russia behaves aggressively because of NATO enlargement, or NATO expanded to prevent Russia from striking back) still corresponds with realist logic of insecurity, it largely disapproves that the Ukraine crisis is great powers clash.

The crisis in Ukraine and Crimea’s recent accession to Russia are events that clearly highlight the underlying sources of conflict in global politics. While Russia sees its actions in Crimea as a “reunification” and the respect for the right of self-determination, the West views it as a threat to European security and a violation of territorial integrity. Crimea has been a debatable topic from the time it came under the control of the Russian Empire in 1783 during the reign of Catherine the Great. The justification then was similar to the reasoning being used by Vladimir Putin today. Catherine declared that she was protecting ethnic Russians in the region from the Ottoman Empire, much as Putin is claiming to protect Russians from Ukrainian

The conflict between the Ukraine and Russia is the Ukraine's most long-standing and deadly crisis; since its post-Soviet independence began as a protest against the government dropping plans to forge closer trade ties with the European Union. The conflict between Russia and the Ukraine stems from more than twenty years of weak governance, the government’s inability to promote a coherent executive branch policy, an economy dominated by oligarchs and rife with corruption, heavy reliance on Russia, and distinct differences between Ukraine's population from both Eastern and Western regions in terms of linguistics, religion and ethnicity (Lucas 2009).

Future relationships between NATO and Russia are very uncertain. These uncertainties are due primarily to geopolitical factors like globalization, economic interdependence and international law. This leaves the world to question the possibility of a conflict arising from these clashing geopolitical factors. First, Russia, one of the major powers, has expanded economically and militarily by increasing trade, communication and even showing military force in other countries with the fight against ISIL. This expansion, known as globalization, has lead to the interdependence between states, specifically, dependence of the production process, investment, consumption, foreign trade, and inflows of foreign currency (Vorobyov 2). Next, the issue of economic interdependence has many wondering about the state of conflict between NATO members and Russia. Economic interdependence refers to a state’s need to rely on other states for resources through trade and investment. Liberalist and realist views of economic interdependence shine light on the last question about causes for concern for war between Russia and any NATO members. In the following paragraphs, these contradicting views will be closely analyzed in order to help get a sense for how interdependence between major powers will have an effect on potential future conflict. Lastly, Russia and NATO have very conflicting views when it comes to international laws and how they ought to be

An article titled Crimea and the Lessons of Frozen Conflicts by John Abrahamson, focuses on Russia’s involvement in the Crimean Peninsula . This interpretive source argues that the Russian annexation of Crimea was a calculated move with the Russian objective to undermine Pro-western states within Russia’s sphere of influence. In the article, Abrahamson compares Russia’s annexation of Crimea to former Soviet States that poses several frozen conflicts. Abrahamson furthered his argument by writing: “…Russia helps fracture local elites, prevent the emergence of "normal political systems," and encourage "illicit activities . . . from the smuggling of drugs and arms to nuclear proliferation1."

The conflict stems from the result of the Government’s decision to turn down the European Union proposed “association agreement” in 2013 and instead Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych accepted fifteen billion dollars in aid and other economic benefits from Russian President Vladimir Putin. For years Ukrainians have yearned for economic reform that would seek to open new trade and economic ties with Western European countries. President Yanukovych’s decision to reject the EU’s proposal ignored the feeling of the majority of Ukrainian citizens and further solidified the sentiment that their government was strengthening ties with Russia and not with the west.

Russia’s action in Crimea was a response to the threat of NATO’s further expansion along Russia’s western border. Russia seized Crimea to prevent a new government from joining NATO and that Kiev might evict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from its long-standing base in Sevastopol. Russia wanted to recapture Crimea for the former territories of the Soviet Union. The government never accepted the loss of Crimea so they were determined to restore it in part by expanding Russia’s borders. The government improvised broader designs and presented the response to the unforeseen of Crimea, and this was an impulsive decision on Russia’s part rather than the careful move of a strategist with geopolitical ambitions.

The ethnic Russians in Ukraine live in fear due to extremists and fascists. Even you know this is true. I am listening to my people’s desire for a return of the Russian empire—a mark of a successful and legitimate leader (Lebow, 2010). My popularity has spiked domestically in recent months. These move are natural because they are in the interest of my empire—ahem—great nation.

With the current civil war in Ukraine unfolding and Russian involvement being well known, the average person would consider this a very simple situation of Russia flexing its might. While there is some truth for Russian involvement being exactly that, the reasoning for Russia’s foreign policy is a much more complex situation that cannot be summarized into one definitive reason. In fact there are a variety of factors that could be categorized into three groups known as the three levels of analysis, International, Domestic, and Individual.

Last year, in an interview with National State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK) journalist Vladimir Solovyov, Vladimir Putin said “Crimea has always been and remains Russian, as well as Ukrainian, Crimean-Tatar, Greek (after all, there are Greeks living there) and German - and it will be home to all of those peoples. As for state affiliation, the people living in Crimea made their choice; it should be treated with respect, and Russia cannot do otherwise.” Since 2014, Russia and Ukraine have battled over the territory of Crimea, an area in eastern Ukraine stocked with large amounts of gas and oil. Despite Crimea being in Ukrainian territory, Russia has invaded the region and claimed it as their own. Although, this conflict in Crimea may be rather new, Ukraine and Russia share a deep and complex history. In order to study the crisis occurring in Crimea, it is important to look at not only the problem at hand but also the history, motives, perspectives, and solutions. Furthermore, the issue cannot be put into context without information on international relations as a whole, background information about each country, and the role of NATO.

The annexation of Crimea follows realist theory, and rejects the notion of IGOs having an influence over state behavior. John Mearsheimer explains the event, “the best realist explanation for today’s outcome in Crimea would be the classical realist notion of states pursuing security at all costs. If we understand the geopolitical priorities of Russia, the EU, and the United States in terms of security maximization, the Russian response to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych being overthrown is textbook” (Panda 2014). The reactions were due to a security concern and in attempts maintain its influence in the eastern portions of Europe. Also, much like Syria, Russia has vested military interests in the area of Crimea. The fears that Russia has had with the instability of Ukraine are understandable. As mentioned earlier from a realist context states will act in ways to protect themselves in survive. Mearsheimer argues, “states in the international

Russia has committed to seizing as much control over Ukraine as possible. To increase his approval ratings at times of economic recession, most especially in 2014, Putin has capitalized on the foundation of Russian nationalism he has shaped in his state. Because Ukraine, and many other independent sovereign states, are still claimed by Putin and many Russians as rightful territories of the homeland, exerting power over Ukraine is a reliable source of public domestic approval. In addition to the boon of distraction from economic hardships and corruption that comes from bullying Ukraine, Putin also has a geographically significant peninsula to motivate him to take further action. With the possibilities of Ukraine joining NATO and growing

Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine is divided between two major ideological current. On one side, the Russian movement that remains closely tied to its roots and its recent history and on the other hand, its desire to accede to the European sphere. This ideological divide remains a determining factor of the current situation of the country. Thus, the year 2013 was the culmination of this ideological confrontation materialized by the will of the President Viktor Yanukovych to abandon the association agreement with the European Union and seek closer cooperation with Russia. This action has triggered a conflagration in the region which ultimately led to the