Shifting Constellations Model

Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show.

On January 17, 1961 President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his farewell address to the nation, his final public speech as President of the United States. As such it was his last opportunity to address the nation, on any subject of his choice, with the authority, prestige and preeminence that comes with the office of President of the United States. His choice, what he termed the Military Industrial Complex, was perhaps something that at the time did not register in the mind of the average American as a priority when placed along the topics of the Communism, the Cold War and nuclear war. Yet, as it turns out the issue regarding the Military Industrial Complex and Eisenhower's warnings about it have outlasted the fears of the mid 20th century.

There are people who suggest that President Eisenhower was “cautious in . . . international affairs.” Assess the validity of this statement in regard to policies toward Korea, Vietnam, the Suez Crisis, Iran, Israel, and the Soviet Union.

President of the United States from 1953- 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower contributed greatly to the American society through his foreign policy. Eisenhower’s foreign policy allowed for him and the United States to get involved and associate themselves with other countries. These associations became good and bad; beneficial and damaging. In addition, many of these foreign affairs became crucial to America and its future occurring events. Some of these affairs include: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Domino Theory, Massive Retaliation, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Each of these policy had their own impact on the nation, as well as their own responses.

It was Nixon’s hope that by attacking the reporting of the war it would make him appear more credible, especially when the Gallup Poll indicated that “almost two-thirds of Americans doubted that he was being candid with them about the Vietnam War” (Pach 560). Unfortunately for the Administration this did little to change public opinion about the war (Pach

This doctrine stated it would give aid to Turkey and Greece who were struggling to stay afloat and away from the Soviet Union’s ideals of communism. After the Truman Doctrine, a 66 page top-secret document was presented to Truman known as NSC-68. The document supported an increase in the military budget of the United States and the development of a hydrogen bomb. This example shows how Americans are not backing down from engagement with other countries. The continued willingness to be violent and aggressive which goes against Wilson’s original aims for the

The changing of national interest influences the presidential power, as well as the congressional power. Research shows that presidential powers are particularly strong when the nation in crisis, while the Congress either choose to stand for the president or yield their powers to the presidency. President Truman agreed with UN security council’s decision to lead the operation of aiding South Korea. This decision was not approved by the Congress but made by self-stretched presidential power. He argued that it was not an act of war, but merely a “police action” in support of U.S. allies (Kaufman,2014). The Same example also goes for President Kennedy, who authorized the “bay of pigs” incident targeting Fidel Castro in Cuba, without prior consulting with the Congress (“Bay,” n.d.). President Johnson, who became president as former vice president with deep connections in Congress, recognized the importance of seeking support from Congress. Believing in the Domino theory and worrying the spread of communism, President Johnson had been hostile to the North Vietnam. In August, he claimed that “two U.S. destroyers were allegedly fired on in the Gulf of Tonkin (Kaufman,2014)”. On August 7,1962, the Congress passed a joint resolution, called the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as Johnson requested, which states, “The Congress approves and supports the determination of the

President Eisenhower is willingly threatening to use nuclear war to maintain peace. This policy came to be called massive retaliation. This new policy enabled Eisenhower to cut military spending from $50 billion to $34 billion. This can worry many Americans about the well-being of their nation. However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the dominant figure in the nation’s foreign policy, strongly defended his approach. He thinks you should have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Taking strong action when needed is best instead of walking away from it.

In class, we discussed the Iran-Contra Affair involving Ronald Reagan. However, we did not go in depth about public opinion, George H.W. Bush’s involvement, or how people feel about it today. This paper will seek to continue this topic. For example, the Iran-Contra polls showed that most Americans did not believe Regan’s cover stories, yet there was never a push for him to pay the political price, which would ultimately have been impeachment. Thus this paper will further attempt to understand the mindset of people that allowed these events to occur with little penalty.

Even with the approval of congress towards the Tonkin Gulf incident showed a “misuse of power” (Rotter, 77). When Dante B. Fascell said “The president needed authority. Who cared about the facts of the so-called incident that would trigger this authority? So the resolution was just hammered right on through by everyone” (Young, 120); this recollection makes it appear as through the Tonkin Gulf incident decision was not well-informed. The resolution was the issue of Johnson’s authority and the potential that offensive measures in South Vietnam could lead to a third world war (Young, 121). Another example that Americanization was unwise and not well-informed was Johnson ignoring the George Ball about better solutions to help America leave the war. Once again it is the issue with Johnson’s authority, he constantly ignores other possibilities of leaving Vietnam. At the end the Johnson administration would choose three tactics: bombing the North, intensify the war in the South using U.S. troops, and concentration on pacification of the

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. federal government took several actions both at home and abroad that many Americans didn’t always feel were justified, and didn’t agree with.

“Congress is not a good position to contend efficiently with the President in the formation of US foreign policy. Congress is more oriented towards domestic than foreign affairs. All the 535 Members of the Congress have much more narrowly construed electoral basis and correspondingly restricted constituency interest. Whereas the President has a nationwide constituency, the outlook responsibility within Congress are fragmented. Unlike the executive division, where policy debates take place, the President, use the right of final option, constitution debates are publicly eliminating, with the final choices made to continue and nays, and with the decisions making diffuse” (Ali & Sabir, p. 155).

Since the Vietnam War, the public's opinion has played major roles in how policymakers operate. Their opinions may not always support to choices which are best for the country, however they are still factored into the decision making. Richard Sobel discusses several cases on how the public's attitudes have affected policymaker's decisions in his book, "The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam."

The Vietnam War is widely regarded as the lowest point in the history of U.S. foreign affairs. It mercilessly dragged an unwilling country on a fatal ride for twenty years, all while receiving low approval ratings and high funding. The Vietnam conflict served as an optimum environment for the virus of controversy. No one has more experience with controversy than Heinz Alfred Kissinger. He is the ultimate pragmatist, as embodying his philosophy of realpolitik, a diplomatic ideology based on utilitarianism rather than international ethical standards. When one’s political calling card downplays the role of ethics in diplomacy, that individual is bound to garner a high profile reputation. Kissinger himself has lamented the national predicament during this conflict—squeezed between the ultimate rock, his duty to keep peace, and hard place, his duty to act with the approval of the American people. This predicament was rooted in an omnipresent opposition to Communism, as was America’s role in the entire Cold War. Cold War politics were politics of fear. That fear drove competition, which bred a certain variety of leader – a logical, calculating politician with regard for nothing but his country’s success. To avoid an uncontrollable spread of Communism through the westernized world, some moral casualties were strewn about the wayside. However, the American public had no trouble rolling up their collective sleeves to back this forward-thinking activist. In more recent years, some

This span of time allows for the analysis of how a president changed throughout his presidency in terms of their decision making. Such an understanding is relevant because it can determine the strengths and weaknesses of a person in power that can either be exploited by political opponents or improved upon by future commander-in-chiefs to determine the overall effectiveness of the president. This topic was of interest because an analysis of the both of the events can present the way in which John F. Kennedy changed in relation to his foreign policy between 1961 to 1962.