Regionally-Aligned Brigade Initiative

In FY13 the Army will transition as we reduce the size of the assigned personnel and force structure. The initial stage of drawdown for Active Component Operational Support is expected to end by FY15 and begins to eliminate the wartime allowance completed by FY17 affecting the ability formations. The Army has enough Soldiers to fill authorization aggregate, but still has shortages in Rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). We need to assign personnel that are available to determine manning effectiveness as well as readiness in deploying units. Synchronizes and integrates readiness priorities for the war fighter and our Army including all forces. The Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and the Army priorities are already established

Regionally Aligned Brigades/Forces is the vision of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army that will provide combatant command with constantly readily available troops that are versatile and responsive. Regionally Aligned Forces are based on an organizing principle that allows the United States (U.S.) Army to provide units that maintain core war-fighting skills complimented with cultural awareness training, language training, and regional expertise. A revised ARFOGEN cycle based on Active Component and 60-month Reserve Component sequence will replace the current Army model. Mission specific training requirements will be communicated, based on combatant command’s require¬ments, and organized through FORSCOM. These

Being at war for the last 14 years the Army now finds it has the best trained and the most combat experienced force in its history. However, the intense focus on a relatively small number of mission sets such as irregular warfare detracts resources for the other missions required by Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). To address this shortfall, the Chief of Staff of the Army General Ray Odierno directed implementation of the Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) concept as means to address Combatant Command’s (CCMD) requirements. Regional alignment of Army units provides the GCC assigned units for a dedicated period , capable of executing myriad of specified missions as outlined in their Lines of Effort

Strategically, RAF will allow combatant commands to engage and shape operational environments (OE) prior to crises and contingencies, as well as gain a significant understanding of the OE prior to committing money and forces to their respective region. Operationally, RAF enables better interdependence, interoperability, and integration between United States Army and its global partners. Tactically, RAF ensures units assigned to combatant commands will have Cultural, Regional Expertise, and Language (CREL) awareness in their regions of responsibility. This Army strategy provides a versatile, responsive, and consistently available force able to support the forward stationed combatant commands in accomplishing their regional missions. The combatant commands consists of six geographic combatant commands, as well as the three functional combatant commands. The former Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno stated, “We will have units that will train to certain [combined arms] levels, then as they get requirements from combatant commanders, they train and are capable of conducting operations in those areas for that combatant commander.” RAF forces will conduct operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercise and theater security cooperation activities, but not without

Initiatives such as Security Cooperation MAGTFs, Crisis Response MAGTFs, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) integration into the MAGTF, MEB operational concepts and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) restructuring provide scale able, responsive options to combatant commanders that are integrated into theater operations and can function across the range of military operations. The ability to employ the right sized force to a specific crisis allows the preservation of combat power and ensures we are responsive across the range of military operations. These new initiatives provide innovative crisis response options for combatant

Moreover, we are entering an era where the American people finally support this reality. However, the population also has limited patience for significant military casualties, and large number of “boots on the ground”. The solution to this problem rests on the close interaction between SOF, CF, and IA to prevent tripping wires of escalation. While this type of military action will require an increased level of cooperation between SOF and CF, it will also reduce risk to US forces. More importantly, this strategy will allow the US to achieve limited, political objectives, without losing popular support. Whereas, during the Korean and Vietnam wars, US limited war strategies focused on preventing an escalation to general conventional war, this new era of warfare will seek to achieve objectives in the sub-limited range of military operations. This strategy will ensure the US can persistently engage our adversaries with multiple instrument of power while allowing SOF to mature its capability to encounter global

The problem the total Joint Force (JF) 2025 will face will be consistent emerging “gray zone” threats that include hybrid and near peer competitors trying to tip the balance in the global security environment. In addition, as the Department of Defense (DOD) learned from past wars while its resources reduce, the total JF 2025 must adapt and become more agile in countering these emerging threats. The DOD has provided the strategic and military guidance along with associated posturing statements for the complementary capabilities of strategic adaptability and agility that will enable the rebalancing of the total JF 2025, support future contingency operations, and mitigate risk.

