Similarities Between Falsification And Structure Of Scientific Revolutions

We discover scientific knowledge in various natural science fields such as biology or chemistry. A common misconception about the natural sciences is that both the knowledge they reveal to us and the scientific method used in discovering this are purely analytical. This means that these sciences are rigid in facts and do not contain any subjectivity or creativity. However, the scientific method is not a rigid system of pursuing measurable facts. It contains fallacies and biases. In testing hypotheses, performing observations, or reasoning inductively, science is undoubtedly flawed and erroneous. Paradigms, commonly seen as infallible and containing rather insignificant errors, contribute to many of the errors involved in scientific

Scientific innovation, a newly introduced idea that everything has to be proven by science in order to be accurate , begun heading into the 20th century. Science led to confusion, uncertainty and unrest

Grinnell explains that when scientists make a discovery, they cannot claim it as a scientific fact until they have convinced the scientific community of its legitimacy; therefore, a discovery that has not entered the second conversation of Grinnell’s cyclical model is only a proto-scientific claim. This distinction is an extension of Grinnell’s argument regarding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Furthermore, when a scientist make a discovery, it is deemed as proto-scientific since its interpretation could have been influenced by the scientist’s subjective experience; however, once the scientific community inter-subjectively agrees on the legitimacy of the claim, it becomes scientific. Credibility is the process by which this transformation

What is Science? When it comes to the word ‘science’ most of the people have some kind of knowledge about science or when they think of it there is some kind of image related to it, a theory, scientific words or scientific research (Beyond Conservation, n.d.). Many different sorts of ideas float into an individual’s mind. Every individual has a different perception about science and how he/she perceives it. It illustrates that each person can identify science in some form. It indicates that the ‘science’ plays a vital role in our everyday lives (Lederman & Tobin, 2002). It seems that everyone can identify science but cannot differentiate it correctly from pseudo-science and non-science (Park, 1986). This essay will address the difference between science, non-science and pseudo-science. Then it will discuss possible responses to the question that what should we do when there is a clash between scientific explanation and non-scientific explanation. Then it will present a brief examination about the correct non-scientific explanation.

Science was born deeply intertwined within the Western cultural realm. It developed snuggly with ideas of European grandeur through the “grace and favor of Almighty God” (Lindqvist, pg.11). “The cultural conditioning these [scientists] had absorbed early in their careers influenced more than their writing: it skewed their research (Freedman). Coinciding with scientific inquiries of

In Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm cycle, normal science inevitably leads to an anomaly, which eventually leads into a crisis. If the current existing theory in the paradigm fails to solve the puzzles of normal science, it will eventually call for a new theory to take its place. Kuhn further expresses that, although, normal science holds the objective of creating boundaries and structure in the scientific community, and thus, suppressing ideas and findings outside of this structure, normal science is also a driving force of the creation of anomalies and an eventual paradigm shift. Scientists’ ultimate goal is to unravel the truth of the universe. Normal science and the existing paradigm are successful, in the beginning, in aiding and justifying scientific findings of that time. However, as experiments and research methods progress and advance with time, the polished version of the theories and concepts may start to conflict with the initial paradigm. It is the success of normal science, which is inevitable through time, that leads to an, thus, inevitable crisis. The increasing precision and improvement of understanding the paradigm, makes the paradigm an easier target to find

science is done, 4) importance of data and evidence we can measure, 5) the culture of science.

Science is often considered to be devoid of the human qualities that are attributed to other disciplines. Only objective views and claims are valid in scientific research, and as a result, many consider the field to be uninfluenced by the private judgments and beliefs of scientists. Despite its apparently neutral and impersonal character, however, science is ultimately advanced by people, not by isolated ideas. It is therefore subject to the vagaries of human nature, including personal predilections and interests that shape how people frame research questions, distribute resources, and interact with fellow scientists. In this way, bias can easily alter the course of scientific research, usually with negative effects.

Throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn goes over a common problem that often exists among science, the problem of relativity in conformation with Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm. Many viewed Kuhn’s reply to charges of relativism as mundane, and that his reply may be inadequate. I feel his reply is adequate in the sense that Kuhn accounts for the fact that different people may have different perceptions of reality and that competing viewpoints may both be valid. Kuhn argues that both the skeptic and the relativist are wrong. Potentially, it could be said that Kuhn does not feel that progress in the field of science is a relative concept. However mainly the argument is that Kuhn

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

In this essay I attempt to answer the following two questions: What is Karl Popper’s view of science? Do I feel that Thomas Kuhn makes important points against it? The two articles that I make reference to are "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper and "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" by Thomas Kuhn.

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

As people, we come with earlier knowledge and understandings on subjects and topics of study, “Science” being one of them. We make presumptions, based on either reasonable evidence or that our thoughts and ideas are known as true by others. Through this we have come to understand and define science as its aims, leaving its definition, whether consciously or unconsciously, unchallenged. We have taken advantage of the label that we have set for science, as well as its goals, and failed to look at them further.

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat

This book, ‘What is this Thing called Science?’ is assigned to write a review on the third edition which was published in the year 1999, 1st February by University of Queensland Press. This book is reflects up to date with day today’s contemporary trend and gives a basic introduction on the philosophy of science. This is a very comprehensive book explaining the nature of science and its historical development. It is very informative and a necessary reference when attempting to understand the how science has evolved throughout time. The book is also well organized, and each chapter is concluded with suggestions for further reading. This book is actually a review on the philosophy of science.