Review Of The Moro War By James Arnold

The war saw countless devastating war methods that not only killed thousands but killed them in torturous ways. An example of one of the tactics can be seen in document 13 in which water is forced into a person until their stomach nearly bursts and the person is beaten until they vomit all of the water back out; this is also known as water curing. This is repeated many more times as a way to gain information about the enemy. The American soldiers were not able to differentiate which of the Filipinos was a friend or foe because of the Amigo warfare strategy where the Filipinos pretended to be friends during the day but attacked at night. It is worth mentioning that America also used something similar to this scheme when they first entered the

was generous to annex the Philippines because the U.S. lead the Philippines to a self-government. “It takes a few weeks of work like this to make one proud that he is an American”(Doc H). This document tells the story of the Philippine- American War coming to the end with America’s victory. Letter written by William Connor shows how the United States military won the war that lead the US to guiding the Philippines to a stronger government. “it cannot rule over vassal states or subjects peoples without bringing in the elements of death into its own constitution…”(Doc I). Document I explains that annexing the Philippines is unconstitutional, but this is not correct because the Philippines was bought by the U.S. and they were owned by U.S. “We could not leave them to themselves- they were unfit for self government- and they soon would have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was”(Doc C). The United States saw the Philippine as unfitted for self- government and the Philippines needed the United States to be a parent government, and guide them to a more fit

Their homes were violently searched and sometimes burnt down. “In minutes, the entire hamlet is in flames, the thatch and bamboo crackling like small-arms fire. The marines are letting out high-pitched yells, like the old rebel yell, and throwing grenades and firing rifles into bomb shelters and dugouts. Women are screaming, children crying. Panic stricken, the villagers run out of the flame and smoke as if from a natural disaster” (109). The Marines are there to fight the Viet Cong not destroy civilian homes. Now, the people that they are fighting for are left exposed to the enemy. Instead of helping the Vietnamese, the Marines are making living more difficult. This happens multiple times in Philip Caputo’s story. Each time Caputo’s feelings about the locals change. At first he feels bad for them as their homes go up in flames, but toward the end he begins to hate all the Vietnamese. Even the non Viet Cong. These mistakes are corrected in the war in Afghanistan. “U.S. forces begin to

I do not think that the United States were the good guys in the Philippine- American war. The only right that we had to be in the Philippines was the right taken from Spain. In many ways the imperialism idea that the U.S. had were undemocratic. The United States at the time was developing and did not have adequate resources to keep military in foreign places. I think that we should have focused on own land. We have a large chunk of land full of growth possibilities. The war was not only brutal on both sides, but it also increased tensions about race. Overall the war did not accomplish much besides hurt both sides. The United States should have stopped their efforts after they met resistance.

The Vietnam War was largely considered a failure, a waste of resources, time and precious lives. It was simply a war that did not need to be fought. But in order to combat the ever prevailing communist forces; the capitalists and in particular, America, decided that Vietnam would be the land where these differences would be disputed. Men were sent in to fight in this war and they came back with very different experiences. As seen in both perspectives held in “A Rumor of War” by Philip Caputo and in “We were soldiers once... and young” by Hal Moore and Joseph Galloway; they explore the varying perspectives and experienced seen and learnt within war. Whereas in “A Rumor of War”, it tackles the consequences of being sent into such harsh warfare, only because Philip Caputo saw the harsh reality firsthand as he was a soldier in the war. The former, “We were soldiers once... and young” tackles the glorification of war because it’s not solely a soldier’s account. A journalist was in company of these men and as such details get skewed for the public’s perception. Regardless, both these books share a telling tale of the war in Vietnam through their radically different views.

We Were Soldiers Once…And Young: Ia Drang-The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam, by Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore (Ret.) and Joseph Galloway, published 20 October 1992. This book is the account of the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley in November of 1965, focusing on the First and Second Battalions of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. This book is not only an account of war through the eyes of those in the field, but an account of then Lt. Col. Moore’s leadership leading up to and during combat. I chose this book because the story is not only a gripping recollection of American war history, but an account of the love for your comrade that inspires leadership at all levels.