A good example of this is the implementation of command and control exercises (C2Xs) performed by the U.S. Pacific Command to develop a C4I architecture. The program was used to validate the proficiency of primary Joint Task Force and component commander staffs by executing basic procedures using fielded and experimental tactical systems and applications, documenting subsequent shortfalls and workarounds, and identifying solutions and associated timelines. Focus and objectives alternate between communications networks and systems architectures, decision tools, and processes. The progressive results were useful to improve procedures and increase interoperability. Following this example, a worldwide C2X program can eliminate the barriers to connectivity between the Joint Force Commander and control element in regional commands on one side, and theater Joint Task Force or functional component commanders on the other. Testing compatibility with permanent, transiting, or rotational component commands and coalition partners will contribute significantly to increase interoperability and security. A global exercise program can facilitate technology induction as well as the coupling of command and control procedures in regional scenario vignettes. Besides, additional

Operational design can be a useful planning technique to develop Combatant Commander (COCOM) theater campaign plans. The utility in the process lies in the method of examining factors across the entire political, military, economic, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) spheres to rapidly build awareness and assess risk. Operational design does present both utilities and handicaps in the development of COCOM theater campaign plans. If done correctly, operational design accurately describes the operational environment, holistically defines the problem, and achieves policy objectives. If done poorly, operational design may not assess critical environmental factors, inaccurately defines the problem, and fails to implement a solution. Interaction between the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and staff is a critical step in the operational design process and must be encouraged. In this paper, I will highlight the critical roles of the GCC and staff in the Operational Design process and illustrate where operational design contributes to and where it falters in the development of theater campaign plans (TCPs).

(1) (U) Phase I. (Deter – Force Build-Up) (C-Day to W-Day). Complete RSOI and position each Signal Battalion collocated with their service support elements throughout the designated training locations. Successfully integrate and coordinate with adjacent Brigade IVO the training locations.

detachment OIC for a short notice surge deployment to Iraq, he led Naval Special Warfare

a. The AOC, TP 525-3-1, describes how we will employ forces and capabilities in complex environments against increasingly capable opponents. It describes how our contribution will globally integrate operations, and to address the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities in a Joint Force environment. The Joint Force will project power

Operational art is the application of planners and commander’s skills, intuition, knowledge, judgment, and experience that link ends, ways, means and risk to achieve a desired end state. Whereas, operational design is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that supports planners and commanders in their application of operational art to conceive and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. The result of operational design is the commander’s operational approach that generally describes the actions the joint force needs to accomplish its end state. With the overall intent of operational art and design providing a bridge between tactics and strategy, which links military operations to national interests.

The Army has transformed several times during its history. Adapting to the operational environment is a necessity for the force called upon to prosecute its adversaries. The Army must do what is necessary to protect the U.S. against all enemies, and advance the national interests of the American people. To accomplish this, anticipation of threats is crucial and victory against its adversaries is an imperative. The nation relies on the military for strategic level deterrence and expects that it will be decisive in combat operations. For the military to be successful, it is important that transformation adapt to meet these expectations by conforming to the requirements of a successful force of the future in order meet any new threats in

The United States will only be able to rebalance the Joint Force in 2025 if adequate resources are available. Even with adequate funding, combatant commanders will experience considerable challenges operating in the global security environment. The current strategic direction has prompted a shift of military resources to the Asia-Pacific. This trend will continue. Additionally, globalization, cyber-attacks and advances in technology will further challenge the Joint Forces in the next ten years . The U.S. Joint Forces must identify and develop critical technology now in order to overcome future challenges risk in 2025. Diminishing resources and lack of predictability within the military budget process will introduce significant strategic, military and political risk . While no major organizational changes or force reductions are recommended for the Joint Force, finding the right balance between Active duty and Reserve end strength and missions will be necessary . Each of the Services will need to continue to man, equip and train forces to effectively integrate operations across the Joint Force. Anticipating, developing and fielding capabilities will be key for the Joint Forces to shape or respond to the challenges associated with the global security environment in 2025. Military advantages within the U.S. and allies will continue to diminish if not adequately funded, especially as globalization and the growth of immerging state and non-state proxies become more capable to