Rational Appeasement

Robert Jervis in ‘Security dilemma’ states that “states can neither neglect the possibility that others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves remain peaceful”. He argued that although other motives such as ‘greed, glory and honour’ come into play, much of international politics is

Appeasement is the policy of acceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace. This is done by giving in to demands of a leader in order to satisfy their short term goals and avoid conflict. It was a policy used by the leaders of France and Britain with Hitler in the 1930s because they hoped that if they showed understanding and gave Hitler what he asked for, there would be no reason for fighting or war to break out. Some of the things followed for appeasement that the Western Leaders did were, When Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland, France did nothing, France and Britain did not oppose his rebuilding the German military. Britain, in fact, signed a treaty with Germany allowing them to exceed Treaty of Versailles

Appeasement in the general perspective could also be viewed at the “cooperation of adversaries or aggressors within the context of a normative environment” (cited in Dimuccio R.B.A. 1998:251) What this general view of appeasement is trying show is that in this situation appeasement of an aggressor nation would motivate the aggressor nation to reward the appeasing nations. It was the assumption of the appeasers that the proper incentives and initiatives could lead to the rectification of incentives and initiative

So the theory suggests that because democracies externalise their interstate norms, they resolve disputes with other states like them in a peaceful way. Hence domestic inner-state policies influence their foreign policies. However, this proclamation is disputed by C. Layne who argues that the ‘crux’ of this theory is that if the assumption that democracies promote their peaceful inner-state norms and beliefs, then they shouldn’t ever threaten other democracies, especially not in a crisis. I will use the case study of the ‘Trent affair’ to provide evidence of how war was avoided. I will argue that in this case, war was avoided not because of the domestic pacific influence on foreign policy but because of other strategic reasons.

In Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, author Jack Snyder seeks to explain why overexpansion has been so common among the great powers. Sometimes, Snyder argues, states over-expand so aggressively that their actions risk the survival of the states themselves, as was the case of Germany and Japan in the World War II era. Snyder explains that the ‘central myth of empire,’ which he considers ‘defensive realism,’ is that states think that their security can only be safeguarded through further expansion. Snyder explains that this myth of empire is the counterproductive aggressive foreign policy that was the major force that propelled

Weber’s second solution is “Restoring the Balance.” Weber explains that the United States continues “dissuading potential competitors from challenging the United States, its allies and partners.” In other words “More American power is always better.” George Kennan brought this problem to the world’s attention in the 1940’s, when he suggested a European country rise to restrain the

(Henriksen, 1999) The international community could attempt to dissuade the rogue nation from engaging in an act of war by threatening military retaliation. Tyrants have historically treated conciliatory actions in response to warlike behavior with contempt. For example, Hitler interpreted Neville Chamberlain’s agreement to the Munich Pact as appeasement and weakness, while Moscow removed its missiles out of Cuba in response to Kennedy’s political resolve and our country’s show of

The world was plunging into World War II in 1939 because the league of nations did not accept the appeasement. Chamberlain suggested appeasement because he believed ¨good will and determination¨could solve differences among countries peacefully. Chamberlain said ¨They could not fight to save Czechoslovakia because it is too small of a country.¨ Hitler was going to keep on expanding and and it would get to a point to where no one would be able to stop hitler from expanding. The most effective response to aggression of nations would be collective security because shocked by the will to be taking some military actions when necessary. This was proved to be affected by many people, this gave the allies buying time to make preparations for war. This

Throughout history, negotiation has been a powerful tool used by world leaders to avoid violence and solve conflict. When negotiation succeeds all parties can feel that that have achieved their goals and met their expectations, but when negotiations go awry countries and relationships can be damaged beyond repair. The Munich Agreement of 1938 is a primary example of this type of failure, which was one of the catalysts to the start World War II and Czechoslovakia’s loss of independence. The Czech people were greatly overlooked during this agreement process, which still in some instances affects the country today. The 1930s were a challenging time for Europe and the powers within it due to the aftermath of WWI and the worldwide economic

The task of explaining why appeasement, has been continuously addressed by historians over the years. To date, there is still no single cause identified. Nonetheless there is however a general consensus amongst historians that the frightful events of world war one, distilled a sense of fear and regret amongst British society, and consequently Britain strived to prevent any future war, through whatever means necessary. In the aftermath of World War 1, lay a mutual understanding between the British government and society that never again should a catastrophe such as World War 1 occur, it was described as the "war to end all wars" reinforcing the view that it was a cataclysmic event which should never be re-enacted upon

Britain in the 1930s followed a policy of appeasement to retain peace between countries and stop the fascist powers of Italy and Germany causing disruption. There is a subsequent amount of evidence to suggest the policy of appeasement was a failure due to events including the Abyssinian Crisis, the Reoccupation of the Rhineland, The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the Spanish Civil War and the Anschluss. Although it can also be argued that Britain had some success with preventing the fascist powers making appeasement successful.

President Theodore Roosevelt, well known for his extraordinary, worldly diplomatic skills, was quoted as saying, “Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far.” During the early twentieth century, he brandished that big stick, or convincingly threatened to, with remarkable efficacy in support of his country’s political objectives. The big stick that President Roosevelt carried with him as a diplomat and Commander in Chief was the superior power of the United States military. “Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want.”1 Power, a nation’s ability to influence other states to achieve a desired outcome, manifests in numerous different forms or elements within a state. Powerful states strive to employ all the elements of power, including diplomacy, information, economic, cultural, and most importantly military to further their national objectives. Although a reasonable person might expect that a militarily powerful state routinely triumphs over the weaker state in matters of war, superior military power only guarantees a victory on paper, not in any real war. This paper will show that when one considers a state’s relative military power, weaker states are capable of defeating more powerful states that struggle to formulate

Cleva also examines what he terms the “Kissinger cycle” of foreign policy, which advocated limited war and continued enhancement of military strength . Cleva cites the paradoxes present in Kissinger’s foreign policy, for example, the reason a virulent anti-communist could negotiate détente is that Kissinger also sought to avoid nuclear holocaust .

The international system is a self-help system; states are obliged to look after themselves, because there is no one else to look after them. Waltz does not assume that states are pursuing the increase in their power and the importance of them between others states, necessarily aggressive body, but he does believe that they desire to preserve themselves. This means that they are obliged to be considered with their security, national defence and obliged to regard other states as potential threats (Brown, 2001).

Theories are used in many fields of science, but in no field are they more prevalent than Political Science. These theories are often used and researched upon to try and attempt to discern how states interact with one another. Offensive Realism, a new branch of realist political theory, is brought forth in John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. This theory focuses on the key aspects of realism, while adding a twist as to why war is an option. In his book, Mearsheimer explains the history of great powers, and predicts that China, the world’s current rising great power, will not gain hegemony in Asia peacefully. With the rise of China, he asserts the US will form coalitions with multiple states throughout Asia, to contain their growing power. This rise in power, and subsequent reactions by the US, are based on his theory Offensive Realism, which is used to predict China’s future actions. The rise of powers, and the reactions of other powers, is historically analyzed, beginning in the late 18th century, all the way to modern times. These analyzes each attempt to support his overall claim that China will rise through non-peaceful means, and shows significant support with historical examples. While the theory often meets an exception when the usual non-European power, Japan, is mentioned, Mearsheimer’s theory introduces a solid new aspect to the realm of Political Science, and presents enough evidence and information to be considered integral to