The first day, I was assigned to 3rd watch and I was assigned to P.O. Wasilewski. The first task that was given to us was lower the flags half mass for in memory of the 4 Marines who were killed in Tennessee at the recruiting station. After, we went off to patrol P.O. Wasilewski’s beat. Later in the day, we were called in by the Sergeant for assistance. As P.O. Wasilewski was assisting the Sergeant, Division Chief Bembenek called me over to tell me about a case he was involved in. The case was about a Child abduction where D.C. Bembenek, a P.O. at the time, almost lost because he wasn’t specific on what type of confirmation was given when identifying
Among these leaders was Bravo Company’s 1st platoon’s SFC Robert Gallagher. The platoon endured terrible living conditions including no running water and filthy living space. These inadequate living conditions must be met with some relaxation on the standards they were expected to follow. Company leadership viewed this as a bribe to keep the soldiers in high spirits. In reality, they set the stage for the erosion of the morals the enlisted soldiers are supposed to possess. While the morals were being chipped away, so was the original plan the battalion had hoped to follow. Fragmentation orders became a pseudo-standard for the boys of Bravo Company. What had originally started as short-term overnight patrol bases turned into fortified traffic control points with the exception of any form of fortification other than in notion only. Despite the fact that platoon-level leadership requested for supplies they were repeatedly turned down. A major breakdown in the communication between the leadership created a loss in faith in the higher leadership for the lower-enlisted soldiers on the ground. Very soon into deployment, Bravo Company began to experience contact with unseen enemy forces. The enemy was able to engage and plant IED’s and cause casualties while remaining elusive. After the first few casualties within the company, the mission to start set up traffic control points was to begin. While conducting patrols down the road time and time
This unit was practicing improper procedures for their soldiers were drinking, doing drugs, and visiting local brothels. From a tactical stand point the 48th infantry was no better in this aspect either. The patrols they conducted were inadequate and performed far from often. The area supposed to be under their control became dangerous because the insurgents moving in the area were virtually unchallenged. This was no feat for the 101st and 1st platoon because the 101st is a tactically sound unit that could establish control and a presence in the area but for soldiers that had to do so upon arrival when it was supposed to be maintained is not necessarily a good thing. The company commander of bravo, Cpt. Goodwin decided the best way to take back control of their area of operations is to have a three station cycle for his company. Each platoon would have a twenty-one day rotation at a different location carrying out a different task. The three tasks were to set up TCP on a main roads, set up a FOB and be the quick reaction force for the other platoons, and the third task was to patrol the city as per guidance from higher. The least liked job was manning the TCP’s. The soldiers did not like this job because they knew soldiers sitting in the open made for easy targets. The task of patrolling was no easy feat either, as stated earlier the previous unit left the city in poor conditions. The roads were filled with
-Exemplary Supervisor. Petty Officer Brickhouse led, trained, and qualified eight personnel in daily watch routine requirements. He maintained custody of 18 Electronic Key Management System line items during watch to watch turnover with zero discrepancies. Additionally, he earned the Enlisted Information Dominance Warfare Specialist designation and conducted training for three Sailors in Maintenance, Material, and Management (3M).
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Officer Timothy Oddsen was denied his first and Fifth Amendment’s rights, which is for one a violation of the amendment constitutional right. Although, Officer Oddsen broke the law he still have constitutional rights. By depriving officer oddsen for food was in humane. Officer Gail Quade was denied medical attention. Although officer Quade eas accused of provided false information about the unauthorized party at the police academy for wrong and a violation of code of conduct and I am sure of departmental policy.
On Wednesday 07/26/17 at 1306 hours I heard Officer D. Jones state via the radio a male had just possibly broken into a vehicle near 602 Auburn Way N. Officer Jones stated he detained the male on 6th ST NE just east of Auburn Way N.
We had a wounded soldier, but no one was killed. We continued to work with EOD from different services for the rest of the deployment. My gunner recovered from his wounds, but never returned to Iraq. I continued to take the lead of the section regardless of my vehicle being hit. SSG Thomas couldn’t deal with being on patrol so they moved him to S-3. The soldiers were relieved when SSG Thomas was moved to S-3. SFC Lackey seemed bothered be the fact that a Sergeant lead out and not the SSG that he had designated as point man. That is why he removed SSG Thomas from the platoon. In place of SSG Thomas, he got another SSG from S-3 that wanted to be out on
Candidate Martinez began the SULE I evaluation with a standard five paragraph order. Although it was a standard brief, SNC failed to give an adequate mission and execution paragraphs. The statements were disjointed and confusing and were briefed without confidence. SNC was briefed that the mission was to get the map found at the weapons cache and brought back to MA2A IOT have S2 Intel look at it. Candidate Martinez was given the map and reminded that it was part of the mission and not to forget it. SNC started the execution without the map, ultimately failing the mission. During execution Candidate had little regard for the tactical situation as demonstrated with little to no communication for formations at danger areas or dispersion.
ATZT-NCM-B 02 April 2016 MEMORANDUM THRU Military Police Advanced Leaders Course (ATZT-NCM-B) 1400 MSCOE Loop, Suite 316, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 For Commander of the 984th Military Police Company (AFVP-CDR) 1140 Ellis Street, Fort Carson, CO 80913 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of SGT Horton 1. References: a. AR 600-8-19 (Enlisted Promotions And Reductions) 18 December 2015 b. FM 7-22
SNC delivered a complete five paragraph order addressing all required paragraphs. SNC stumbled over SNC’s own words at several times during the order but conveyed the majority of the information in an acceptable manner. SNC’s confidence was lacking during the delivery of the order which was evidenced by SNC’s lack of eye contact and unassertive tone. SNC asked the subordinates questions at the end of the order to ensure understanding. SNC briefed an initial plan. When SNC’s fire team received enemy contact SNC froze for several seconds before delivering the ADDRAC. SNC’s hesitation illustrated a weak ability to make decisions in a timely manner. SNC did not control the fire team during contact, rather the fire team moved on its own and
1. 548th CSSB currently has two delinquent NCOERs for the following individuals: a. MISKEL, ANTHONY K., 1SG, XXX-XX-9999, B Co, 548th CSSB b. FRIENDS, TERRY L., SSG, XXX-XX-0000, HHC, 548th CSSB 2. The previous NCOER NCOIC departed unexpectedly two months ago due to a compassionate reassignement, and he was out the majority of the previous sixty days prior to his departure due to medical and personal issues. As such, the corrections the battalion CSM required on the NCOERs were not done and the NCOERs were not processed in a timely fashion.
The simplest example covered we will next discuss someone who willingly and neglectfully failed to report. Same scenario in the basics but this time SPC Snuffy has no valid reason. His non commissioned officer will have to drive to his house. Upon waking SPC Snuffy’s wife he learns that SPC Snuffy went out for a guys night out and did not return. First the non commissioned officer will have to call his platoon sergeant and keep his entire non commissioned support channel informed. His platoon sergeant has the option to enlist the help of other soldiers in the platoon or talk with the other platoons sergeants to see if anyone has the information. After checking with the other soldiers within the section his non commissioned officer finds out that SPC Snuffy went out with a few soldiers from another company. His options are to go to that unit and find someone who can help him locate the soldiers that went out the night prior with SPC Snuffy. After devoting his entire morning to this task, his non commissioned officer learned that one of the other soldiers in the other company had also failed to report. After seeing the training room NCOIC and getting the squad leaders contact information the two squad leaders set a link up point. The second soldier’s non commissioned officer was not available to find his
SNC briefed an above average five paragraph order. SNC correctly plotted and calculated the azimuth and distance to his objective. All of SNC’s order was very detailed with important information pertaining to his mission. SNC was able to speak quickly and give a complete order. However, as he was being briefed by the evaluator, SNC asked permission if he could go in a certain route; the evaluator denied his request and told SNC to stay on mission. During the execution of his mission, SNC was clearly in charge. However, SNC seemed frustrated when he could not get the attention of his team leaders and would make an excessive amount of noise to gain their attention. As they were on the move, SNC gave the order to go in the opposite direction