Rottman v commissioners of police for the Metropolis

What if police could barge into any house whenever they feel like it? In a world like this, citizens would have no privacy. People would have to be on alert 24/7 in case any unwelcomed visitors invited themselves inside without permission. The Background Essay: Search and Seizure: Did the Government Go Too Far? notes that the British government would inspect colonists’ houses for certain goods. In order to avoid such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment states that a search warrant and a reasonable cause is required before any government official is allowed to search another’s belongings. However, in some dire situations, a search warrant is not necessary. The Background Essay gives the examples, “…hot pursuit, public safety, danger of loss of evidence, and/or permission of the suspect,” for when police do not need to worry about taking the time to receive a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment is open to interpretation. As a result, there is a collection of various cases that need to be addressed that involve search and seizure. Such as the case of DLK. In this case, DLK’s house was searched by federal government officials with a thermal imager, which senses warmth, because he was suspected of growing marijuana. The question proposed is whether the use of such high-tech tools, like the thermal imager, count as a “search”. In a situation such as this, it is safe to say that the government went too

Whether a law enforcement officer was justified in acting in the absence of a warrant depends on the “totality of circumstances.” The United States Supreme Court uses a “careful case-by-case” approach to determine whether circumstances rose to the required level of exigency. Recognized exigent circumstances that justify warrantless entry may include, but are not limited to: entering to provide emergency aid to someone inside, pursuant to an immediate threat to officer safety, in “‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect,” “to put out a fire and investigate its cause,” and to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence of a serious crime. While circumstances that present the requisite exigency to justify a warrantless search differ, “in each

“The police have a number of powers of stop and search. When using any power they must always have regards to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice.” The effectiveness of the police stop and search procedures being used as a valuable tool in the detection of crime can be measured by looking at the role that stop and searches play in policing and the arrests they lead to. However their impact on the community and the negative image it has given the police force outweigh the results generated from stop and searches. It has been found through various reports such as one by The Equality and Human Rights Commission, arrests for serious offenses are less likely to follow from stop and searches however they do play

This case mainly deals with the interpretation of our Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which protects us from unlawful search and seizures. What we can learn from this case are: the differences in court systems, the elements that comprise the Fourth Amendment, and the controversies surrounding it. The text relevant to this case can be found within the first six chapters of our textbook, with an emphasis on Chapter 6 “Criminal Law and Business”.

Search incident to Lawful Arrest- if an individual happens to be arrested lawfully they are no longer a free citizen therefore a police officer may search their persons and any areas that are within their reach. An example can be Mary is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. She was stopped after swerving through the road and going at a very slow speed. A search of her vehicle found narcotics in the passenger side of the vehicle. She was herself and that was within her wingspan.

Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187 signified the requirements of legal justifications when conducting unwarranted arrests, and further expresses the importance of the right to personal liberty as it is ‘the most fundamental of the human rights recognised under the common law.’ It was evident to the Judges that at least one officer held reasonable suspicion that “the suspect” had committed an indictable offence, but the lawfulness of the arrest was inevitably questioned as to whether an officer with reasonable suspicion was the arresting officer. The judgements in favour of the appellants heightens the need for officers to use their powers within the ‘confines of the law’ when ‘forcibly arrest[ing] and detaining’ a person as to preserve the right to personal liberty, for once this right is left in the power of any authority, to imprison arbitrarily whomever they suspect, ‘there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.’

The latter case of DPP v Carr (2002) shows many similarities, providing that arrest should and can only be used as a method of last resort, and must not be used for minor offences where the defendant can be identified . In this particular matter, a highly intoxicated Mr Carr was of the belief that police were accusing him of throwing a number of rocks, when this was not the case. This confusion led Mr Carr’s to use offensive language, which provoked the police officer to caution the accused. Mr Carr was then soon after arrested for offensive language because of the continuation of this offence, and also for resisting arrest and assaulting a police officer in the execution of their duties. The main issue in this matter was whether or not the arrest was lawful, and if so, was it improper. It is important to note that this case was decided before the provisions of LEPRA was passed by the parliament and became valid law meaning the Court had to rely on common law principles to determine its outcome. The arrest for vulgar language in this case was held to be proper because the officer had reasonable suspicion (having witnessed him swearing and

Section 24 of PACE (1984) sets out the general powers of arrest which may be exercised by the Police as well as the public. However, S24 of PACE was substantially changed by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA, 2005). Section 110 of SOCPA replaced most of the existing powers of arrest with a new general power of arrest. It also created Code G of PACE which sets out when an officer might arrest. This power of arrest is only exercisable if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary.

Police officers including approximately six armed members of the “Special Emergency Response Team” forcibly entered the appellants’ (Bulsey & Anor) house. Bulsey was taken from his bed, placed on the floor, handcuffed and dragged out to the street and later charged with riotous assembly and destruction of a building. In subsequent committal proceedings, the respondent conceded it did not have a case against the first appellant. He was discharged. Bulsey (the first appellant) sued the respondent for damages for trespass to the person (assault, battery and false imprisonment). Anor (the second appellant) sued the respondent for damages for assault and false imprisonment. The trial judge dismissed the appellants’ claims with costs, with judgments in favour of the respondent.

It is vital for law enforcement to determine whether a search warrant, arrest warrant, or both is needed. When an arrest is to take place within a dwelling where reasonable privacy is expected, law enforcement must determine whether or not the prospective arrestee lives there. If the person to be arrested lives there, only an arrest warrant is needed. If the dwelling belongs to a third party, an arrest warrant and a search warrant is necessary. In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy, police must secure the appropriate warrant(s) and knock and announce their presence.

Your managing partner has handed you the Supreme Court of Queenslands’ decision in The Public Trustee of Queensland and Anor v Meyer and Ors [2010] QSC 291 and asked you to answer the following questions. You should assume you are answering questions for someone who has not read the case, so be sure to provide sufficient detail in your answers. You do not need to provide reference details for Part A of the assignment.

Safety is a fundamental right that we all deserve. Most of us rely on the government to provide this security. We pay for this through taxes, but the question that we must ask ourselves is are we getting what we are paying for? By paying our taxes to the government we are giving it the authority to choose the service we are getting back. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) is an Act of Parliament which instituted a legislative

(i) House of Lords suspended the operation of an Act of Parliament where the Act was in conflict with EU law

Section 24(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (henceforth, the PACE 1984) provides where an offence has been committed (as in this case, with the theft of £5,000 from Mr and Mrs Smith) it is possible for a police officer to arrest Bill without a warrant where they have reasonable grounds to suspect he is guilty (see Shields v. Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2010] EWCA Civ 1281 and Richardson v. Chief Constable of West Midlands [2011] EWHC 773). This provision of the PACE 1984 should then be read with sections 24(4) and 24(5) (Wilson, et al., 2014). The reason for this is that section 24(4) of the PACE 1984 provides summary arrest under section 24(3) of the Act may only be exercised if the police officer had reasonable grounds

in criminal law and Beckett Ltd v. Lyons [1967] 1 All ER 833 the law