Sixty Acres In Etowah County, Evelyn Ellis V.

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

In order to interpret the law concerning Sheriffs and the state of Alabama correctly, the court deferred the case to the Court of Appeals’ experts on interpreting Alabama’s law (Jett, Supra, at 738). The interpretation provided supported McMillian argument by providing that Sheriffs represents the State when acting in their law enforcement duty. Relevant parts of Alabama Code also supported this conclusion. Although such codes lack adequate jurisdiction to favor the

The defendant moved to suppress the cocaine and inculpatory statements in District Court. Suppression was granted as a fruit of the poisonous tree under the exclusionary rule. The Court of Appeals upheld the motion with the claim that private security officers were 'state actors'. The Supreme Court upheld that the

Patricia, the informant in the current situation, name is known, but in Benters it is not known. Patricia had a past relationship with Defendant, but the informant in Benters did not have a relationship with that case’s Defendant. Officer Whatney did not perform an illegal knock and talk, but the officers in Benters did. The informant in the current case, Patricia, has given reliable information in the past, and the informant in Benters has not. The officer in Benters searched around the property without a warrant, and Whatney did not. People were seen unloading boxes at Defendant’s property in the current situation, but there was no activity at Defendant’s property in Benters. Both Defendants owned the properties searched but did not live on them.

The trial court denied Harris’s motion to suppress evidence that was found when Officer Wheetley performed a search, and the court found that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s vehicle. The defendant entered a not guilty plea and appealed to the intermediate state court. The intermediate state court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision stating that Wheetley lacked probable cause. When the case was brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, they rejected and reversed the decision that the Florida Supreme court made, and they upheld the decision of the trial court.

The Court ruled in favor of the appellant, and the decision is described as follows:

Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.

Thus, the court determined that La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:961, 40:962 could have no application in the prosecution of a person for the mere status or condition that might possibly arise unintentionally or involuntary. The court dismissed defendant's appeal of the judgment that revoked the suspension of two concurrent 10-year sentences for violating the conditions of his probation.

Nature of Case: The District Court condemned Antoine Jones of previous drug crimes. The defendant asked for an appeal and then then it headed D.C. Circuit of Appeals which they ended up reversing the condemnation. They stated that the no warrant use of the GPS violated the fourth amendment. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused a rehearing en banc. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (review order of a higher court from previous court decision).

On Thursday, July 23, 2015, I attended a trial at the First Judicial Circuit for the State of Florida. This trial was held in the M C Blanchard Judicial Building in Escambia County. The judge presiding over the trial was the Honorable Linda Nobles, who is also the Chief Judge for the First Judicial Circuit. The prosecuting attorney was Assistant State Attorney (ASA) Tom Williams. The attorney for the defense was Public Defender (PD) Melissa Scarbrough. In this case, State of Florida v. Craig Jackson, the plaintiff is the State of Florida and the defendant is Craig Jackson.

In the in Boyd v. United States, considering the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as running "almost into each other" apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. . . . Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation

Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 53 (N.D. 1983)); Florida v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 414 (Fla. 2012) (discussing the difference between actual and constructive possession); Brent v. State, 957 N.E.2d 648, 648, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the defendant did not have actual or constructive possession of a bag of drugs located on the ground, beside a vehicle, that the defendant was in); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 690 S.E.2d 792, 794, 799 (Va. 2010) (holding that the evidence would have supported a charge of constructive possession of a firearm when the defendant/passenger stated that the gun located in the driver’s glovebox was his, but he was not charged with that crime); Martinez v. State, 152 P.3d 1237, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the defendant’s case must be reversed because he was not aware of the required mental state to plead guilty to constructive possession); Campbell v. People, 73 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the State must prove that the accused had actual or constructive possession of the drug); Washington v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 291 (Wash. 2002) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of drugs found in another person’s pocket under the accomplice liability theory); Sims v. Alabama, 733 So. 2d 926, 929 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs located under the driver’s seat of a vehicle he

What did the appellate court rule? Did it agree with the trial court (affirm) or disagree (reverse)?

Appellant contends that the district court erred in convicting her under the malicious-punishment statue as well as in ruling that the statute does not require proof of bodily harm. Accordingly, if proof of bodily harm is not required for conviction of malicious punishment, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

As a final argument on the RICO cause of action, the defendants argue that the