What Is The Doctrine Of Promissory Estoppels

Mr. Potbelly and Mr. Slim Jim are two competent people who voluntarily entered into an agreement for the purchases of the pottery and the home. Mr. Potbelly presented Mr. Slim Jim with the original offers and Mr. Slim Jim counter counter-offered within reason of the asking price. The conversation had between Mr. Potbelly and the other individual should not be grounds for him

Id. at 74. The court's conclusion of unconscionability was supported by findings of additional factors. Id. at 174. There is evidence of concealment, misrepresentation, and undue advantage on the part of Mrs. Derby as well as emotional weakness on the part of Mr. Derby. Id. at 74. In Jones, Section 2-302 of the UCC authorizes the court to find, as a matter of law, that a contract or a clause of a contract was "unconscionable at the time it was made", and upon so finding the court may refuse to enforce the contract, excise the objectionable clause or limit the application of the clause to avoid an unconscionable result. Jones, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).

Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is a “legal bar preventing a (first) party from denying another (second) party's right in first party's property where the second party has incurred costs in that property to its detriment”. Proprietary estoppel, like other types of estoppel, is not a remedy in itself but a tool to raise “estoppel equity”, on the basis of which the court is able to decide on the type of remedy that this equity will satisfy. Similarly to the need for the element of common intention for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust, there is a need for the establishment of an active or passive assurance on the part of the defendant that leads to some form of consequential detriment on the part of the claimant when acting in reliance on that assurance. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the actions undertaken by the claimant and the initial assurance on the part of the defendant. The extent and the nature of the detriment suffered by the claimant, however, appears to be substantially more flexible than that necessary to find the existence of a constructive trust. For example, in Inwards v Baker [1965], such detriment amounted to the improvement of the defendant’s land, while in Gillett v Holt [2001] it was manifested in both financial and personal detriment. Yet unlike in most cases involving common intention constructive trusts, in neither of

A’s promise to B can only be enforced by B if B has given consideration for that promise;

Gregory, a comedy writer, entered into a contract with Wessel, a comedian. The contract provided that Gregory would provide Wessel with a 15 minute monologue for his upcoming appearance on the comedy Hour and that Wessel would pay Gregory $250. All Performers on the comedy Hour make $500 per appearance. As Gregory knows, the last time Wessel appeared on the Comedy Hour he was asked to make special guest appearances at three local comedy clubs using the same monologue. Wessel earned a total of $750 for the three performances. Shortly before Wessel was scheduled to appear on the comedy Hour, Gregory informed Wessel that he was unable to provide the monologue. As a result, Wessel was forced to cancel his appearance. Wessel sued for breach of contract and requested damages of $1,250. What will result? Issue, -

The following case American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171 (Va.1904) it is expressed that; where the consideration for the promise of one party is the promise of the other party, there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other to a positive agreement. Both parties must be bound or neither is bound. A party making a promise is bound to nothing until a promisee, within a reasonable time, engages to do, or else do or begins to do, the thing which is the condition of the first promise. Until such engagement or such doing, the promisor may withdraw his promise, because there is no mutuality, and therefore no consideration for it.

Danny Davidson sold a single family home to Paul and Priscilla Peterson. A long-term relationship between Danny and Paul is the basis for not including a written agreement. The simple contract was made orally and only included the legal object and the amount to be paid. Danny did not disclose a dispute with his neighbor over boundary lines or include information about a soil subsidence in the front yard he claims not to have known about.

This case illustrates the presence of conditions precedent, implied conditions, substantial performance, and breach of contract (material).

“Promissory estoppel is a term used in contract law that applies where, although there may not otherwise be an enforceable contract, because one party has relied on the promise of the other, it would be unfair not to enforce the agreement.” (USLegal.com, 2012)

For the reasons set forth below, I submit that we could plausibly argue that a condition precedent to Proterra’s duty to pay has not been satisfied, the interest provision of the contract is an improper liquidated damages clause, and the interest provision of the contract is unconscionable.

The U.S. court of appeals ruled that the general release Marder signed was an enforceable contract. In other words, the court of appeals agreed with the district court’s verdict dismissing Marder’s complaint against Paramount. Marder’s complaint against Paramount was invalid because the contract she had sign with them covered all four of the characteristic found within a legal contract. Both parties made an agreement to release and discharge during the signing of the contract. Paramount paying Marder $2,300 is classified as a promise that was supported by a bargain-for consideration. Marder had contractual capacity and the objective of the contract was lawful. Marder should have negotiated for a percentage of the profit instead of signing off

Within the last decade, Canada has become internationally recognized as a constitutional democracy. Moreover, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is seen as an exemplary rights protection document. Nonetheless, the Charter 's most unique feature, the Notwithstanding Clause (NC) is highly controversial as it allows the legislature to displace most Charter rights. The NC can be applied to fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights; however, it cannot be applied to mobility rights, minority language education rights, or gender equality rights. Ultimately, if a legislature is determined to preserve a law that violates Charter-protected rights, it can do so. In assessing the logic, wisdom, and viability of the NC, it is clearly indefensible and unviable; therefore, Canada should abolish it. Firstly, the NC is inconsistent with the entrenchment of rights and freedoms protection embodied by the Charter. Secondly, the legislature 's power of the NC cannot be legitimately exercised against the judiciary 's power of review. Thirdly, the NC has a long history of dormancy and has become irrelevant.

The prior medical practice agreed the noncompete clause could be waived and bought-out in exchange for a payment of $195,000.00. In December 2010, Dr. Stout desired to become an employee of the Practice. Dr. Stout believed the noncompete clause would “curtail[]” his “employability” with the Practice. Therefore, Dr. Stout obtained a loan from the Practice to buy-out the noncompete clause. Dr. Stout signed both a written agreement and a promissory note in which he agreed to repay the loan to the Practice. Thereafter the Practice caused $195,000.00 to be paid to Dr. Stout’s prior medical practice on

The plaintiff Michele Nichols purchased a car from defendant Century West, LLC using three checks as a down payment, dated the day after the contract was signed (two checks) and the other was dated two weeks later. After eleven months owning the car, the plaintiff sued Century West and another defendant, BMW Financial Services NA, LLC, seeking to release the contract. Her evidence at trial court concentrated mostly whether she received a fair deal for her trade-in vehicle, a new car she had leased a month earlier. Furthermore, on appeal, her sole argument was about the way Century West entered her three-check down payment on the “down payment” line of the sales contract, instead of putted it on the “deferred down payment” line. For this reason, she claimed that she had the right to rescind the contract according the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance

On September 17, 1787, the Constitution was signed into law and applied to the United States of America. Since its establishment, there have been numerous situations where the government has created laws that go against the Constitution. Importantly, the First Amendment in the Constitution protects freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. The First Amendment restricts the federal government on imposing any system of prior restraint. Prior restraint allows the government to censor material before its distribution or publication. When prior restraint is allowed, it in turn, limits 1st Amendment rights because it gives the government a right to suppress certain material. It is widely believed that the doctrine of prior restraint should only be used in rare events such as when it’s in regards to national security. But, how do we define national security? For years after the signing of the Constitution, the government has found loopholes to impose prior restraints on publications from the press because of national security.