Section 482 of Crpc and Powers of Quashing of Fir

Sub-sec. (2) of S. 438 enables the High Court or Court of Session, while granting anticipatory bail to impose conditions as enumerated in the section.

The doctrine of judicial independence rests on three concepts. The first one is the security of tenure of office which is supposed to guarantee judicial officers freedom from the interferences by the parliament or the executive. The doctrine requires

The Australian Constitution is a rich amalgam of various classical political principles. The concepts of the Rule of Law and the doctrine of the Separation of Powers evident in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws are both salient examples of political theses that are central to Australian Constitutional Law. The structure of the Constitution itself and decisions of the High Court of Australia unequivocally validate the entrenchment of the doctrine separation of powers in the Commonwealth Constitution . In particular, the High Court has applied this with relative rigour with respect to the separation of judicial power. The separation of the judicial power is fundamentally critical to upholding the rule of law. The High Court in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs noted that “the separation of the judicial function…advances two constitutional objectives: the guarantee of liberty and, to that end, the independence of Chapter III judges” . Kitto J in R v Davidson also identified that the judiciary should be subject to no other authority but the law itself . This is a critical aspect ensuring the concept of legal equality is upheld. Therefore, its role clearly extends to providing checks and balances on the exercise of power by the legislative and executive arms of government . This ensures the liberty of the law and limits the abuse of the judicial system. Judicial Power is defined as “the power which every sovereign must of necessity have to decide between its subjects

64: Original jurisdiction which means it can try all cases dealing with such subjects as:

There have been many complaints and theories of how the Supreme Court has a tendency to act as a "supra-legislature" (Woll 153). It is proposed that the Supreme Court takes the

Article III also says that the Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to "such Exceptions and . . . Regulations as the Congress shall make." No such provision is made with respect to the Court's original jurisdiction. The Constitution thus implicitly suggests that, in contrast, the Court's original jurisdiction is not subject to congressional regulation.

According to Article III, the determinations of the Supreme Court are constitutionally fixed as the land’s superior law. This makes it seem like the Supreme Court wields its own power.

The Court found that Congress does not have the authority to expand the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specifically given it in Article III. The last question centers on whether the Supreme Court as the original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. The Court decided that it did not have this jurisdiction. In order to issue a writ of mandamus, the Court may only exercise appellate jurisdiction in an existing case.

xiii) Influence of EU ensures that altering UK constitution is hard – cannot be incompatible

first look at the validity of the court and of the entity of authority itself.

Lower courts now have the ability to hear cases. This authority, known as jurisdiction, was granted to them by the Supreme Court. Jurisdiction also refers to the territory that a court can exercise its power. This factor also determines its other definition, the ability of a court to hear a case (Legal Information Institute, 2015). There are two components of jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction. Both elements are mandatory for a court to preside over a particular case. This essay defines the two elements giving the requirements of personal jurisdiction in a federal court and further explains the three different types of personal jurisdiction.

The power to strike down Acts of Parliament is defined as the power to declare legislation invalid because it is unconstitutional. This paper will critically assess sections 3 and 4 of the HRA 1998 by defining them, reviewing case law surrounding their use, and by evaluating the powers that they give to the judiciary. By doing so, it will demonstrate that section 3 gives judges powers that are not significantly different from the power to strike down Acts of Parliament, whereas section 4 does not.

Some judges in their obiter dicta have declared their inclination to disregard the Parliament’s legislative objectives, and therefore limit parliamentary sovereignty if the rule of law is vulnerable or if the circumstances demand “a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism” . They have also suggested that, while the British Constitution is dominated by parliamentary sovereignty, “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based” . This represents a possibility of stretching the dominance of the rule of law in constitutional law so that it becomes more powerful than parliamentary sovereignty in the British Constitution .

A bench of the Supreme Court has in Bankura Municipality v. Lalji Raja and Sons[2] held that:

One of the well-established and widely recognized sinews of the extraordinary residual power of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is the power to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding.