Russia’S Invasion And Subsequent Annexation Of Crimea Under

The foreign policies of Russia also compliments in many ways its domestic policies, both in the apparent want for dominance and security in the focal point on sovereignty. These aims lead to an importance on bringing back Russia’s international status and removing positions of power that Western states have had in Russia

While chaos continued to spread across the country, Russia began to eye the territory of Crimea, one if Ukraine’s most southwestern territories and an area that used to belong to Russia until it was transferred to Ukraine in 1954. By the end of February, masked Russian troops without insignias took over the Supreme Council of Crimea and several strategic sites across Crimea. This event led to the installation of the pro-Russian Aksyonov government in Crimea and the declaration of Crimea 's independence. This spurred the Ukraine’s provisional government to request an emergency meeting with the U.N. Security Council in which they called on Russia to stop all military action in Crimea. By Mach 1st, Russia’s parliament approves President Putin 's request to use force

For example, Russia helped to clear unexploded ordnance left behind by NATO’s bombing during the Kosovo war of 1999, and in 2014, helped fly in emergency relief when floods hit the region. Since then, Russia has regularly been helping with forest fires, providing tents for migrants and training emergency responders. To the citizens, Russia’s consistent involvement, on top of its historically strong ties, creates a sense of trust and goodwill. This also increases their likelihood of buying into Russian propaganda against the West. Although the EU has provided $3.16bn in aid since 2000, an amount that dwarfs Russia’s in comparison, a recent poll showed that Serbs wrongly believe Russia to be one of their main benefactor and 64% view NATO as a threat. However, this does not mean that Serbia is entirely pro-Russia, as 40% of the population is in favour of joining the EU.

Through the USSR rule, a great number of imperial autocracy aspects of its forms of governance, social and economic reforms were reproduced such as central control and nationalism policies, for example, Russification. However, there is a debate if Stalinism was a continuation of Tsarist autocracy due to differences between two regimes as the Bolshevik government categorically refused to be defined as an empire; contrastingly, its leaders saw imperialism as the policy adopted in capitalist states which have been viewed as competitors and enemies which bring a contradictory argument. This essay will argue that although in theory, the differences between Imperialism and Communism were colossal, a leading argument about Russia, famously defended

From the Beginning of the Soviet Union, the West opposed the communist nation ideologically, the capitalist West feared communism. Communism was the reason that the Soviet Union was not compatible with the Western capitalist nations. With the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of capitalism in Russia, the West believed that their eastern problem was over, although as time would tell this assumption would be incorrect. Over the next decade, Russia would exert their power over boarding nations trying to join NATO, even invading Georgia, and Ukraine. Furthermore, they would back anti-West dictators such as Assad, proving Western tensions with Russia are far from over. Political and military tensions between the West and Russia persisted after the end of the Cold War because of the rise of anti-west military elites in Russian politics. This occurred because of Russia’s inability to properly implement a free market economy. Instead, Yeltsin, the Russian president at the time, enacted “shock therapy” capitalism. This process led to corruption in Russian politics and consolidation of power among anti-western Russian elites. The anti-west security elites, such as Putin, were able to rise to power by vowing to eliminate this corruption. These elites pose a threat to the West due to their dislike and aggressiveness towards the West.

2. Russia has a long history of invasions, uprisings, external influences, and revolutions which have caused its borders to expand and contract over time.1 Heroes of mythic proportion such as Alexander Nevsky earned their fame by defending the homeland in these times of strife. Nevsky, in particular, inspired in the Russian people a strong sense of Slavic nationalism that persists to this day.2 Throughout Russia’s many fluctuations, however, some factors never changed. For the vast majority of its existence, Russia has been viewed as a global power. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that Russia lost its global eminence. Another constant has been the need for access to warm-water ports on the Baltic and Black Seas. Russia has fought many campaigns to push its borders to these waters.1 These campaigns along with expansion eastward to the Pacific have left modern day Russia with an important legacy – access to

In the year of 1991, the socialist giant –Soviet Union collapsed. At the beginning, many people expected a fast tend of democratization to spread all around not only Russia but also even the whole Eurasian areas. However, this expectation did not come into reality. Or in other words, Russia was anticipated to accept a total new political order internally and externally. But transitions are never so easy. Sometimes, they can be extremely difficult and painful. From my point of view, even until today, Russia is still suffering from the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has been profoundly influencing Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.

In Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Karen Dawisha relates Russian President Vladmir Putin’s rise to power. She overarchingly claims that Putin is an authoritarian leader who has obstructed and even reverted Russia’s path of democratization, citing, amongst many factors that enabled his ascension, his “interlocking web of personal connections in which he was the linchpin” (100), money-laundering to tax havens and personal projects, and the complicity of the West. With copious research, journalistic interviews, legal documents, and even sporadic informational diagrams, it is evident why her book is so popular amongst scholars and history enthusiasts. Unfortunately however, in spite of the grand yet oftentimes substantiated claims she generates, a more subtle yet noteworthy assumption is made: that the state is a protector, as Olson proffered. She employs this theoretical underpinning from the beginning, though is not representative of Putin’s actual authoritarian regime.