Diplomacy is the art of dealing with foreign countries and their people in a sensitive and effective way. The ability to influence people and situations contributes to effective American diplomacy. In The Ugly American William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick comment on the nature of American diplomacy in 1950s Southeast Asia. They identify the characteristics and effects of both inept and skilled diplomacy. The book highlights knowledge of language, history, and culture as critical components to the ability to influence indigenous populations. In many ways the situations and characters described in the book mirror situations and challenges faced by Special Operations Forces (SOF) today. Special Operations Imperatives are a planning tool that SOF use to influence people and situations they encounter. In order to understand the influence and effects of proper application of the Special Operations Imperatives the stories of Homer Atkins, Colonel Hillandale and Solomon Asch provide a setting to compare and contrast with my own experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan.

Moss, G.D. (2010), Vietnam an American ordeal (6th ed.), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

Benevolent assimilation allowed for the expansion of business, the improvement of education and health conditions, and the construction of roads, schools, and public marketplaces. The United States provided inoculations against disease and cleaned the city streets in local townships. Additionally, Army officers, placed in civil positions of authority, were responsible for supervising these projects through completion. Some of the officers practiced policies of attraction in the form of immersing themselves in the Moro culture through familiarization of Moro customs and beliefs. However, the agenda of convincing local leaders, or datus, to accept United States sovereignty through strong emphasis that the American government would preserve their rights, and allow for continued practice of Islam, failed. The United States was unable to acquire the buy-in needed from the Moro. Conversely, the campaign President McKinley worked so hard to put in place, began to break down, and fighting between the Americans and the Moro population, increased.

The Vietnam War and Era has been a strange configuration of differing parts. So many differing parts that more often than not Historians struggle to find a way to accurately make sense of this behemoth of history. In an effort to make sense of Vietnam, it must first be segmented. Unlike previous military consumed eras, the Vietnam era has no general consensus for long. It must be fragmented by topic, antiwar, politics, soldier’s perspective, cultural changes on the home front, and military engagements. But then it must also be split based on the years in which change is not occurring.

This case study is on the battle of Mogadishu. This battle took place on October 3rd and 4th of 1993 in the country of Somalia which is located in Africa. This battle changed the foreign policy of the United States. The battle cost the Americans 18 lives, and 77 wounded. Estimates are that it cost the Somalis about 500 lives and wounded 1000.1 This battle was fought with some of Americas most highly trained and lethal warriors. The main effort of the battle was led by Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Operations Forces Detachment- Delta. It started out as a peace keeping mission and escalated into a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It ultimately ended up being a mission

Fifty-eight thousand were killed, a pair of thousand captured, and three hundred fifty thousand; maimed and wounded, just about everyone throughout this country still feels the results of this conflict. Today, the kids in the country rest uneasy in response to the senselessness of this struggle. A different generation of school students, staff and young parents bring a singular perspective to the analysis of the implications of this specific war. These square measure the sons and daughters of the boys that fought to their death inside the jungles of South East Asia..

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were comprised of mostly Catholics from the northern provinces occupying the contested southern provinces. The local populace was almost exclusively Muslim. The history involved with the Mindanao region is rife with struggle between the Muslim Moros, who wanted independence from the Republic of Philippines, and the military. Both sides committed atrocities over the years and mistrust was a natural byproduct. Establishing legitimacy and credibility was essential for the AFP to gain the local support of the populace and deny the insurgent groups their freedom of movement. The Philippine Marines created a Civil Military Officer who would coordinate with NGOs and the local barangay leadership to participate in Civil Military Operations (CMO). These CMO activities were MEDCAPs, schoolbook distributions, and minor civil projects (such as building wells). At the time my SFODA was in the region, the AFP were more focused on assisting the populace and less focused on searching for rogue elements in the area. When asked, the AFP command told stories of how the military would send battalions of Marines who would comb the jungle searching for Abu Sayyaf or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members. They learned that the populace suffered and they viewed the military as an

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are