Smallpox Bioterrorism and Emergency Management Essay

Communication is essential between health care facilities and the CDC. For example, the facilities experience an emergency and follow certain quarantine protocols and alert the local public health department and the CDC. The CDC organizes secure transmission tactics to merge and notify public health officials at local, state, and federal levels. The institute deploys scientific and logistical proficiency, personnel, and vital medical resources to the area of the emergency. The CDC (2012) explains the implementation of the essential medical assets for protection of communities in the state of an emergency:

I feel that strong communication not only within your own county but from county to state has a lot to do with how things are gone about and dealt with. You have to have strong communication one with such a large issue that might be at hand and plus look at the amount of lives that you are taking care of. Everyone that is or gets involved throughout such a large issue such as anthrax needs to be in on “the know” about every little single detail that there is. Strong communication is what gets everyone through it and in a manner that is not hectic or chaotic. Granted there are those people that are going to be beyond beside their self because of what is happening but there should also be those people out there helping them calm down and letting them know that everything is going to be ok. It is sad to say but big events such as 9/11 bring people together and closer and makes us realize that it isn’t just about us there are other people involved and we need to be

Position 64001558 was assigned to the Evaluation and Analysis Unit within the BPR, and its duties and responsibilities are concentrated in non-nursing related areas of evaluation of public health and medical capabilities, development of risk and vulnerability assessments, and monitoring disaster preparedness tools such as the National Health Security Preparedness Index (NHSPI) and HSS Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Information Gateway (TRACEI). As a Government Operations Consultant III, position 64001558 will not provide nursing consultation to the Bureau and will not be involved in coordinating clinical resources for public health

Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf/ Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2002). Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents. Retrieved from http://ct2learn.com/els/resources/documents/managing-emergency-consequences-terrorist-incidents/ Newman, G.R. & Clarke, R.V. United States Department of Justice.

In reviewing the Institute of Medicine crisis standards of care report, “the committee concludes that there is an urgent and clear need for a single national set of guidance protocols for use during generalized crisis events”. Six recommendations were thought to be the basis of the standards developed.

One threat that smallpox poses, is the use of it in biological warfare. According to Colette Flight, "in the 1990s the public discovered that Russia planned to turn smallpox into an effective weapon".

Being a highly contagious, deadly and airborne virus, it would be virtually impossible to completely eradicate smallpox. Peter Jahrling, the scientist that discovered the deadly Ebola-Reston virus, once stated, “If you really believe there's a bioterrorist threat out there, then you can't get rid of smallpox. If smallpox is outlawed, only outlaws will have smallpox ( Preston 4).” To date, only Russia and the United States have clearance to maintain the smallpox virus in two selected laboratories. Enforced by the W.H.O, this was mandated to ensure that the virus cultures could be heavily monitored and researched to prevent future outbreaks. Unfortunately, the power that is associated with having access to a virus as devastating as smallpox is often interwoven with greed. For example, in 1991, British inspectors discovered that the Russian government had been testing bio-nuclear weapons using smallpox in an unauthorized base ( Preston 6). Since smallpox can be used as a powerful weapon, there is no way to determine what country may try to obtain it. Additionally, even if a country was highly suspected of testing the virus for warfare, it would be difficult to prove that the country actually had virus cultures. During that same inspection in Russia, for instance, the head of the base that was testing this virus denied any association with the

The smallpox bioterrorism attack was made more successful when the FBI did not inform the local authorities and health agencies of the potential for an attack. This lack of information caused a delay in the medical community being able to respond quickly and effectively by isolating those exposed and assessing an immediate vaccination plan. People who were infected at the venue went about their lives and would later expose many others to smallpox. Since hospitals were not informed about a potential large-scale smallpox exposure they were not aware to be cautious for any symptoms associated with smallpox. This caused the first few smallpox patients to be misdiagnosed patients with things such as the flu and dengue fever instead. This time lapse

The preparedness community has vastly changed since we first started working toward eradicating smallpox. They have made progressions in areas of communication plans, isolation and quarantine, environmental control, and checklist for different levels of government.

The authors highlight that the synchronized efforts of various offices are needed to accomplish this, and they also address the impact that cultural differences may cause between public health and emergency management regarding the overall success of these organizations. This main purpose of this article is to examine how public health and emergency management vary in their approach to laws and policies, and how these differences can negatively affect their preparedness to respond to critical situations. This study was accomplished by conducting 144 interviews with public health and emergency management officials on both the state and local level between the time frame of April 2008 and November 2009. The researchers then used qualitative analysis to compare and contrast the characteristics of each organization and their approach to legitimate public health preparedness. The resulting data was found to show two conflicting approaches to public health law. The public health approach was distinguished by perceived unpredictability with respect to legal power over the methods of preparedness planning, presumption of guidance on interpreting public health laws, and the extension of anxiety regarding the placing of liability. The emergency management approach was characterized by the impression of wide legal authority, flexible connotation of public health law, and moral concerns pertaining to the violation of an individual’s freedom and confidentiality. Botoseneanu, Wu, Wasserman, and Jacobson concluded that “Distinct interpretations of preparedness law impede effective collaboration for PH preparedness. Clarification of legal authority mandates, designation within laws of scope of preparedness activities and guidance on interpretation of current federal and state laws are needed.” (2010, p. 361). These results are clearly

As the Disaster Coordinator for the city I am responsible for ensuring the public safety and welfare of the citizens within the city's jurisdiction. This requires me to have a full understanding on my role and responsibilities for managing disaster response and employing resources in order to save lives, protect property, the environment. Additionally I’m tasked to preserve the less tangible but equally important social, economic and political structures. My first reaction was to alert the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force to prepare them for possible activation. Next it is vital to gain situational awareness and develop a Common Operating Picture (COP). This COP is the who, what, where, when and how as it relates to the incident. Situational awareness starts at the incident site and includes continuous monitoring of reporting channels to gain

Nevertheless, recent world events have raised concerns that smallpox could fall into the hands of questionable individuals or groups who might attempt to use the virus as a weapon. Publications from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reveal that the threat of smallpox being deliberately released by bioterrorists groups is presently considered as a possibility.

Terrorist incidents causes consequences that has an unimaginable and everlasting effect on emergency responders, citizens, communities, and countries. Emergency responders face terrorist incidents exposing them to chemical agents, biological agents, nuclear/radiological agents, explosive devices, or a combination of the agents. Some other risks emergency responders encounter with terrorist incidents are small explosive devices, suicide bombers, infrastructure attacks, and cyber terrorism (CT2Learn: Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents, July 2002). Emergency responders put their lives on the line for the citizens, communities,

In the Franklin Country disaster, major public health personnel, including the public health nurse clearly understood their role. Their immediate response was to focus on urgent life and safety issues. The public health department established an Incident Command System (ICS) that was designed to help organize it to respond to emergencies. The ICS provided a common language as well as the standardization necessary for communicating and cooperating with other agencies and the EOC. The public health group contributed at the EOC briefings updating on the public health concerns.

A group of scientists met at Andrew Air Force Base in last June to “run a computer stimulation exercise known as the Dark Winter.” In it, former government officials acted if they were struggling with a bio-terrorist attack using smallpox. In the scenario, “three shopping centres in Pennsylvania, Georgia and Oklahoma” were introduced to a smallpox virus. The first case was diagnosed in nine days. The “government” was unable to isolate the victims because small pox has an incubation period “between 7 and 17 days,” during which carriers of the virus spread infection to others. The infectious virus spread to such an extent that it was not enough vaccine for the affected areas.