Resource Wars: the New Landscape of Global Conflict

His approach attempts to consider deeper causes of intrastate violence than traditional case-studies have done (Newman 2014, 63). Newman identifies four general types of civil war: ethnic, political-ideological, weakened or failed state, and resource-based (Newman 2014, 63-65). Most intrastate conflicts can be characterized by a combination of these classifications and their influences. Newman defines four loose requirements for a conflict to be considered using this model. First, a conflict must mainly occur within the borders of an internationally recognized state to be considered “civil” rather than interstate (Newman 2014, 62). Secondly, civil wars are fought between organized groups rather than individuals or unorganized affiliates (Newman 2014, 62). Governmental military forces fit this mold, but are not required for a conflict to be deemed as intrastate. Third, there must be evidence of sustained violence. Newman defines this threshold as 1,000 fatalities (Newman 2014, 62). Last, belligerents must be fighting with a political objective in mind (Newman 2014, 62). This requirement is given a wide range of applicability, as almost any objectives of a group can be defined as political. The Nigerian civil war of the late 1960s fits all of these parameters, and can therefore be analyzed using the typologic system devised by

Charles Tilly’s article “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” creates an analogy between the creation of European states and acting out an organized crime. Earlier in our course, we learned about Max Weber, who defined a state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Tilly argues that the word “protection” in relation to physical force has positive and negative connotations, leading to illegitimate use of power during the period time that Tilly is discussing. Tilly’s analysis eventually tells the reader that war is always a major part of state politics; specifically that war making and state making are interdependent.

Greed and grievances are found to be two of the most crucial causes of most violent conflicts as well as the driving forces of mass rebellion. In the case of Sierra Leone, a war that went on from 1991 to 2002 killing about 50,000 people and displacing almost two thirds of the total population is a great example of a violent conflict that fits both the greed and grievance based explanation. At the time, Sierra Leon was a country based on a one party system and dominated by the APC also known as the ‘All people’s congress’. During the APC regime there was great misuse of political power for the parties personal gain. There appeared to be great decline of “total output, neglect of agriculture, increase in unemployment, deterioration and neglect of agriculture, increase in unemployment” (Naguib, 2015). Although the president at the time made major reforms that pushed for a more democratic state, that guaranteed basic human rights, he did not keep his promising allowing the APC to continue in

Firstly, the bibliography is not representative of the vast existing literature about conflict, development and violence (Jones and Rodgers 2011).The majority of the literature mentioned is based on quantitative parallels between economic and political aspects and conflict. This goes against the World Bank claims that “Our approach is multidisciplinary and draws on both quantitative and qualitative evidence” (2011, p. 73). The lack of qualitative data is also apparent in the report’s explanation that it structure is adequate with theories of violence in various disciplines with the use of box 3.4 page 104 that is based on the research of economists. Even tough they are prominent scholars in the violence and conflict debate; they are novice in this debate that emerged with classic figures that are not mentioned in the bibliography such as Machiavelli arguing that conflict contributes to the stability of the society (in Jones and Rodgers 2011, p.983). Hobbes is mentioned only once page 75. This is also the case for Tilly (2003) that is considered as one of the most prominent scholars that have studied the relation between violence and the state. The main idea in his work is about what work does violence and conflicts do and make a distinction between many types of violence, what the report does not. Finally, Galtung developed the idea of peacebuilding, insisting on the formation of peacebuilding structure in

I intuitively sensed the ascendant role of non-state-armed actors in Kosovo. However, my experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan crystalized in me the desire to explore the broader political and social ramifications of the rising influence of non-state armed groups. I began to ponder the strategic impact of their decisions and actions on the long-term evolution of political institutions. What are the consequences when local political elites try to incorporate

All three of these authors believe that major violent conflicts are growing increasingly more intense in recent history. Bodley states that these conflicts have grown increasingly common with the formation of state forms of governance. These structures have grown increasingly common, starting about six thousand years ago. This author describes the state structures as being “predatory” in nature (Bodley 1: 1). States began growing to an increasingly larger united human populations. As they grew in size, they require more resources, often more than is present in their current territories (Bodley 2: 5). Bodley also mentions other factors that are responsible for increasing the intensity of violent conflicts. The mindset that comes from ethnocentrism

