Science : Conjectures And Refutations And The Problem Of Induction

He explains why UCTs are as popular as they are in modern society, and why people should nevertheless disregard and approach them with caution. What Keeley refers to as “virtues” are the reason for the popularity of UCTs. He gives the virtue of explanatory reach as the first and main reason for UCTs popularity, which is the account of all knowledge including errant data. This is in stark contrast to the received theory, which is imperfect by nature. This quality of UCTs is particularly attractive because it appeals to human rationality by allowing for no loopholes. Keely argues that errant data alone is not significant enough, and that a theory should never fit all of the data. This leads into one of the main points, concerning falsifiability and skepticism. Unfalsifiability is acceptable when the item or person under investigation is not actively trying to escape from the investigator. Keeley contends that the problem is not the innate unfalsifiability, but rather the increasing amount of skepticism required. Keely seeks a hole in the concept of conspiracy theories that accounts for a person’s innate sense that belief in a particular conspiracy theory is not justified. In the case of the natural sciences, falsifiability is acceptable because of the rigorous protocols in place, and therefore, we are warranted in believing scientific claims.

The author says that to be a scientist, we must have the courage to face doubt, and he backs up his idea with a 19th century French physiologist, Claude Bernard, “Science teaches us to doubt.” Saying that a scientist must be open-minded to the fact that their findings are not always correct, the author describes Einstein’s process and how he goes about it. There is sense of knowledge that Claude Bernard seems to have as he is titled, “the great French Physiologist”. Also, the qualification and power that comes with Einstein’s name is known worldwide and clearly apparent. Both of these names and titles, which are very credible, come together to make Barry’s argument more

What is Science? When it comes to the word ‘science’ most of the people have some kind of knowledge about science or when they think of it there is some kind of image related to it, a theory, scientific words or scientific research (Beyond Conservation, n.d.). Many different sorts of ideas float into an individual’s mind. Every individual has a different perception about science and how he/she perceives it. It illustrates that each person can identify science in some form. It indicates that the ‘science’ plays a vital role in our everyday lives (Lederman & Tobin, 2002). It seems that everyone can identify science but cannot differentiate it correctly from pseudo-science and non-science (Park, 1986). This essay will address the difference between science, non-science and pseudo-science. Then it will discuss possible responses to the question that what should we do when there is a clash between scientific explanation and non-scientific explanation. Then it will present a brief examination about the correct non-scientific explanation.

Furthermore, there are three main aspects which were customarily associated with a science: metaphysical, theoretical and methodological assumptions. Under metaphysical it is believed that to gain scientific status requires the certainty that the subject matter i.e. human thought/ behaviour, is similar to that of other accepted sciences. This could then be true for Psychology, as particularly since Darwin’s suggestion of a continuity between behaviours of humans and other species, behaviour has become more scrutinised. However, this must be assumed in respect of determinism, suggesting predictions could be made. ‘Heisenbergs uncertainty principle’ suggests that when relating evidence of indeterminism within the universe to human behaviour, it proves ambiguous, and with parts of the discipline believing strongly in free will it seems difficult to establish a common ground (Valentine E.R. page 2).

In Creation Science is not Science, Michael Ruse argues that Creation science is not science and in Science at the Bar- Causes for Concern, Larry Laudan opposes this view by arguing that Creation Science is science, but that it is false. In this paper, I argue that Michael Ruse had the better argument and that Creation Science is not science. First, I explain Ruse’s argument for why creation science does not meet the criteria for science. Second, I consider and explain Larry Laudan’s opposing view that creation science is false science. I then argue why I believe Ruse has the better argument.

For this week reading, I had the pleasure to read from the authors Karl Popper, Edward O. Wilson, and Vandana Shiva. Karl Popper, philosopher and author of Science as Falsification, believed the scientific method was made to seem quite easy to be placed yet mistaken due to claims of palm reading or astrology making a status in the field of science. Karl Popper says, " There was a lot of popular nonsense talked about these theories, and especially about relativity (as still happens even today)..."(Popper 338). People don't really question the field of science and theories that are being stated. People go along with what is being stated and not question the theories. A theory or an idea should not be classified as scientific unless proven so

In the New Riddle of Induction, Goodman is challenging Hume’s problem of induction. In Hume’s problem of induction, induction can be understood as drawing conclusions from particular use cases and making generalized claims. Inductive reasoning has been a cornerstone in scientific discoveries. Historically, scientific discoveries have been introduced by observations from specific cases. For example, the discovery of gravity by Isaac Newton rests on a small observation of an object falling from a tree. On the contrary, Hume argues that inductive observations do not guarantee the truth of the conclusion but provide strong evidence for a conclusion. Goodman goes on to show that the future observations will have nothing in common with past observations

In Karl Popper’s paper “Science as Falsification”, he attempted to explain what exactly separates hard science from pseudoscience. He came to the conclusion that all theories which are to be deemed scientific must be falsifiable. In other words, the theory must have the ability to be tested and proven to be true, and not just deemed to be true because it happens to be true in some instances. Popper’s logic was that the only reason to test a theory was to find a way to deem it untrue, and so theories which are unable to be tested cannot be considered as science. I believe that this was a great turning point in the history of science because there were many theories which were considered as scientific because there was no basis of proving them otherwise.

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

While induction is only one of the five parts of the inductivist account of science, it is one of the most important steps. Induction is the process by which scientists make a leap of thought from observation to theory, and if induction has flaws, then the new theory must unquestionably contain flaws. Regardless of these errors, a scientist, according to an inductivist philosopher, will still accept a particular scientific theory if it can be validly induced from factual observation and experiment.

In this essay I attempt to answer the following two questions: What is Karl Popper’s view of science? Do I feel that Thomas Kuhn makes important points against it? The two articles that I make reference to are "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper and "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" by Thomas Kuhn.

Popper opines that a significant problem with the scientific method is that scientists get so caught up in evidence that supports a specific conjecture that they either 1) fail to consider

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat

In the natural sciences, theories may not be proven experimentally correct; however, it can be falsified through experimental evidence. Aristotle’s idea of spontaneous generation, organisms descending from inanimate matter, was falsified by Pasteur. As Pasteur’s falsification was drawn from the cell theory, this shows how scientific theories are