Secondly, NATO enlargement was not necessarily Russia’s containment by the United States. Some experts indicate that there was no consensus on the issue in American political landscape. At the same time, many countries in East Europe, especially the Baltic ones, expressed their willingness to enter the EU and NATO because they feared imperialistic comeback of Russia. Though this “the chicken or the egg” argument (Russia behaves aggressively because of NATO enlargement, or NATO expanded to prevent Russia from striking back) still corresponds with realist logic of insecurity, it largely disapproves that the Ukraine crisis is great powers clash.

Many Russian today consider the North Caucasus to be a “separate but unequal entity”, and “the belief that the republics of the North Caucasus are not part of the Russian Federation is a sentiment that is now shared by 60 percent of Russia’s population” (Rodeheffer, 2013, para. 5). In order to increase stability in the region, Russia must begin to reintroduce control of the North Caucasus to those who reside in the area. The Russian army appears to be little more than an occupation force, as no officers from the Caucasus exist, and military commanders admit that “ an unspoken policy of discriminating against North Caucasians exists not only at the conscript level but throughout the entire chain of command” (Rodeheffer, 2013, para. 6). If control is given in increments back to the natives, and the brutal police-state like restrictions are relaxed, Caucasians may be less drawn to the radical islamic movements which are drawing in many youth from the region

The largest nation in the world, Russia has demonstrated acts comparable to the Soviet Union. For instance, their military agreements with the Syrian national army (which believe in the oppression of citizens and the rule of a totalitarian dictator named Bashar al-Assad in the civil-war stricken Syria) have inflicted controversy in the UN Security Council. Furthermore, their invasion in Ukraine’s Crimean territory and obstinacy against the UN resulted in the Security Council and NATO sanctioning Russia for its civil

The main question being asked here in this essay is whether or not Mearsheimer's account of the Ukraine Crisis in his article titled “Why the Ukraine Crisis was the West's fault” is entirely convincing to the reader and whether or not they agree with his controversial opinion on the crisis. In his account of the Ukraine Crisis, Mearsheimer assesses the point that Putin’s tactics and actions for this crisis do not necessarily show a good attempt to build a greater Russian empire. He focuses here on Putin’s decision makings, assessing them critically. Mearsheimer argues in his account that there are three major reasons for why the West has caused the Ukrainian crisis and forced Putin to intervene in Ukraine: Eastern enlargement of NATO, enlargement

To note, the West has preconceived notions that were caused, and have lasted, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Putin’s centralization of power, oppressive control, and military engagements in Georgia and South Ossetia, all these reaffirm the West's perception that Putin is attempting to return to Soviet Authoritarianism. However, in Russia, all these actions are seen as necessary. The country was on the verge of collapse when Putin came to power. Social reforms had upturned the former way of life and corruption was rampant. In Russian’s, and Putin’s, eyes, the country is becoming more modernized. Putin is doing what he sees fit, using his prior experiences from the two decades before his presidency. Putin is the savior of Russia, and, arguably, the creator of today's

Vladimir Putin’s actions incite economic, military, and political tension within the NATO alliance and set the world stage for Russia to enter the New Cold War. Firstly, Putin’s dwindling respect for the United States of America and Europe - the West - causes him to seek an alternative market for Russia’s economy. Additionally, Putin increases Russia’s military activity inciting tension within NATO and Eurasian countries along its borders. Lastly, Vladimir provocatively drives a “political wedge” between his interests and that of the Western World. If Vladimir Putin continues to incite economic, military and political tension, Russia will be on the glide path headed for a new Cold War.

“Ukraine officially declared itself an independent state in 1991,” with the collapse of the Soviet Union, “when the communist Supreme Soviet of Ukraine proclaimed that Ukraine would no longer follow the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and only the laws of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics.”[1] More than two decades later, the sovereign nation still has trouble escaping Russia’s threatening shadow. Ukraine’s geographical position between Europe and Russia has left the country divided culturally and politically. After many recent months of protests and street demonstrations, the Ukrainian people were successful in ousting their incompetent and corrupt president, Vicktor Yanukovych. Russian President Vladimir Putin however, was unwilling to accept this and in February of 2014 Russian troops, aided by pro-Russian local militia, occupied important sites across the Crimean Peninsula under the pretext of “protecting Russian people.” Now Crimea and possibly Eastern Ukraine is under Moscow’s control and the Russian parliament has voted to annex the region into the Russian Federation. [2] This is nothing new for Russia, as was evidenced