Raghunath Prasad CASE

The appellants complain that the tax court fail to apply debt-equity principles. The secondary inquiry cannot be reached unless the first question concerning whether an economic

On January 13th of 1999, a 17 year old Korean girl by the name of Hae Min Lee when missing after school in Baltimore, Maryland. Lee’s body was discovered in Leakin park; three weeks later in a shallow grave. The police arrested and charged Lee’s ex-boyfriend Adnan Syed with the murder six weeks later. The police alleged Syed because of phone records they obtained also their only witness Jay Wilds. In the murder case of Hae Min Lee, Adnan Syed should not have been convicted. Syed should not have been convicted on the account of Syed has no history of violence, the single witness in the case has major inconsistencies in his story about the events that occurred, and the lack of evidence that firmly connects Syed to the murder.

The plaintiff, First Colonial Bank for Savings entered into an interpleader action in the District court to determine who was entitled to the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. The foreclosed property belonged to the defendants, Robert H. and Sherrell L. Bergeron, and the codefendants, Ford Motor Credit Company, the junior mortgagee of the foreclosed property as a result of corporate restructuring Ford Consumer Finance Company was substituted as the defendant for Ford Motor Credit Company. Both the Bergerons and Ford filed motions for summary judgement as they both felt entitled to the surplus. The district court ruled in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company and denied the Bergerons motion. The Bergerons appealed the decision of the District Court because they argued that they filed for and were discharged from bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure sale, therefore they believed that the security interest granted to Ford prior to their petition does not carry over to the surplus funds received after filing the petition.

Harding further asks us to confirm that the trial judge complied with the requirements of Md. Rule 14-305(e) when she ratified the foreclosure sale. Furthermore, Harding petitions us to subpoena certain phone calls made between her and M & T Bank officials. Harding’s requests, however, are not properly presented before this appellate court. Moreover, Harding has failed to present an argument that would overcome the presumption of legitimacy we afford to the ratification of a foreclosure sale.

But such evidence is only relevant if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. Generally, the “remoteness in time of the other bad acts is ordinarily a factor affecting the weight of the evidence.” State v. Shaw, 847 S.W.2d 768, 778 (Mo. Banc 1993). But when “remoteness is so great that it erodes the probative value of the evidence, the prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value and the evidence is not admissible.” Id.

This court case involved the plaintiff Hamptons Landscaping Service Inc., who had been represented by Lieb at Law, P.C. This side of the case then was seeking summary judgment to recover $17,217.00, from the defendants Michael & Frances Sherman who had been represented by Kelly and Hulme, P.C. which was alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment causes of action. The Sherman’s had crossed moved seeking an order dismissing Hampton's complaint, also had asserting that Second

The context of Appellant’s actual damage presentation is instructive. Appellant’s consistent position seeks the claimed compensation for the tortious damage to his Property viewed as a whole. Appellant’s Property includes the dwelling he had on the Property and also includes the land and the value of all of those assets contained thereon. Appellant has demonstrated that the Trial Court erroneously

I have John Mchugh 658M78455 that filed a complaint because he has made several attempts to reach his case manager Sharla Hinds at 866-804-4589 but he

The final case I will be discussing is, Saleslar, Paul G.v Mahaevan P. The plaintiff, in this case, had loaned the defendant money to start a business, and was now suing for $25,000. In the previous settlement conference, the defendant had admitted fault and agreed to the judgment of paying $1,500 bi-monthly. The defendant did not agree to the terms of payment and was noted in default after breaching the pay agreement.

evidence of the case was brought to the courts stating that the prosecution did not

Facts of the case (Summary of facts of case and its journey to Supreme Court)

The complainant, N is the husband and legal guardian (since March 3, 2009) of A; A is the sister of M. On June 12, 1989 B, the mother of A and M, retained Attorney J, a family friend, to assist in the execution of a deed. The deed transferred the ownership of Barbara's home at 27 Elm to Al and M. Shortly after on October 16, 1989, another deed for the same property was executed transferring a portion of the property back to Barbara. This document is purported to contain the signatures of B, Al, and M Helena. On January 25, 2006

During my line of questioning with Albert Waltham, I will ask him whether he had any interest in David Waltham’s car or loan. I will ask Albert whether he was a co-signor for David, or if he helped with any of David’s down payment. In the likely event that Albert had no financial interest in David’s loan with Great Northern bank, then he would not be considered a secondary obligor under RSA 382A:9-611(C). If this is the case, then the bank would be under no obligation to notify Albert regarding David’s default. Therefore, the plaintiffs would not have a valid claim under RSA

As a result of the foregoing, an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between plaintiffs and defendants DPR concerning their respective rights and duties. Plaintiffs contend that their security interests in the collateral described in the security agreements continued notwithstanding the sale or disposition to defendants DPR of the collateral, and continue to this day or, alternatively, defendants DPR should be estopped from asserting any right, title, or interest in the collateral senior or adverse to the security interests of plaintiffs in that recognition of any priority interest by defendants DPR would sanction fraud and promote injustice because recognition would effectively render plaintiffs’ security interest illusory, thus allowing

The trial judge instructed the jury not to consider LM’s statements when deciding the appellant’s case. The appellant’s grounds for appeal to the High Court, were that these statements should have been considered.