Realists Vs. Scientific Theory

Epistemological Foundationalism essentially claims that some empirical beliefs carry justification that does not require, or depend, on the justification of other empirical beliefs. In this essay, I intend to introduce the reading, “Can Empirical knowledge Have A foundation?” Written by Laurence Bonjour, to give a detailed summary of his arguments - as well as those who object to his - and ultimately to assert my belief that there is currently no example of an empirical belief that of which can be justified in an epistemic sense without avoiding reference to other empirical beliefs, which would then have to be justified themselves, not solving the regress problem.

(b.) A prediction is different from both because it describes a result of a hypothesis that must be correct

Jonathan Vogel wrote Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation as a solution to accept the real world hypothesis over any skeptical hypothesis. Vogel presents a compelling argument for a definitive reason to accept that the world we are experiencing is in fact the real world. I believe that Vogel’s argument falls short of proving a reason for accepting the real world hypothesis over a skeptical one. In this paper I will clearly explain Vogels argument, explain some important concepts to understand, and attempt to refute the argument.

15. A scientific hypothesis has two important qualities. The first is that it is testable. What is the

Grinnell explains that when scientists make a discovery, they cannot claim it as a scientific fact until they have convinced the scientific community of its legitimacy; therefore, a discovery that has not entered the second conversation of Grinnell’s cyclical model is only a proto-scientific claim. This distinction is an extension of Grinnell’s argument regarding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Furthermore, when a scientist make a discovery, it is deemed as proto-scientific since its interpretation could have been influenced by the scientist’s subjective experience; however, once the scientific community inter-subjectively agrees on the legitimacy of the claim, it becomes scientific. Credibility is the process by which this transformation

body of data, it may be elevated to a theory. Theories are abandoned when subsequent

Most importantly are that theories must be clear and understandable so that they may be tested, otherwise they will be undermined and unable to be put up against practice. Theories are expected to pass certain prerequisites laid out in science i.e. logical consistency, scope and parsimony. Or in other words a theory should be clearly defined, incorporate an inclusive scope, but is explained using a limited reasoning. A theory is best if it can avoid being tautological in nature, although sometimes unavoidable, nevertheless a theories empirical validity and reliability is what the scientific community relies upon when determining the overall value of theories. After all, the ultimate reason scientist theorize is to solve the puzzle or

Empirical science’s theories and knowledge should never be imposed or blindly accepted without self-exploration. Since the planet is complex and contains so much uncertainty, whenever a new theory adapts or when we accept the prior theory, scientists should always test or observe upon if the theory is compatible with the time period. Learning knowledge is a serious matter and should be never forgotten by the

When answering the question What is the “No Miracles” Argument for scientific realism? We first need to look at what is scientific realism. The definition of which is ill- defined, one definition is; Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the science. (Anjan Chakravartty,2011). Also When looking at scientific realism it is said that it can be split in three different kinds; theory realism or epistemological, realism, entity realism or semantically realism and natural kind realism or metaphysical realism. that can all be justified by the no miracles argument. A scientific realist believes that the aim of science is knowledge and finding out the truths in the universe, this allows scientist to predict and create things with the products of the theory. The no miracles argument claims that scientific realism is the best explanation of the successes of science, which would otherwise be seen as ‘miraculous’; meaning if scientific theories are incorrect why is there evidence that supports the theories that is successful such as with DNA and electrons that can correctly be predicted and experimented upon. It also means that too have a successful theory it must tell the truth about the universe. Within this essay I will also be looking at the counter arguments that try and disprove the no miracles argument and scientific

The positivism perspective is an extension to the empiricism view on knowledge that states that knowledge comes from induction and observable experiences and that this knowledge is used to explain social phenomena (Benton & Craib, 2011). Nevertheless, the empiric view of knowledge on which positivism is based has long been subject to limitations. Immanuel Kant noted for instance that knowledge does not only come from the senses but also from a basic pallet of conceptual knowledge we all have. Furthermore, the interpretation of observations can differ due to the different way everyone acquires concepts. The claims done by Staman and Slob (2012) mentioned earlier are analyzed below for using this perspective on science.

The study is discovery based because the text does not pose a question; rather, it discusses observations made in relation to

Upon further deliberation, driven by the evaluation of my peer's speeches, I have revised my view on the true extensiveness of the concept of Discovery.

Both Marxist and positivist stress the need for a rigorous scientific method, for scientific analysis of the social phenomenon and natural world.

The inductivist account of science recognizes five steps which are essential to scientific progress. First, scientists compile a large body of facts from observation and experiment. Using the principle of induction, these facts can be generalized to form the basis for a theory or law. Then, once a theory has been developed, scientists can use the theory as part of a valid logical argument to make new predictions or explanations of phenomena. According to Chalmers, the inductivist account has “a certain appeal” to it, namely, that all of scientific progress can be seen as the result of five fundamental leaps of thought (54). “Its attraction lies in the fact that it does seem to capture in a formal way

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat