Student I.D: 1470747
Module: Contract Law
Word Count: 1997
Promises qua promises can be regarded as contractual obligations implying a moral obligation to keep promises and the law is justified in enforcing those obligations by way of damages in-order to protect the underlying rights and interests. This article aims to illustrate how this is achieved by analysing two of these interests identified by Fuller and Purdue (hereafter Fuller)1 as the expectation and reliance interests and considers their relation. It shall be argued that the expectation interest is the main purpose of contracting and therefore should be accorded primary protection and that Fuller’s glorification of reliance interest was misguided. I begin by
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[1848] 1 Exh 850, 855 (Parke B)
3. E Finch, S Fafinski, Contract Law: Law Express (Harlow, 2010) 195
4. [1967] UKHL 4
5. [1955] Ch 177
6. [1957] 2 QB 117
7. Ibid [n3]
8. M Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (4th Ed, Oxford 2012) Chap 13
Questions often arise whether to base the calculation of damages on actual or market value 9. Although this shows flexibility, my criticism is that this can lead to inconsistencies, reduce certainty and predictability in judicial decisions as in Ruxley. 10 The claimant contracted the defendant to construct a swimming pool with a depth of 7ft 6in but the finished pool was 6ft 9in. The COC was £21500 but the claimant had no intention of using the damages to correct the defect. Nominal damages of £2500 were awarded for loss of amenity. The court held that where the DIV caused by the breach was zero, it was not correct to award the COC as an alternative to the DIV. Lord Lloyd stated that, although what Forsyth intended to do with the money was irrelevant, but was certainly relevant in determining the appropriate measure of that loss. This was fundamentally different from a performance based-approach to losses and akin to the judiciary imposing its own interests on the claimant’s expectations. Contrast this with the Radford 11 where the COC awarded yet was substantially higher than DIV.
A welcome development is recovery of consequential losses subject to remoteness12 as established in Hadley v
Nebraska was home to many Native Americans, including the Ponca tribe, who took great pride of their homeland. Many people think the Ponca tribe was once a part of the Omaha, Osage, Kansa, and Quaqaw tribe. These five tribes lived in an area east of the Mississippi River. No one knows the exact date of their separation or why they had separated, but it was believed to be as early at 1390, and as late as 1750.
Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is a “legal bar preventing a (first) party from denying another (second) party's right in first party's property where the second party has incurred costs in that property to its detriment”. Proprietary estoppel, like other types of estoppel, is not a remedy in itself but a tool to raise “estoppel equity”, on the basis of which the court is able to decide on the type of remedy that this equity will satisfy. Similarly to the need for the element of common intention for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust, there is a need for the establishment of an active or passive assurance on the part of the defendant that leads to some form of consequential detriment on the part of the claimant when acting in reliance on that assurance. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the actions undertaken by the claimant and the initial assurance on the part of the defendant. The extent and the nature of the detriment suffered by the claimant, however, appears to be substantially more flexible than that necessary to find the existence of a constructive trust. For example, in Inwards v Baker [1965], such detriment amounted to the improvement of the defendant’s land, while in Gillett v Holt [2001] it was manifested in both financial and personal detriment. Yet unlike in most cases involving common intention constructive trusts, in neither of
The book by John Isbister, “Promises Not Kept” brings to light the real truth behind poverty and the betrayal the third world received from the economics, legal, policy, and nationalism. What are the two major promises that Isbister indicates were not kept in the 20th century? A first promise was that to the “leaders of the nationalist independence movements and the revolutions in the third world.” They promised the people’s labor would be used for their own progress and not for the enrichment of others. Almost all the nationalist leaders made this promise but as we know not very many kept it. The goal was to end poverty, I believe and as we know poverty is still alive and growing daily. Ending poverty was a major movement towards independence but was
Promisee must incur a detriment or confer a benefit on the promisor (Currie v Misa).
It is argued, that the imposition of this rigid structure would only undermine the settlor’s wishes and result in the courts finding the trust to be administratively unworkable. It has been stated in Re Manisty’s Settlement “that a power cannot be uncertain merely because it is wide in
In this essay, the focus is on whether it is morally objectionable for a person to recover damages from another’s breach of contract that results in a better financial position than they would have been if the breach had not occurred. This is because in deciding whether to preserve the principle in Clark, law-makers would place high regard on the analysis of Clark’s normative outcome. The following points are the key arguments against awarding a sum to a higher pecuniary advantage??? Such as Clark, which can be subsequently rebutted in this analysis with “normative” research.
