Essay on Running Estimates and the Battle of Wanat

He understood this and still “underestimated AP Bia Mountain and the NVA facing him.” LTC Honeycutt relied on map reconnaissance and helicopter overflights to determine his scheme of maneuver. He thought he understood the terrain, and the enemy from this intelligence and proceeded to send troops up the hill for a frontal attack. After three days of assaults against Bravo and Charlie companies of 3-187th, it became clear to LTC Honeycutt that the enemy was stronger than originally anticipated and that the terrain was very hard to maneuver.

The Battle of Wanat is widely recognized as one of the most organized attacks against U.S forces in the Afghanistan war. This battle produced the most casualties on the American side since the start of the war in 2001. Nine United States soldiers were killed and 27 were wounded; however, between 21- 51 Taliban forces were claimed to have been killed. The Taliban forces knew where to attack the U.S. forces base and focus most of their fire power on the base weak spots. As for the United States, the biggest target was their most casualty producing weapons: a U.S. mortar tube and 50 Cal machine guns. The American forces also put the patrol base in an area that was hard to defend with many blind spots. The Taliban forces outnumbered U.S. forces vastly, attacking with about 300-400 Taliban soldiers to only 45

In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally

However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were the “Hammer” that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the “Anvil” composed of U.S. forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the operation.

The plan was to have the mission function like a “hammer and anvil.” The very outer cordon area would consist of mainly US SOF and numerous other nations. Task Force Rakkasans (10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions) would be air assaulted in by Chinooks helicopters on the eastern side of the valley to set up blocking positions. The valley floor

The Battle of Takur Ghar, or Roberts Ridge, as it’s more affectionately called by members of the US military, occurred on March 3-4th 2002. Takur Ghar translates from Pashto as “Tall Mountain”. The battle became the most memorable part of a much larger operation called Anaconda.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

LTC Kunk’s mission was twofold. His BN was to deploy to a region in the Euphrates valley that was south of Baghdad, dubbed the “Triangle of Death”. An American presence had only lightly occupied the area and the insurgency in that region was multiplying. They were unleashing havoc on American troops in the area as well as civilians. 1-502nd was also tasked with training a division within the Iraqi Army in the hope that they would secure the area once American troops departed for good.

Two ODA soldiers started digging a foot or two deep hole to set my base plate as per my platoon standard operating procedures (SOP). I started my Light-weight Handheld Mortar Ballistic Computer (LHMBC), I inputted the location of my mortar, Forward Observer (FO), and myself as the Fire Direction Center (FDC).

Forethought or the counter ability to think as far down the road as we need is not always a blessing given to us. This is exactly what led to the Battle of Wanat. Sights are set on the 50-yard target because the rifleman is shooting at you, yet the 1000-yard target is a tank that has your position zeroed in. Near sighted vision requires a broad peripheral reaction force. Under staffing and over extending the battle force led to the variable that would ultimately lead to the almost defeat of Combat Out Post (COP) Kahler, ex-fil, and the awarding of a Medal of Honor.

The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H

The Battle at Dong Ap Bia occurred during Operation Apache Snow during The Vietnam War, which had the aim of clearing the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) from the A shau Valley in South Vietnam. This valley was situated near the border with Laos, and it had become a haven for communist forces and major infiltration route into the south. This operation was initiated on 10 May 10 1969 with the specific purpose of destroying the PAVN and VC forces believed to be grouped in the A shau Valley, blocking enemy routes of egress in Laos, interdicting enemy lines of communication and locating and destroying known enemy caches. This valley was heavily forested, and above the it stood Ap Bia Mountain, otherwise

As the commander of the 3/187th BN, LTC Weldon Honeycutt understood the mission he was given. Hill 937, more commonly referred as Hamburger Hill, was a key terrain in the A Shau Valley. Securing the hill was not an option at the time he was given this mission. The terrain and enemy however made securing this key hill nearly impossible. He was a tough leader and demanded the most from his troops. Operation Apache Snow was a three-phased campaign to secure the A Shau Valley. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) used the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the A Shau Valley to transport supplies from Laos and Cambodia south to Hue and could easily overrun the South Vietnamese civilian population. (Battle Staff Paper) The NVA had over 6,000 miles of trails through the valley and while the US would bomb to destroy these trails the NVA would simply reroute and rebuild. This led to over 10,000 tons of supplies being moved through the valley every month. (youtube) LTC Honeycutt was given the brutal task of securing Hill 937 because of his previous experience. This task started on 10 May 1969 and ended after 11 attempts to secure the hill on 20 May 1969. (Hell on Hamburger Hill)

The security of BSA and ability to ensure the effective logistic support for the offensive operation is the main criteria to identify the BSA within AO KICK. Therefore, the BSA location is away from the enemy likely avenues of approach and out of the range of artillery fire as well. Moreover, the good network of supply roads will maintain the momentum of the attacks of the 1/9 ABCT’s units and coordination of sustainment with the 9th Infantry Division as well. Finally, the location of BSA will not interfere to the freedom of maneuver of tactical units. Therefore, the selected location of BSA will contribute to the general success of the operation significantly.