Regionally Aligned Forces

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Despite the complexity of this environment and fiscal austerity, the JF25 must “protect our Nation and win our wars.” It must deter and defeat state adversaries, disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations, and strengthen the global network of allies and partners.” The prioritized capabilities required for Joint Force 2025 are linked to the imperatives of securing the homeland and maintaining strategic agility. This essay discusses general attributes of the JF, specific capability requirements by service, and the risk associated with focusing the rebalance on these two imperatives.

The transformation in military thought towards employment of forces across multi-domain operations battlespace is based on the current threats

Three short years ago, the 4th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM. In all areas, the brigade shined. Morale was high and it exerted a pull on the best and the brightest officers and non-commissioned officers. Leaders lead, Soldiers soldiered, and a family atmosphere of support emanated within the brigade. The work ethic was strong. Competition amongst the battalions was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade and there was frequent coordination among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Now, after a jaded Afghanistan deployment, it appears that the climate has shifted and the battalions are striving to make themselves distinct from each other and the brigades rather

The Army has already established the need for maintaining an operational reserve, through former and current TAAs, capable of breaching AC capability gaps to meet joint force requirements. However, the analysis lacks resources to accomplish this guidance effectively. The demand for RC forces requires generating more operational unit readiness to fully complement the rotational force pool to meet the deployment demand at the same standard as the AC. After conducting a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis, both overarching recommendations address an identified capability requirement and associated capability gap that could be mitigated with a non-materiel solution with changes or existing capabilities in five, organization, training, personnel, facilities, and policy, of the eight functions.

The Department of the Army XXXXXXX, in coordination with XXXXXX and XXXXXX, ordered the restructure of the XXXX Aviation Brigade and augmentation of aviation capabilities with the first Rotational Aviation Forces (RAF) concept in the US Army. The mission of the RAF is to support the XXXXXXX alliance in XXXXX and XXXXX.

First, armored BCTs—consisting of tanks, armored reconnaissance and engineers, mechanized infantry, and self-propelled artillery—provide a powerful offensive, forced-entry capability as well as the ability to defend against enemy conventional forces. Armored BCTs are powerful tactical formations that combine firepower and maneuver to defeat adversaries, but they lack strategic mobility. The large number of heavy vehicles means that it takes time to transport an armored BCT from home station to a crisis zone—a process that requires loading BCT equipment on cargo ships for weeks-long voyages to a theater of operations. In some theaters where a rapid response is essential, such as the Persian Gulf and South Korea, the Army has established pre-positioned stocks of armored BCT equipment sets so that BCTs can deploy faster by flying soldiers from home station without having to wait for their equipment to arrive by

Proper training provides any organization with the fundamental base for successful operations. The importance of training is even more crucial when teams are expected to deploy in small elements and provide commanders with operational and strategic options for the conduct of UW. The modern Jedburghs provide Joint Force Commanders with the capability to conduct the most difficult aspects of UW campaigns by understanding, influencing, and shaping the operational environment, deterring adversary forces, and when necessary, defeating threats to U.S. national security. The operational tempo that 4th BN’s face today obstructs from the operator’s ability to receive advanced unconventional warfare training, military training directly related to the

The next area that will be considered is the conduct of operations examining platforms, weapons, and targeting. During Op DESERT STORM whilst there were 34 members of the UN coalition, the practical contribution by nation varied significantly, both in their role, capacity and capability . This is a critical factor to acknowledge, as any discussion about evolution or revolution in airpower has to focus primarily on the US, with the UK, France, Canada and Italy taken into account albeit to a lesser extent, due to their relative contribution. In quantitative

2. A problem with the current United States Air Force philosophy is that it tends to favor efficiency over effectiveness.1 With an increasing need to streamline procedures, the Department of Defense claims it can operate more efficiently by reforming weapons acquisition with an emphasis on operating jointly and attacking redundancies among military services.2 The Air Force continues to decline in numbers and strength as the American perception of air threats decreases and the focus on land campaigns increase.3 This shift is best characterized by a quality over quantity mentality, upgrading the current fleet with new sensor suites, avionics and weapons.4 In terms of sustained deployments and wars of attrition, mass quantities of advanced aircraft and highly skilled personnel are needed to meet the demands of a worst-case scenario engagement.

General Dempsey articulated the United States military is the premier global military with a decisive military advantage but dominance just doesn’t happen necessitating the United States military to maintain the decisive edge. Dempsey’s statement is the catalyst for the premise of Joint Force 2025 in which the United States military embarks upon a transition and rebalance to address a wide continuum of emerging threats to our nation’s national interests in the foreseeable future. Dempsey correctly states that adaptation and innovation are essential to the Joint Force 2025 as ‘we have to out-learn and out-think our adversaries.’ This essay will recommend general capabilities of Joint Force 2025 which are necessary to transition and rebalance the force based on strategic guidance and the global security environment which provides the combatant commander with right-sized capabilities in support of the nation’s strategic interests. Utilization of national strategic guidance will lay the foundation for the assessment of each service’s general capabilities in support of Joint Force 2025 while also appraising risk implications in the foreseeable global security environment.

Achieving national goals and maintaining balance in military, political/diplomatic, and economic objectives can be challenging. John Stillion’s proposal to engage in fighter pilot combat skills training during peacetime deployments presents an opportunity for advanced readiness in the case of potential future conflicts, yet I have some concerns with his rationale.

To do this, it must train as realistically as possible. In the USAF, the innovations in training like Red Flag drove the enhancement of the flight skills; while the emergence of jointness after the Goldwater-Nichols act helped to solve issues of inter service rivalries. While the threat of a Soviet aggression to Europe drove most of the training during 1980s, the integration of technological innovations in communications, weapons and platforms in the training would result in the success during Desert Storm. However, technology could not solve completely the problem of fratricide. Is successive wars, the lesson for CAS forces is that such wonders of modern technology do little to help pilots that must get very close to their work in order to separate friendly form enemy

With the advancements of technology, conventional warfare is at a constant change. A country is faced with two options, adapt or meet defeat. One military branch at is shaping the future of geography and political points of interest is Air Defense. Qatar, a country not well known to most Americans, but in fact has been a valued partner and alliance member for over 40 years. Qatar currently hosts the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Headquarters and is a major supporter for U.S. Air Defense operations (“U.S. Relations With Qatar,” 2014). Leaders must understand an alliance’s culture as it provides insight on how to conduct interactions. What works for one culture doesn’t always work for another. To help build relationships

In order to ascertain how air power can be most effectively employed, it is first necessary to analyse its evolution in the strategic context. This section aims to identify why the strategic uses of air power are still in their infancy, and therefore what type of strategic effects must be considered in response to future regional military modernisation. This will enable future strategic directions to be forecast, and subsequently matched against effective response options.