In this article, Justine Kirby (2000) analyzes the basic law, section 11 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and acknowledged routines for "exchanging" commitments, and after
Most conflicts scholars and courts now recognize the principle that the parties to a contract generally may agree upon the law which will govern their relationship.' "One of the few non-controversial maxims of conflicts is that the autonomy of the parties should be given great weight.” While the principle of party autonomy has only recently achieved preeminent and almost uncontested status in American conflicts of
Because contracts are at the heart of a democratic free-market economy, it is unsurprising that contractual freedom has taken a vital role in defining the term of contract law.
This essay will discuss the Supreme Court decision in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (Cedar) . The issue in this case was whether a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on constructive trust for his principal. This topic is a “relentless and seemingly endless debate” , as Sir Terence Etherton described, and that the “remedy awarded has vacillated for the last 200-odd years” . The major reason for the debate is because the principal will have propriety claim as opposed to a mere equitable compensation, if the bribe or commission is held on a constructive trust . The principal will be in a much more advantageous position if he was held to have propriety
Equity has been described as a ‘mysterious creature’ that lies distinctly alongside the common law. In considering the statement, there is an almost linear reversal in which the remedies in equity procure a type of right not necessarily available in the common law. This peculiar jurisdiction has created consistent controversy especially in regards to the fusion of the common law and equity. To understand further, this essay will consider the relationship between equity and the common law. The development of equity alongside the common law through its history and intention, and application in case law will be imperative in the discussion of the statement. In conjunction with an analysis of fusion, it will become apparent that equitable damages were enlivened, separate to, in unfair circumstances where no rights/damages existed within the common law. In trying to tread the murky waters of the distinction yet the procedural fusion of equity and common law, the contention of this essay becomes apparent. Effectively, this essay aims to highlight that the history, intention, application and fusion fallacies regarding equity, all which point to an assertion that rights in equity are indeed the product of its remedies. Whether they are merely ‘two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters’, is yet to be seen.
The impact of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 on the doctrine of consideration.
A Contract requires several elements in order to be considered enforceable. However for the purpose of this essay we would explore one of these elements in order to effectively understand the controversial cases of Williams v Roffey Brothers and Nicholls (contractors) Ltd (1990) and Stilk v Myrick (1804). Before going any further one should briefly understand the doctrine of Consideration. Despite the vast amount of content written, the doctrine of consideration is still to this day unclear due to the inconsistency of the courts and its application of necessary rules. Consideration refers to that which the law deems as valuable in that the promisor receives from the promise that which was promised. In other words, it is the exchange of something of value between the parties in a contract. One should be mindful that in English law, every promise may not be legally enforceable; it requires the court to distinguish between are enforceable and non-enforceable obligations. This brings us to the controversial cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v the Roffery brothers. Many argue that that the case of Williams was wrongly decided leading to impairments in the rule initially established in Stilk v Myrick. This essay seek to analyse and critique the cases of Stilk v Myrick and Williams v Roffey Brothers and also highlight whether or not the new rule of Practical benefit lead to serious impairments in later cases.
Perhaps the greatest insight provided by my colleague's discussion is the deconstruction of the process by which the concept of negligence did ultimately emerge as a new tort standard. Here, the discussion illustrates the challenge before a judicial body when a legal conflict appears to bring about a new and previously unforeseen point of contention. In this case, as my colleague highlights so effectively, the charge of fraud would be the only theretofore existent way of legally addressing liability for a business or organization such as the defendant in this case. The great insight provided by my colleague is in acknowledgement of the exhaustive review of existing legal documents engaged by the ruling parties and arguing parties. This process demonstrates well that even where no precedent existing for what would become the charge of negligence,
The author argues that the operation of Belize test should be understood as: A term has to be fit in either of the traditional test, but before the implication, it has to be checked by Belize that is in congruence with the reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole. However, there are some fears that the role of necessity has been trumped by reasonableness in Belize that will consequently lead to the court making the contract for the parties. The preliminary issue is how should we understand “necessity”. Some say it is necessary to make the contract work. Some others propose that it is meant to give effect to the intention of the parties. To uphold the principle of freedom of contract, the court must give effect to what the contractual parties intended therefore the court does not inquire into the subjective intention of the either party. In Liverpool City Council and Philips both stress the importance of necessity. Yet we should be careful in both cases they did not nevertheless totally eliminated the role of reasonableness. The difficult here lies in how the court could