Research Paper On Operation Anconda Joint Planning

Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan. The mission began on March 2, 2001 and ended on March 16, 2001. A “hammer and anvil” attack, with 600 American and 400 Afghan troops, would rout, capture, or kill enemy forces. The operational timeline for a three-day battle projecting light combat took fourteen days to complete. During Operation Anaconda, Unity of Command planning did not fully anticipate the need for additional forces, inducing a stall in operations on the battlefield, and negating a timely victory.

The United States’ War on Terror following the attacks on 9/11 began with the invasion of Afghanistan and an attempt to to overthrow the Taliban government for harboring Osama bin Laden, the one responsible for the devastating attacks, led to devastating casualties of American and Taliban soldiers, as well as countless civilians. The United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001 and began a ground and air attack in Afghanistan. In the first year of the war, it is reported that between 1537 to 2490 civilians were killed in the air assault led by U.S. forces (Guilliard 66). The U.S. swiftly defeated the Taliban but failed to capture Bin Laden before he escaped to Pakistan. It is reported that roughly 13,000 Talibani soldiers were killed in the first year of the war Guilliard 74). This led to very poor relations with Afghan “rebels” in which there were many sporadic battles with that led to Afghanistan becoming a

As Operation Anaconda took shape the command structure became very convoluted. MG Hagenbeck had command and control (C2) of the majority of the U.S. ground force elements, but not all of them. There was a separate chain of command for black Special Operations Forces (SOF) and inter-agency operations. These forces reported directly to CENTCOM, and had different priorities and the authority to request and receive support from a variety of the same assets needed for Operation Anaconda, to include AC 130 gunships. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003)

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

“I can do things you cannot, you can do things I cannot; together we can do great

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) aimed at destroying terror groups Taliban and al-Qaeda carried out operation Anaconda. The operation was executed in March 2002 outside the valley of Shahi-Kot in Zormat area, Afghanistan (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, Searle, 2003). The task included forces that required direct command and instruction from their Commanders. The mission was in direct link with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) office and CENTCOM with the General Tommy R. Franks as the officer in charge that received, analyzed and provided real-time intelligence. Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, of the 10th

In 2001, Afghanistan was a society taken over by extremists and a safe haven for international terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The tragedy that occurred on September 11 triggered the growth of radicalism. Thus, Canada felt an obligation to interfere. The first Canadian Armed Forces contribution to the campaign against terrorism in Southwest Asia was at sea. "Beginning in October 2001, Canadian ships would search unknown boats for illegal activity." The Aurora Patrol Aircraft and Hercules and Polaris transport planes were also involved. Soon Canadian soldiers joined American and British troops who were already fighting to overthrow the Taliban regime. Canada's Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) has also operated in Afghanistan. "JTF2 is proficient in counter-terrorist operations and specialized military activities." "Chrétien’s government predicted that the military eviction of the Taliban was likely to be as successful as the 1980s eviction of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan." All in all, Canada abandoned its traditional peacekeeping role and served alongside the Americans to annihilate terrorism at its

In February 2002, Special Forces intelligence agents along with Advanced Force Operations (AFO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were starting to make a connection between an increase presence of high-value targets (HVT), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters in an area called Shahi-Kot Valley (Neville, 2005). Shahi-Kot is located in Afghanistan, just southeast of a town called Zormat. A plan was devised to eliminate the enemy threat in that area. Major Franklin L. Hagenbeck was to command the mission called Operation Anaconda. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United States War in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora (Call, 2007, p. 57-86). Operation Anaconda was also unique in the fact that it would involve a great number of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations, and conventional forces (U.S. Army, n.d.),

On September 11, 2001 terrorism became a reality! There is no way for the United States to prevent future attacks on Americans without working as a coalition force with the other nations to identify, track, and eliminate terrorist networks around the world. One of the main problems with fighting a war on terrorism is that the nations of the world have become accustomed to working alone as individuals vice working together. The United States will need to change its approach in order to conquer the worldwide threat of terrorism. The way to defeat terrorism at home and around the world is to form an international counter-terrorist task force.

The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H

Every year, since the Taliban regime ended, foreign troop numbers within the country have increased dramatically. The greatest increase of troops was about twenty thousand additional troops added to the grand total of sixty-six thousand. With increased troops, the Taliban activity has also intensified. Mullah Saifur Reheman, a Taliban, began to rebuild his militia forces to support the anti- United States fighters. His forces amounted to over one thousand by the beginning of Operation Anaconda in March of 2002. Rebels against the revolution had planned to use the region as headquarters for launching guerrilla attacks (Shapiro). The United States used Kandahar International Airport as an operational base for taking and dispersing personnel and supplies. The number of U.S. troops who operated in the country grew to more than ten thousand against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Eventually, the United States and its allies drove the Taliban from power and curtailed al Qaeda’s efforts to plan and execute terrorist attacks at a high cost. The United States special inspector for Afghanistan reconstruction has reported that, when the security for aid workers is counted, the total amount of nonmilitary funds that Washington has appropriated since 2002 “is about one-hundred billion dollars (Emadi).” That is more than the United States has ever spent trying to rebuild a country. There is no need to spend that much money to have an impact, that money just needs to be spent well. In

Operation Anaconda was the largest battle fought in Afghanistan by conventional forces. It took place after US Special Forces aligned with Afghan forces from the Northern alliance ran bombing campaigns that crushed the Taliban in late 2001. The operation would take place in the Shahikot valley which had peaks that were anywhere around 8,000 to 12,000 feet. The high altitude, rocky terrain and the cold weather prove difficult for air assault missions in the area of operations (AO) and for conventional forces that were not trained for combat operations at such high altitudes and cold weather.

When the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred the United States responded in a manner which was seen as a traditional reaction to such an attack; it used its overwhelming superior military to invade the nation of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was the operating base of the terrorist group responsible for the attacks, Al Qaeda, the invasion all but destroyed the group's operating capacity. But in response to the United States' apparent victory the terrorists have re-organized themselves into a looser confederation and turned to alternative methods of finance and operation. One could say that the success of the American military's answer to the September 11th attacks have created a new environment in which terrorists currently operate. This includes the use of the internet, unconventional alliances with international criminal organizations, as well the inception of the "lone wolf" terrorist. Faced with these new type of threats, the United States and its allies must find a way to identify and deal with them.

U.S. battle plan for Anaconda employed forces, tactics, and procedures that reflected earlier successful experiences in Afghanistan. The early stages of the battle, however, produced stronger enemy resistance and a more adverse combat environment than expected, and major adaptations had to be made to the initial plan. In particular, joint air forces had to be quickly called on to provide a large volume of close air support. Because such changes had not been expected or prepared for, U.S. forces initially had some difficulties integrating their service-component actions into true joint operations; allied contributions and agency cooperation were also lacking. The battle was predicted and planned to last 2 to 3 days. In the event, U.S. forces