Rfk Command

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

Between the years of 1914 to 1918, the whole of Europe was locked in arms, not only for pride but mostly for survival. The years of war brought devastation upon all societies. Men were massacred in droves, food stuff dwindled, and at times an end seemed non-existent. The foundation of the first Great War, one can muse, began as a nationalistic race between rival nations. By the onset of 1914, once the Archduke Frendinad had been assassinated in Saravejo, the march for war became not just a nationalistic opinion, but now a frenzy to fight. In battle, unlike previous wars, new weaponry caused drastic alterations in strategy. No longer will armies stand to face their rivals on the plains. Now the war will be fought in trenches, hidden

World War II officially racked the world from 1939 to 1944, but before any one nation actually declared war, Hitler was trying to take land. To respond with appeasement or collective security was debated by many as to which would avoid damage in the most efficient manner. Document 3, Document 4, and Document 6 show how collective security was definitely a more beneficial strategy than appeasement to respond to aggression.

The 1986 revision of the US Army, FM 100-5 “AirLand Battle” doctrine introduced the Clausewitzian concept of culmination point as a “key concept of operational doctrine.” Moreover, the new manual adopted the traditional German notion of Auftragstaktik, a decentralized command system with the commander devising a mission and then leaving the methods and means of achieving it to his subordinate

While the development of guerrilla war does not factor into Weigley’s thesis that the United States has moved from a strategy of attrition to a strategy of annihilation, it is important in understanding how and why the United States made that change. For Weigley, this change came during the American Civil War when Grant became Commanding General of the Army. Grant did not believe the war could be won with a single, decisive victory against the Confederate Army, rather, he initiated a strategy to destroy the Confederate Armies through many battles and by attacking their economic resources. The orders to begin destroying the war resources of the Confederacy may have had their roots in the Western and Trans-Mississippian Theaters of the war because of frustrations associated with guerrilla war.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

In the future, technology and digital systems will continue to play an important role in how the United States Army fights and wins our nation’s wars. As technology improves and becomes an increasingly integral part of every Army system, it is important that leaders maintain the ability to fight and win without these benefits. Over reliance on digital systems and unfettered information is a weakness that our enemies will exploit on future battlefields. Ukraine learned this lesson very devastatingly in the recent annexation of Crimea. In order to safeguard the trust emplaced on leaders by the American people, it is a lesson not repeated by the US

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Our nation’s military continuously evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in an ever-changing environment.

Through separate publications, Geoffrey Parker and Victor Hanson describe principal foundations (Parker) and a prominent element (Hanson) that serve as the basis for their argument in defining a Western Way of War. However, both men fall short in clearly describing what is a true Western Way of War. Both the principal foundations by Parker and the prominent element by Hanson, while insightful, only delineate a single type of warfare that was used by the armies of Europe and the United States, however they fail to capitalize on the basis of their argument because neither man legitimately compares that type of warfare to any other method of fighting that was used, or is currently used, by other nations around the world. Hence, there is no

The second half of the 20th Century saw the development of nuclear weapons, jet fighters and helicopters. The significance of nuclear weapons is illustrated in the Vietnam War, where the Americans, who were in possession of such weapons, posed a huge threat to the Vietnamese who lacked them. This drawback lead the latter to instigate guerrilla warfare, as it was the only possible way to oppose the Americans. This war demonstrates how the development of such destructive nuclear weapons lead to unconventional types of warfare. Irregular warfare due to advanced technology also had a huge impact on structure and organisation of forces. For example, in the Soviet war against Afghanistan, the occupation of the Soviets in major urban centres antagonised the civilians, and subsequently provoked uprisings. The Soviets found themselves drawn into fighting against the Ishtar and the Mujahedeen, which forced them to abandon conventional “front lines” and instead form disorderly groups to try and oppress the rebels. This irregular warfare was especially intense as the side that couldn’t compete technologically with the opposition waged ferocious wars. For example the Mujahedeen launched relentless ambushes and raids on the Soviets, keeping their initiative through offensive action. This type of fighting also affected the civilians, who were frequently targeted by the Soviets due to their support of the Mujahedeen.

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.

Cyber-space and cyber-warfare are two terms that have varied definitions from between agencies and institutions. Since there are varying definitions of cyber-space it is important to accurately define the new digital domain where cyber-warfare will take place. A comprehensive definition of cyberspace explicated by Thomas Wingfield states,

Wars and conflicts have been happening around the world since the dawn of human kind. Wars happen due to the nature of political societies and human kind’s willingness to kill. Without the will to kill, there would be no war. In this essay I will be looking into the wars and conflicts that occurred in the 20th century and why it was an event or a series of events that occurred in the first place. The 20th century saw mass killings, genocide and extreme violence, not only in the European countries (in reference to Nazi Germany) but all throughout the world as well. This essay focuses on why there was so much bloodshed in the 20th century and the purpose of these events occurred the way it did and whether it was necessary, justified or could have been prevented.