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Compare And Contrast Mills And Shelby

Decent Essays

Here is where Mills and Shelby primarily differ: their conception of ideal theory and its relationship to non-ideal theory. Shelby views non-ideal and ideal as not completely independent fields; rather they are “complementary components of a single comprehensive theory of social justice” (“Racial Realities” 153). As such, he thinks you can transition from one to the other, using ideal in non-ideal (insofar as ideal is necessary for non-ideal). He sees ideal as a standard for judging oppression and injustice. From there, “non-ideal theory specifies and justifies the principles that should guide our responses to such deviations from ideal justice” (“Racial Realities” 154). This belief at least explains why Shelby thinks the principle of FEO can …show more content…

Even if it could, Shelby should be advocating the use of BL over FEO since it is lexically prior according to Rawls. Taking one principle from the middle of the chain and extrapolating it beyond the apparatus defies the Rawlsian framework. Shelby’s response to this obvious violation is a bit surprising: he assumes basic liberties are already in place. “This principle [FEO], were it to be institutionally realized in a well-ordered society in which the basic liberties were secure and their fair value guaranteed, would mitigate, if not correct, these race-based disadvantages” (“Race and Social Justice” 1711, my emphasis). The problem here is that we do not exactly live in a well-ordered society where everyone’s basic liberties are secure. Obvious examples include impediments to transgender bathroom access, gay marriage (pre-2015, which was still after this piece was written), and abortion. Or rather, in terms of race, we live in a society with a history of racial injustice. Even if black people are granted basic liberties today, the foundation is plagued by violations, which impact the current distribution (of, let’s say, property). Mills’ point is that “the correction of BL violations would seem—by the very lexical priority relations both authors emphasize—to need to be dealt with first, even before we get to the question of the applicability of …show more content…

Instead, it should be framed as a violation of equal personhood – BL – and not just socioeconomic position (Mills 20). There is a major difference in the moral weight of discrimination based on a feature of identity like social assets and oppression based on (historical) discrimination based on a feature of identity like race. Mills puts this distinction nicely: it comes down to being disadvantaged versus being barred (20). Socioeconomic status is achieved; race is ascribed. Hence why racial subordination is more universally opposed than Rawls’ version of unfairness relating to the distribution of natural and social assets . For all these reasons we ought not to focus on correcting racial injustice – a violation of equal personhood - through a mechanism meant to correct class

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