Seam Case Study

As a Senior Enlisted Leader I aspire to develop a better comprehension of strategic issues. Having in-depth knowledge of the complexities behind decisions, processes, and the totality of circumstances is instrumental when addressing matters to Coast Guard field units. Furthermore, this perspective is integral to a Senior Enlisted Leader’s ability to provide timely, complete and reliable counsel to operational and strategic leaders, particularly when making decisions that significantly affect the workforce.

What had initially started as a source of enlisted recruits and officer candidates, evolved into a broad program devoted to the moral, physical and educational advancement of its cadets. The program has retained its rigid structure and goal of infusing in its student cadets a sense of discipline and order through its growth. JROTC today has become a source of structure in the lives of its cadets, contrasting greatly with its original purpose. JROTC today has become a vital facet in the lives of its cadets. JROTC has become, in and of itself, a source of broad opportunities for leadership and enrichment. The program is similar to a school inside of another school. JROTC teaches its cadets moral, social and practical skills, many of which are not covered in the common school curriculum. The JROTC curriculum ranges from life-saving to negotiation skills, both of which are of indispensable use to cadets in their future regardless of the unique path that they elect to take. JROTC also possesses a macrocosm worth of special teams. Ranging from Color Guard to JLAB Leadership Bowl, to Cyber Patriot, each of these teams cater to the different bits of intelligence, strengths, and interests that every cadet undoubtedly possesses. JROTC also contains an enormity of opportunities which are available to be seized by each and every cadet. Ranging from meeting Major Generals in command of a plethora of troops to assisting with the

JFSOCC’s delay caused issues in the development of the command structure. Furthermore, the mission requirements changed by the time the CFLCC and JFSOCC took control of their respected requirements, unity of command was still developing. External to the JFOCC structure, additional SOF units were operating across Afghanistan conducting their own individual missions with no JFOCC over sight. When SOF units request air support, it was send directly to CFACC and then forwarded to the CAOC dislocated from the ground force headquarters.

Upon the CENTCOM’s arrival to its AOR, units continued business as usual based on them being successful in the past due to lack of a fruitful relationship between commanders. In addition, the commander failed to apply the joint planning operations process which led to joint planning issues, including the departure of Navy carriers, and close calls during air strikes requests which cause more damage to the relationship between sister services. This was demonstrated as senior leaders were criticized by their air and naval counterparts for failing to coordinate effectively across the services (Grossman,

A Chie's wears an Anchor as the symbol of his or her rank. That same anchor is the symbol of the Navy. It is fair to say that the spirit of the Navy, it's tradition, ceremony and its very honor are alive because it's Chiefs keep it that way. The Chief is the anchor of the Navy. Without the Chief a ship would be just a ship with no soul. Its crew would just be doing a job with no life. Words like shipmate would be have no

In mid-2016, after a successful IG Inspection we were flooded with concerns form the IRC partners and liaisons that they were experiencing difficulty in obtaining mission and asked if our MEPS could assist. This problem required a deep look into how we as a MEPS conducted our operations and how that impacted the recruiting service mission goals.

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) utilizes command and control to exercise authority over assigned and attached forces within his or her command. Command provides direction and motivation to individuals and units, whereas control is the task of managing forces and the associated tasks required to accomplish the mission. Effective command and control successfully balances the art of command with the science of control and strengthens the commander’s ability to make and execute decisions. Mission command advances command and control

5. The present senior officers of the Navy are well aware of the reasons for changes in established doctrines and in the development of new ones. But bhis cannot necessarily be said of the Commanders of the future, who very probably will be inexperienced in command in war.

Sir, the termed ‘managed’ is undermined, if CSC missions (i.e. FTX or deployments) are less than 90-days, CSC leadership will not have administrative control (ADCON) authority to influence nonconformist 92Gs. Therefore, as pervious advised to assign or attach 92G soldiers (upfront) will eliminate C2 related issues, as previously mentioned above.

During this mission we were afforded the ability to effectively influence the Operational Environment (OE) due to CJSOTF / SOTF understanding and support of Mission Command. During this deployment we effectively halted malign influence, increased partner force capability and increased security within the region. However, we did not have daily storyboards, twenty eight page conops, or the requirement to await email traffic from higher. We simply conducted operations in accordance with our commander’s intent, sent VIASAT messages that contained a basic 5w’s for higher’s situational awareness, and focused on our efforts to shape the OE as we were directed. Higher command’s trust placed in our detachment to accomplish the mission was established during the plan and prepare phase of the operations process because of our understanding and application of the commander’s mission and intent. This trust allowed our detachment to quickly and effectively influence the OE by operating within the parameters established within Mission

Field commanders requested safer vehicles suited for irregular warfare tactics, and received up-armored Humvees and add-on armor kits, which did not provide sufficient protection in an irregular warfare environment. Further, the services were slow to respond to combatant commanders’ requests for MRAPs because their priority was to develop the JLTV, fueled by the assertion that MRAPs would be obsolete beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This speaks to the tendency of the services to invest in future capabilities, while failing to provide combatant commanders with a method to develop or procure equipment necessary to successfully fight present wars (Carter, p.2). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees JCIDS and is “often misaligned because it often defers to the services. Neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the JROC” (p. 10, Lamb). As a result, the requirement for MRAPs was slow to validate and once valid remained an unfunded requirement until political pressure and public opinion forced the Pentagon to reevaluate fielding MRAPs in large numbers.

The JTF is based upon current doctrine, the scenario, and forces currently available. The command and control and organization of the JTF explains the need for service and functional components as well as the effectiveness of dual-hatting in certain situations, and where it could add additional confusion in other situations. It also explains the multinational, civil-military, SOF, command

Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff signs JSCP which translates strategic policy derived from

The Army’s Strategic Goal is to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with forces prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (United States, 2014)

All operations require a shared understanding among the commander, staff, and subordinates. In order to develop a shared