Russia 's President Putin?

As stated earlier, Russia’s economy is largely based on oil. Further, throughout Russia’s existence, its political institutions have strongly remained stable do to their performance legitimacy. Therefore, the rise of oil and therefore competitive authoritarianism are not mutually exclusive. Since Putin’s election, economic growth has averaged 6.7%, however, much of this growth is directly due to rising oil prices since 1998 that have topped over 100 dollars a barrel. Rising oil prices has allowed Russia to eradicate foreign debt, establish massive reserves of hard currency, and create budget surpluses. This has in turn allowed Putin to accumulate massive amounts of wealth as well as improving his performance legitimacy. Arguably, this is a false performance legitimacy. To many in Russia, this is the best the economy has ever been, and it has allowed for Putin to easily consolidate power. Yet, with oil on the decline, Russia has effectively created an economy that can not last into the near future, and only time will tell how far they will end up

Putin cannot be trusted by the Western countries. Because he switches back and forth between both Locke and Hobbes’ opposing views on human nature depending on his situation, his actions cannot be predicted. This poses a major problem for countries trying to make plans that involve Russia. Because Putin cannot be counted on to view human nature in a certain way, he poses a major problem for the other

Before we begin in analyzing Putin’s Russia we must outline a few of the essential factors of the realist stance in international relations that can be traced back to Machiavelli’s The Prince. First, we ought to see at the existing position in the world that includes negative features. Second, it aims to have an unfavorable aspect of human nature as

It seems Obama’s foreign policy in Russia has to do with institutional constraints and reminding the kremlin of American economic power and their dependence on its support. The contrast between Obama’s realism in one situation and liberalism in another communicates that his foreign policy strategy of “smart power” has more to do with approval ratings and money than a principled construction of foreign policy through bending and blending. Obama’s sanctions attempt to secure U.S. economic hegemony by weakening the ruble relative to the dollar, and Obama’s treasury department believes this strategy works better than hard power. Regardless of Obama’s hard or soft power, the motive behind his foreign policy remains the same: ensuring U.S. hegemony. Though realism cannot fully explain Obama’s instrumental mechanisms for ensuring such an effect, realism does explain the Obama Administration’s motives for global dominance—liberalism (and sometimes constructivism) merely justifies the

When it comes to critiquing Jeffrey Goldberg’s article, the four constellations of issues approach will be used. The first constellation comprises of humanitarian disasters and respect for sovereignty. Many Americans like Samantha Powers believe in the doctrine known as “responsibility to protect” (Page 4). Thus to people like her, sovereignty should not be considered “inviolate” provided that a country is “slaughtering its own citizens” (Page 4). President Obama does not agree with Samantha Powers (unless there is a direct security threat) and Russia vehemently disagrees with that doctrine. Analyzing Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, he believes in respecting other nation’s right to self-govern the way they see fit (Page 2). For instance, Putin says “What will happen with Kosovo and Serbia? Only Kosovars and Serbs can know. Let’s not tell them how they should live their lives. There is no need to play God and resolve all of these peoples’ problems” (Page 18). This basically means that even in the face of “atrocities” or other humanitarian disasters; respect for sovereignty is still top priority for Putin and Russia. In contrast, the doctrine “responsibility to protect” usually lead to intervention in the face of atrocities committed by various individuals in different countries.

19). That begin said, Russian politics have always governed around protecting themselves from threats inside and outside their boundaries both economical and militarily. In addition, Lynch elaborates that the capability of a state is so important in developing; in order to form a democracy since having been a built on post communist and Imperial auspices (Lynch, p. 5). In other words, a democracy does not merely come out of nowhere in a civil society, unless there is a capable national service where a political authority may draft, pass and enforce legislation. Furthermore, it is the neopatrimonial model that best describes the functioning of the Russian state that took hold in post communist Russia ruled by Yeltsin and Putin (Lynch, pp. 128-30). To clarify, it was significant that Russia established itself in a liberal economy, which was mostly supported by Western states, however the emergence and eventual consolidation under Putin established a neopatrmonial Political system.

Russia’s geopolitical strategic goals in the region involve exerting control over the Caucasus region, particularly energy resources, pipelines, and infrastructure. Moreover, Russia may press for the eventual annexation of several separatist territories, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Additionally, Russia’s long-term strategic goals include preservation of their maritime dominance in the Black Sea region, home to the Russian Black Sea fleet. However, what may be the most dangerous course of action as highlighted by Cohen and Hamilton is, Russia’s intent to

Russia is the largest threat facing the United States [25]. The threat from Russia specifically comes from not only their supply of nuclear weapons and their advanced military, but their “intent” behind the use of their military power. The state’s recent aggression against surrounding countries shows the attempt to reclaim international influence [25]. Their “behavior”’ in “Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine,” has prompted the global community to rethink security in Europe. [25] Russian nationalism, and a desire to recoup their prestige from the cold war is an invitation for confrontation [25].