Violence and bloodshed within and among communities is perhaps the most salient and overarching problem to afflict the world since civilizations emerged. Academics and policy-makers have strove for stable peace amongst the world since the enlightenment, with little success. In order to curb the world’s rampant communal violence, agreeing upon the sources of conflict need is imperative. Many attribute today’s violence to economic forces, that unfairly dispersed economic gains have pitted the poor up against their richer counterparts. While economic factors might have used to be the main actors in fomenting conflict, their impact is being now being overshadowed by cultural factors. Two nations that exemplify the modern world’s main

Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of the book The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century is considered a subject matter expert in the realm of national security. He “has worked in US national security circles since the end of the Cold War, starting first with the Department of Navy's premier think tank, the Center for Naval Analyses. From there he moved to serve as a senior researcher and professor at the Naval War College in Newport RI”. Dr. Barnett believes that America’s national security focus should revolve around countries that fail, or refuse to adopt globalization. He separates the world into three sections, the Functioning Core, the Gap, and Seam States. Functioning Core states are states with established and

Keller (1997) discusses how internal civil wars rely on military support and arms from across borders. Analysts have long highlighted the relevance of “transboundary formations” that “link global regional, national, and local forces through structures, networks, and discourses that have wide-ranging impact, both benign and malign” (Callaghy, Kassimir & Latham 2001: 5). Non-state actors are able to consolidate their power through their interactions with the international and regional community (Bayart 1993). Mampilly (2011) argues that it is crucial to consider the impact of transnational actors on the behavior of rebel groups as it relates to civilian governance. These relations can bolster non-state actors, including armed groups (Guyer 1994; Ferguson & Gupta 2002). Zahar even argues that because insurgents view themselves as “independent political entities,” they “work to legitimize themselves by interacting with transnational actors” (2001: 60). Mampilly comments that transnational actors support rebel groups by providing them with resources that influence their ability and will to deal with civilian governance (2011: 89). Rebel groups incorporate these transnational actors into their governance systems in order to supplant or supplement their dependence on civilian support, and therefore, their own capacity to provide civilians with goods. And so in general, it is feasible to assume that help drawn from other states will have a damaging effect on civilian governance

Collier (2003) also argues that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars start. Civil wars need both motive and opportunity incentives to start conflicts. However he argues that opportunities are more important in explaining conflicts than motives. I think the new trend to focus on the means of financing conflicts, coupled with the failure of rebel groups to articulate and achieve their objectives, have led to a discourse to find ‘rational’ arguments to dismiss the grievance factor of conflicts as explained by Arowobusoye (2005). I would argue that identity and ethnicity are major factors that are more accurate than the war economies in the instigation of civil wars.

Constructivism, as can be seen from the study case, quite clearly explains the emergence of warlords and conflict, as well as its maintenance. It is completely logical that the mass supported by information (often false) that will propel them against other masses, supports the warlord who created their identity, but more importantly the identity of the opponent.

No matter how far back in the past we look there has always been conflict. Conflicts and succession is what makes every country unique. No one really knows what is going to happen in the future however, some people believe conflicts will continue and get worse whereas some people think conflict has declined and get better. So the question is, what is the future of conflict?

The study of Collier & Hoeffler of 1998 will not be subject of this paper, as only four proxies were examined, namely per capital income, the natural resource endowment, populations size and the extent of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. And also due to the fact, that is was mostly based on the economic model of a rational cost-benefit analysis: A rebellion will be conducted if the assumed benefit is greater than the cost of it (Collier& Hoeffler, 1998). This assumption is quite inaccurate, as it will be argued in the following, that the decision and motivation to engage in an armed conflict is not necessarily a rational one. Also, the study of 2007, which formulated the

Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict is written by Michael T. Klare. Michal T. Klare is an international security expert who believes that in the near future large conflicts will occur between countries for ownership of remaining resources. Klare published this book in March of 2002. This was recently after the attack on the twins towers in New York. Klare uses this attack on the United States to demonstrate how military actions will increase because of the need of resources. Through out the book Klare gives his view on how things will happen as the world uses all of its resources. Klare uses previous research and other resources to validate his argument on how things

All these important questions about terror and insecurity are a considerable part of the subject of international politics. In this regard, scholars have dedicated decades for understanding the relations between states in political, economic, social, and other