Essay about Reviving Psychophysical Supervenience

In this paper, I will examine the principal merits and challenges of René Descartes’ concept of dualism and then defend my preferred alternative among the options Paul M. Churchland discusses. After briefly defining Cartesian Dualism, I will show that its principal merits are that it is consistent with common sense and that it is able to explain phenomena that appear mental in nature. Next, I will show that its principal challenges are its failure to adequately explain how the mind and the body can causally interact, and its failure to respond to the observation that brain damage impairs the mind. Finally, I will explain why Functionalism is the best alternative to Cartesian Dualism.

When contemplating the relationship between the mind and body, most philosophers advocate either dualism, the view that the mind and body belong to the mental and physical categories respectively, or physicalism, the stance that there is only the physical. (Gertler 108) Brie Gertler upholds the former perspective, and her essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism aims to disprove physicalism by establishing the possibility of experiencing pain without the firing of C-fibers, which physicalists believe is identical to pain. (110) She claims that thought experiments are best for determining matters of possibility, but only if such experiments utilize “sufficiently comprehensive” concepts. After first clarifying why Gertler emphasizes the need for

Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.

Kim’s essential argument relies on two different metaphysical principles. Firstly, he presents the ‘Casual Individuation of Kinds’ principle that states that kinds in science are individuated on the

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

The Knowledge Argument by Jackson is one of the main threats to Physicalism. Physicalism says that everything that is or could ever exist is ultimately physical in nature. The Knowledge Argument claims that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth. Lewis’ response on the other hand, disagrees with the Knowledge Argument. In this paper I will address the Knowledge Argument and Lewis’ response to it.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

Descartes believes that we experience the world through our senses and that because of defective nature doubt, the only thing we know for certain is our minds. Dreyfus does not agree because he believes that we experience the world directly and that telepresence is not a realistic concern. Descartes’ defective nature doubt is plausible because the development technology has the potential to satisfy Dreyfus’s conditions for advanced telepresence and we could then call into question our everyday experiences. In this paper, I will discuss Descartes’ three forms of doubt, the cogito argument and its relationship to epistemology. I will also discuss the three conditions that, according to Dreyfus, must be met by telepresence in order for it to be

Supervenience is the philosophical concept that based in the formulation on doctrines and argument that relates the issues are addressed with clarity, originality and power. Supervenience also became an object of philosophical analysis and matter of some controversy. Conception of the idea that Kim introduces is supervenience as fundamental concept for non-reductive physicalist theories of the

The concept of mind and body interactions has been debated among many modern philosophers. Some believe that our minds and bodies are different things, thus existing separately, while others believe that they exist as a whole. In this paper, I will be introducing two rationalist philosophical views regarding this topic, one which is by Rene Descartes and the other by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Rationalists, in philosophical terms, are the ones who obtain their knowledge through reasoning rather than the human senses. Descartes and Leibniz both have similar perspectives, but Leibniz takes a slightly different approach to improve Descartes’ argument. This paper will first show Descartes’ original argument, an example that proves the argument to be invalid, and then lastly, a revised version of the argument with Leibniz’s help.

Many philosophers agree that consciousness provides a very difficult problem in understanding the mind-body concept; this is why from a materialist’s point of view, the problem is not sufficient enough for giving one’s attention. Thomas Negal on the other hand, finds the problem rather interesting. Negal’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” proposes a number of arguments, one of them which states that the subjective approach to the mind-body problem should be abandoned for a more objective approach (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The purpose of this essay is to show that Negal’s arguments are sufficient in describing whether it is indeed possible to know what it is like to be a bat, portraying his arguments in an orderly fashion, and ultimately

The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in

In this paper, I will examine a particular model of the relationship between the mind and body that I find especially attractive: Margaret Cavendish’s Panpsychism. In my discussion of Cavendish’s Panpsychism, I will contrast it with two other models -- namely, Descartes’s Substance Dualism and Hobbes’s Materialism -- to accentuate particular nuances of the model. Next, I will provide reasoning for why I find Cavendish’s Panpsychism so attractive. After, I will consider the strongest argument I believe one could make against my specific support of Cavendish’s Panpsychism; an objection known as the  “Combination Problem.” Finally, I will provide a rebuttal to this objection; one that will render my argument in favor of Cavendish’s Panpsychism even stronger.

about the world.” This thesis is a variation of the view that all facts are mind-independent as only minds can describe the world; Boghossian partly agrees with this view as he does acknowledge that some facts are indeed mind-dependent and he gives examples such as that there could be no fact such as money if we humans didn’t construct that fact; however he believes that logic cant apply to all facts such as dinosaurs or electrons which don’t rely on humans for their existence. Boghossian has trouble identifying a solid argument for ‘absolute’ fact constructivism and this is worsened by the fact that he believes that there is a thesis which is similar to ‘absolute’ fact constructivism to an extent but then again the very same thesis supports fact objectivism which goes against ‘absolute’ fact constructivism and the result is it weakens the argument for ‘absolute’ fact constructivism and makes it seem ‘implausible’ than it actually is-Boghossian calls this thesis Social Relativity of Descriptions.