Yet the election was not like the ones that preceded it- there were large scale demonstrations on the streets of Moscow and other metropolitan areas that were against (and some in support) of Putin. These large scale protests as Elkin notes while certainly disruptive and cast a negative light on Russia globally forced Putin to reaffirm his power when he won the election in 2012. Putin was as discussed by Moskowitz and others in class able to use the media to effectively convey his agenda. But Elkin also notes that the resurgence in popularity for Putin was not simply due to a stymied media presence. Putin strategically allowed Medvedev to become the nation’s prime minister, where he was relegated to a position where he could quietly work on making the changes he set during his presidency. Putin set about “restoring” national prestige by being firm on dealings with the west. In particular, during the crisis in Syria, he averted crisis by securing a deal that allowed Syria to dispose of the chemical weapons while also preventing U.S aggression. Elkin notes how Putin would frequently play on populism and patriotism in justifying his action- a formula which combined would ensure that in the crisis to come regarding the annexation of Crimea that he would have the support of the Russian people.

Putin is former KGB and he has deep Soviet ties as well as ideology. Russia is a one party dominant state. Putin utilizes his power in order to keep his people in check and assert his dominance. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a great show of his power to everyone in the world. Russia occupies Crimea but they have vitrually no power, this is another example of Russia assymetrical federalism. Putin and the Kremlin have been known to take out most people who oppose them. For example Anna Politkovskaya a journalist who was suddenly killed because she was speaking out against the government. Another example is Alexey Navalny who is a political activist and he often times gets arrested right before an organized protest takes place. Vedzhie Kashka is just another example of the tyrant that Vladimir Putin

When looking at the concept of authority, Vladimir Putin does not have a problem as he is the elected President of a large and influential country—Russia. As such Putin uses his position as a Head of State to try and enhance his authority by calling for unity between the two countries. This op-ed was printed in the foremost newspaper in the U.S. on September 11, 2013. It is on this date that Americans celebrate their resolve and unity. To the global population, this authority would be enough to lend him credibility; but to a skeptical American populous, this could be seen as an outsider taking advantage of a

The Soviet Union was a socialist state located on the Eurasian continent, which existed from 1922 to 1991. It was a conglomeration of a number of subnational Soviet republics with its government and economy centralized. The Soviet Union was based on a one-party system under the governorship of the Communist Party, with Moscow as its capital. Since the decline of the Soviet Union, Russia has been on the forefront seeking to bring about a resurgence of the socialist state. Current political events in Europe and in particular, those that revolve around Russia, demonstrate efforts directed towards reviving the Soviet Union. In more than one occasion, news releases have alleged that Vladimir Putin has plans underway to reignite the Soviet Union gradually and that the annexation of Crimea is evidence of this. In an article, journalist Adam Withnall noted that “…Vladimir Putin will not stop trying to expand Russia until he has “conquered” Belarus, the Baltic states and Finland,” (para. 1). Thus, there is increased tension in countries around the region, which was initially considered as being part of the Soviet Union. In truth, the Ukrainian revolution is demonstrative of Russia’s attempt to reignite the Soviet Union following the acquisition of Crimea, which will result to limiting the influence and expansion of NATO and the United States in Europe. Thus, Russia’s motivation to expand her influence

Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Narodnost have become the three ideological pillars of Russia’s internal policy and combine seamlessly with the social Darwinism of Russia’s foreign policy. Vladislav Surkov says that “democracy is no longer a universal concept, the reality of which can be measured by applying universal criteria that are valid in different countries.” Because of this, Russia becomes immune from criticism and other organizations because it can determine whether its system fulfills the democratic criteria. Putin had a grand design which had two main goals: the first was to reestablish at least a Union of the Slavs core countries of the former Soviet Union, and to reestablish Soviet Union under exclusive Russian leadership. In an attempt to create a Federation, Russia is trying to absorb the countries that were formed after the USSR’s fall, such as, Belarus and Ukraine. In retrospect, any country that joins up with the Federation will basically be made

Throughout the course of history repressive forms of government have utilized specific elements of power to manipulate their constituents. The Stasi, the former official state security of Eastern Germany, is commonly referred to as one of the most oppressive secret police agencies to have weald any political power. In present day Russia, President Vladimir Putin exploits his extreme qualities of masculinity to promote and carry through a specific agenda. Both forms of manipulation are incredibly harmful tactics to further control the people of non-democratic societies.

In Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Karen Dawisha relates Russian President Vladmir Putin’s rise to power. She overarchingly claims that Putin is an authoritarian leader who has obstructed and even reverted Russia’s path of democratization, citing, amongst many factors that enabled his ascension, his “interlocking web of personal connections in which he was the linchpin” (100), money-laundering to tax havens and personal projects, and the complicity of the West. With copious research, journalistic interviews, legal documents, and even sporadic informational diagrams, it is evident why her book is so popular amongst scholars and history enthusiasts. Unfortunately however, in spite of the grand yet oftentimes substantiated claims she generates, a more subtle yet noteworthy assumption is made: that the state is a protector, as Olson proffered. She employs this theoretical underpinning from the beginning, though is not representative of Putin’s actual authoritarian regime.