Second Battalion Case Study

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

James R. McDonough sets a spectacular example of what it is to be a second lieutenant in the United States Army and what it is truly like to lead a group of enlisted soldiers for the first time. Lieutenant McDonough, a graduate of West Point, was deployed as a platoon leader in a small fort with the mission of holding a Vietnamese village out of the hands of the Viet Cong. When he arrived, Lieutenant McDonough discovered that the former Lieutenant and platoon leader of the 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) hardly ever left his

The initial airborne drops caught the Germans totally by surprise, and there was little resistance. MG Urquhart, later wrote that “ever since the first landing, General Bittrich commander of the II SS Panzer Corps and his staff had expected the British second lift.'' He also wrote that the Germans had provided early

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

The battle was fought between German Army and the Soviet Army. The Soviet Army outnumbers the Germans. The Soviet Army had 2,500,000 soldiers, 7,500 aircrafts, and 6,250 tanks. On the other hand the Germans didn’t have as much help as the Soviet Army did. The Germans had 1,000,000 solders, 2,200 aircraft, and 1,500 tanks. Both Army’s had their own commanders. The Soviet Army commander was Georgy Zhukov but there were commanders under him such as Vasily Chuikov and Ivan Konev. On the German side their commander was Adolf Hitler and the commander under him was Gotthand Heinrici and Helmuth Reymann. Heinrici was one of Germany’s premier defensive generals that was elected

Sadly, their weapons did not have the ability to cut all the wire and destroy deep German trenches or knock out all enemy guns. It also could not provide a useful bombardment for the infantry attack. On July 1, the artillery drifted away from the German front trenches and left the infantry unattended. Nobody was

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

It was General Bragg’s lack of confidence, previous performances, and relationships with his subordinate commanders that ultimately caused the battle plan to not be executed correctly. Bragg was unable to successfully implement the first principle of mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust. He also had a history of not utilizing the sixth principle of mission command: take prudent risk. Bragg’s lack of competence regarding these two mission command principles ultimately set conditions for a poor mission command climate within General Bragg’s unit. Bragg’s sub-commanders, Generals Hindman, Buckner, Polk, Longstreet, and Hill were all skeptical of Bragg’s leadership and battle plans from his previous campaign at Chattanooga, where he retreated from the city. Bragg was well known for retreating at the first Battle of Chattanooga, and also for predictably employing frontal assault offensive tactics. His history of predictable plans, retreats, and inability to take prudent risk, caused his subordinate leaders to lose trust in his ability to plan and lead his army. One of Bragg’s sub-commanders, General Hill, stated

Lt Col Wise described as he received several reports of the Marine successes in the battle as reports of objectives gained came in. Also several German prisoners were taken. The Germans put up a good fight with their machine guns but as Capt. Wass, one of Wise’s officers said,

For seven days, the Battle of Elsenborn Ridge was valorously held by the artillery forces and Infantry forces of the United States Army. (Starmann R. , 2015). This battle was the greatest crushing victory of the Ardennes valley and is the only part of the Battle of the Bulge line where the Germans failed to advance. (Starmann R. , 2015). From this ridge, the United States forces were extremely trenched in. They used the few days leading up to this battle to maneuver more units to the ridge to help protect the Germans from securing the two villages. These villages were critical to the Germans because without them they would not be able to resupply

On August 7 allied forces begonia moving from their positions, Canadian and British from Canen, moving south and the Americans from Avranches, moving north. German leadership realized that their army was being encircled and that the only route of egress was through the towns of Chambois and Argentan. The German forces fought hard to keep this gap open and evade encirclement, if they could not maintain a possible escape route the only choice would be to fight and die. General Bradley, after studying the map and movements of ground troops noticed a gap that would allow German forces to elude the allied advance. In order to close the gap General Bradley need to act swiftly to prevent the German army form escaping the pocket, he issued orders to General Patton; “strong elements of Patton’s Third Army turned north at Le Mans and moved aggressively toward the city of Alençon, they could link up with the Canadians and British, who were attacking south toward Falaise. This would block all the roads out of Normandy and trap Army Group B”. If General Bradley’s plan would work he saw it as “ a once-in-a-century opportunity

secondly, On the first day, Germans had 12000 casualties, Britain and France had a total of 64000 casualties. Britain and France lost many men that made it harder for them to attack whereas Germans couldn't afford to lose many men so they

On 17 December, 1944, five German divisions were able to push through the VIII Corps’ defensive line 100 miles east of Bastogne nullifying

The operation lasted nine day, in which Allied forces fought the German forces in and around the city of Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Eindhoven. Allied ground forces failed to advance and support the